A study of the computer manufacturing industry in the United States by Billings, Thomas Hadley & Hogan, Richard Claude
A STUDY OF THE COMPUTER MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES
by





1. JL A iLJJ k_
V" -
.
A STUDY OF THE COMPUTER MANUFACTURING






Tk<J> document hcu> bzen appnavnd ^oh. public Kt-
icajsz and &ati} i£t> dutsUbuution 16 untunltzd.
15

A Study of the Computer Manufacturing Industry
in the United States
by
Thomas Hadley Billings
Lieutenant Commander, Supply 'Corps , United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1959
and
Richard Claude Hogan
Lieutenant Commander,' Supply Corps, .United States Navy
B.A. , University of Mississippi, 1958
M.A. , Roosevelt University of Chicago, 1962
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of










A study of the origins and evolution of the computer manu-
facturing industry in the United S-cates, with emphasis on the
economic importance of its present structure and conduct. The
examination of supply and demand as determinants of the market
mechanism is presented in a classic outline of current economic
form for the market structure, conduct and performance of basic
industries. The analysis of demand utilizes the first pub-
lished government material on the computer industry. Derivation
of Lorenz curves for this new industry and its concentration
represent the first so produced. The synthesis of the manu-
facturers' performance is developed from the structure and
conduct. That performance is separately examined in reference
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The computer industry has been described as the major
growth industry of the 20th century. Economists predict that
by the year 2000, more persons will be employed in the data
processing and related industries than in any other single
business. The computer industry has drastically affected the
entire fabric of our society, and has significantly influenced
many other segments of American industry, ranging from pub-
lishing to insurance, transportation to retail trade.
The census takers reveal that in a brief span of twenty
years, the world wide total of U. S. computers has reached
90,000 systems, valued at $30 billion. One dramatic illus-
tration of the industry's growth is the rapid tempo of change
in associated technology. Calculations in Charles Babbage '
s
19th century analytical engine, involving the acceleration,
rotation and stopping of a cog-wheel, were performed on the
order of about one per second. Relays, utilizing a spring-
loaded switch, could be opened or closed in a millisecond.
Vacuum tubes, with no moveable parts at all, decreased this
time unit another thousandfold. Today, semiconductor elec-
tronics make use of components which can change state in a
nanosecond (i.e., one thousandth of a millionth of a second).
The purpose of this study is to examine an industry which
is currently in its early stages of growth. The origins and
1Nievergelt , J., "Computers and Computing - Past, Present,
Future," IEEE Spectrum , January 1968, p. 58.

evolution of the industry will be presented, with emphasis on
its present structure and conduct. Additionally, the effects
of public policy and government regulation on this "young
industry" will be analyzed. Finally, this case study adds
one more industry to the works of other authors covering the
organization of American industry.
Following this introduction, the thesis is organized into
three sections. The first section begins with a history
emphasizing the chronological relationships in the develop-
ment of the industry, examines the size and composition- of the
industry, and looks briefly at the international operations.
Sections III and IV examine the two major forces which mold
the architecture and character of the industry - market
mechanism and government regulation. Responding to the
influence of a competitive market, the natural interaction
of supply and demand tends to formulate the structure of an
industry, govern its conduct, and establish the prices. When
the market process goes astray, public justice demands that
the government intervene to control and regulate the industry
in keeping with federal antitrust policy.
The computer industry today consists of several distinct
sectors - computer manufacturers, component manufacturers,
service bureaus, time-sharing vendors, used computer brokers,
2
computer leasing companies, and software firms. Each of
these, sectors rightfully plays a significant role in the
overall industry, and while none has escaped the attention
2Sharpe, W. F. , The Economics of Computers , Columbia University
Press, 1969, p. 183.
10

of this study, the primary focus has been placed on the com-
puter manufacturing portion of the industry. One further
qualification is necessary. Although the production of
special purpose and analog computers , such as airbourne and
radar system computers, constitutes a significant part of
the business of computer manufacturers, this study will con-
cern itself solely with general-purpose digital computers.
11

II. THE EVOLUTION -
A. HISTORY
This section of the study will hopefully provide some in-
sight into the origins of the computer industry and its growth
and development into the giant of the American economy. An
attempt is made to look into several aspects of its develop-
ment such as early data processing methods, the birth of new
concepts, the breakthrough in technology, the people involved,
the laboratory work at universities and colleges, the early
partnerships and companies, the mergers and formation of
trusts, and the migration of scientists and technology from
one operation or company to another.
While compiling the history of the computer industry, the
authors di.scovered frequent inconsistencies among the various
sources of information with respect to the exact dates of
particular occurrences. The most reliable data, in the
authors' judgement, have been used in the main body of the
paper. For the interested reader, the inconsistent infor-
mation, where occurring, has been included in footnotes.
1. Data Processing - The Beginnings
The computer industry is a new industry only in the
sense that it involves a radical advance in technology.
Realistically, the electronic computer merely represents the
most recent improvement in the field of data processing (i.e.,
the recording and manipulation of data) , which had its begin-
ning in pre-historic days.
12

Recording techniques began with the earliest business-
man making scratches on rocks, notches on trees and marks on
mud walls. Improvements through the years led to the develop-
ment of the first commercial typewriter, the Remington No. 1,
in September 1873. The oldest surviving written records are
pictographic writings on clay tablets made by the ancient
Sumerians
,
predecessors of the Babalonians , during the period
3700 to 3000 B.S. 3
Computing devices had their beginning when primitive
man became aware of his inherent means of counting in the form
of his fingers and toes. Later, he learned to use pebbles or
grains of corn as counting devices. In about 3000 B.C., in
the Tigres-Euphrates Valley, someone designed a clay board
with grooves into which pebbles were placed, and counting was
performed by moving the pebbles from one side to the other.
The clay board was the predecessor to the abacus, which was
4invented in China about 2600 B.C.
Punched card machines had their origin in the 18th
century with the perforated-paper-operated weaving loom design
by Basil Bouchon in 1725, and a similar design by M. Falcon in
1728. The first successful loom application was achieved by
Joseph Marie Jacquard , in 1801, using a punched card design he
5
conceived in 1745.
3Arnold, R. R. , Hill, H. C. , and Nichols, A. V., Introducti on





. , p. 25.
13

The computer is merely a single machine (ultimately,
a system of machines) that performs the data processing
operations of several machines. The computer was not in-
vented, it evolved. It was "perceived as a possibility, and
its function imagined, but had to await the discovery and
development of new materials, miniaturization, the control of
power, new languages, a trained community of specialists, and
the application of a good deal of rroney".
A general purpose computer was first conceived in
principle in the 19th century, when Charles Babbage designee
his analytical engine. Babbage failed to influence history
merely because the only implementation of his design possible
at that time was mechanical, and a mechanical device of the
complexity of a computer was all but impossible to build and
7
maintain.
The principles conceived by Babbage were ultimately
realized in the world's first digital computer, the Mark I,
which was dedicated on August 7, 1944, and put into operation
in a basement at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
The fifteen years that followed saw the digital computer trans-
formed from the use of relays and rotating switches to vacuum
tubes and transformers, from electro-mechanical, delay-line,
and cathode-ray-tube storage to magnetic drum, tape, and core
storage, from input/output speeds of one to two dozen characters
8
6Rodgers, W. H. , Think - A Biography of the Watsons and IBM ,






per second to speeds of tens of thousands of characters per
second, from computation speeds of a few operations per second
gto tens of thousands of operations per second.
The era of electronic computers was initiated in 1946
by the University of Pennsylvania's ENIAC , built by Professors
Eckert and Mauchly for the U. S. Army.
2. The Generations
The period of development of the electronic computer
is generally divided into generations. However, the methods
of division and the resulting time periods of the generations
are the subject of some disagreement. Some say that the length
of each cycle is two times the length of the previous cycle
because of the mysterious "principle of binary powers".
Others separate the generations in terms of software (i.e.,
programming languages) or operation system developments.
Perhaps the most common approach is based on the evolution
of hardware (i.e., machine components) technology as follows:
1st generation - vacuum tubes, 2nd generation - transistors,
3rd generation - integrated circuits, 4th generation - batch
fabrication or large scale integration. A final analysis
of computer generations, called the cycle theory, tends to
9Serrell, R. , and others, "The Evolution of Computing Machines
and Systems," Proceedings of the IRE , May 1962, p. 1055-1056.
10Amdahl, G. M. and Amdahl, L. D. , "Fourth-generation Hard-
ware," Datamation , January 1967, p. 25-26.
11 T1 . ,Ibid.
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to incorporate features of the other three methods. According
to this theory, significant economic and technical transistions
occur in the industry every five years, resulting in the
appearance of a new generation and the beginning of a new
i 12cycle.
The first generation is generally accepted to be the
period from 1954 (first commercial installation of UNIVAC and
IBM 650) to 1959, and is characterized by vacuum tubes, slow
speeds, and limited memory capacity. The computer lines of
different manufacturers were isolated, unrelated, and designed
primarily for scientific application.
The second generation is considered to extend from
1959 to 1964, and experienced the introduction of solid state
components (i.e., transistors) on a large scale, and increased
speed and memory capacity. Manufacturers distinguished between
14their business and scientific oriented computers.
The third generation, 1965 and later, gave birth to
microelectronic circuits, faster main memory, greater memory
size, more flexible mass random-access memories, extensive
data communications equipment, various remote terminal devices,
and improved programming languages.
Differences of opinion exist regarding the emergence
of the fourth generation. Only two years ago, authors wrote
12McGovern, P. J., "The Computer Field and the IBM 360," Com-
puters and Automation , January 1967, p. 16-17.
Ibid
.




of "informed sources" declaring that; the third generation of
computers would have a life span of ten years as contrasted
with the previous generations of only five years each.
More recent authors believe that the industry has quietly
stepped into the fourth generation in 197 0. Changes were
judged to be subtle rather than profound, and consist of
differences of degree rather than kind. Those anticipating
a markedly distinctive breakthrough in technology will have
missed the beginning of this evolutionary vice revolutionary
17generation. Accordingly, with the announcement by IBM of
the System 370 in April of this year, some accepted the in-
creased speed and memory capacity as the fourth generation,
others were surprised by its premature arrival, and others
disappointedly asked, "Is that all there is?" Only in the
retrospect of future years, will one be able to judge more




The first adding machine, a stylus operated mechani-
cal device capable of performing addition and subtraction,
was designed and built by Blaise Pascal, age nineteen.
16Computer Yearbook and Directory ; 1968 , American Data Pro-
cessing Inc., p. 739.
17Bradburn, J. R. , "Where is the Computer Industry Heading?"





The concept of a calculating machine, the first device
that would multiply by repeated additions, was proposed by
19Gottfried Liebnitz.
1673
Liebnitz' calculating machine was completed, but it
20
never provad to be completely reliable.
1725
Basil Bouchon designed a weaving loom operated by
^ i 21perforated paper.
1728
M. Falcon designed a weaving loom, similar to Bouchon' s,
22
operated by perforated cards.
1745
A third design of a weaving loom was developed by
Frenchman, Joseph Marie Jacquard. Jacquard ' s design involved
a method for using holes in cards to control the selection of




; and Serrell, p. 1041.
20Bowden, B. V. , ed. , Faster Than Thought , Sir Isaac Pitman
and Sons, 195 3, p. 6.
21Arnold, p. 25.
22 Ibid .
23Davis, G. B. , An Introduction to Electronic Computers ,




A textile loom operated by punched cards was built
using the Jacquard design of 1745. This loom represented the
first successful application of the principles demonstrated
24by Jacquard, Bouchon and Falcon.
1811
Charles Babbage , a student at Trinity College in
Cambridge, conceived the design of an entirely mechanical
device, called the Difference Engine, to make calculations
25for logarithmic and trigonometric tables.
1820
The Arithmometer was designed and built by Charles X.
Thomas. It was the first machine capable of performing the
four basic arithmetic functions well enough for commerical
manufacture, but only a few were ever constructed.
1822
Babbage completed the construction of a small working
model of his Difference Engine. Referred to by others as
"Babbage' s folly," it utilized several of the principles of
27Jacquard 's punched cards. Babbage, true to his character,
immediately proposed building the largest Difference Engine
that ever might be needed. In the following year, he received
24
Serrell, p. 1041; and Arnold, p. 25.
25Moseley, M. , Irascible Genius, A Life of Charles Babbage





some limited financial backing for his Engine from the Royal
28Society, and began work.
1833
Babbage was encountering overwhelming difficulty in
the construction of his Difference Engine. His government
financing was coming to an end , and engineering technology
was simply not equal to the task of building a device as
29
complicated and precise as he had perceived.
Undaunted , Babbage conceived the design of the
Analytical Engine, for which he requested but was refused
30government support. He proceeded to work on this new
machine, using his own money, until his death in 1871.
Thousands of detailed drawings were produced, but only a few
31parts were ever completed.
Babbage ' s design of the Analytical Engine's stored
program was remarkably similar in concept to a modern com-
32puter. Ultimately, the Engine was to include all the
elements of a modern, general purpose, digital computer.
The design called for a memory of a thousand words of fifty
digits each held in counting wheels; control by Jacquard cards;
branching by skipping forward or backward a prescribed number
of cards; and random access to function tables, which were










stored on cards separately, by ringing a bell and displaying
the number of the card deck that the operator should load. 33
1873
The first commercial typewriter, the Remington No. 1,
was developed by Christopher Sholes
, and manufactured by E.
34Remington and Sons.
1884
A key-set, adding printing machine was designed by
35William S. Burroughs.
1887
A modern machine-readable punched card and related
card-processing equipment were designed by Herman Hollerith,
an employee with the Bureau of Census. The cards used 45
columns (later expanded to 80 columns) of rectangular holes.
The machines were used in the 1890 census to record, compile
and tabulate census data. Cards would be individually
positioned over mercury-filled cups. Rows of pins descended
onto the card surface, through the holes into the mercury,
and closed circuits which advanced the dials one position.
Fifty to seventy cards were processed per minute.
33 Serrell, p. 1042.
34Arnold, p. 19; and Sperry Rand Corporation, A History of









The Rand Ledger Company was organized by James Rand Sr.
1896
Hollerith left the Census Bureau to manufacture and




James Powers, another employee with the Bureau of
Census, designed some punched cards and card processing
machinery with slightly different features. Powers' cards
used 90 columns of round holes. His equipment was used in
39the 1910 census.
1910
Sperry Gyroscope Company was organized by Elmer
40Ambrose Sperry, inventor.
1911
The Monroe Calculator was introduced by Jay R. Monroe
The manufacturer used a design originating with Frank S.
« ia • 41Baldwin.
James Powers left the Census Bureau and established
42
















The Computing-Tabulating-Recording (CTR) Company was
organized by Charles R. Flint. The company resulted from a
merger of three companies (originally 13 companies) including
the Tabulating Machine Company of Herman Hollerith. The
founder, Charles Flint, was a munitions trader, organizer of
trusts, key figure in development of U. S. Rubber, gun runner,
43
and double agent in Latin American revolutions.
1913
E. Remington and Sons became Remington Typewriter
44Company.
Thomas J. Watson, Sales Manager of National Cash
Register Company was fired. He and thirty other members of
the "Cash 1 " had been convicted for restraint of trade and
maintaining a monopoly - the results of their overzealous
45pursuit oj. competitors.
1914
Thomas Watson was hired by Charles Flint as the
46General Manager of the C-T-R Company.
1915
Watson was elevated to President of the C-T-R Company,
following the appeals court set-aside of the antitrust con-
victions. Among other actions, he immediately set up a
Ibid
. ,




45Belden, T. G. and Belden, R. M. , The Lengthening Shadow -
The Life of Thomas J. Watson , Brown Little and Company, 1961,




product research department to improve the Hollerith machine
to compete with the technologically superior Powers Company
47product.




The C-T-R Company entered the Canadian market under
49the name of International Business Machines Company, Ltd.
1919
The C-T-R Company had moved far into the lead in the
'SOtabulating machine business.'
1924
The C-T-R Company adopted the name of International
Business Machines. Watson expressed his concept that the
entire world was the true territory of their international
51
company and its machines designed to serve business.
1925
A large scale analog computer was built by Dr.
Vannevar Bush and his associates at Massachusetts Institute





, p . 4
.
49International Business Machines, Highlights of IBM History ,







. , p. 83; and Arnold, p. 27; and IBM, p. 3.
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mechanical operation of limited accuracy, it marked the
beginning of the modern era of mechanical computation. 52
The Rand Ledger and the American Kardex Companies
merged to become the Rand Kardex Company. 53
1927
The Remington Typewriter and Rand Kardex Companies
merged to become Remington Rand, Inc.
Remington Rand, Inc. acquired the Powers Accounting
55Machine Company.
1933
The Sperry Gyroscope Company merged with several
other companies and became the Sperry Corporation. 56
1935
Dr. Bush and his associates at M.I.T. began the
development of a second, improved model of their analog
57
computer.
During these years, Thomas Watson was active in various
organizations and public affairs. He enjoyed a particularly
close association with Dr. Butler, the President of Columbia
University, and was ultimately made a trustee of the University.
52Bernstein, J. , The Analytical Engine, Computers - Past,










He made gifts of several tabulating machines to Dr. Wood at
Columbia. Due to the foresight of Dr. Wallace Eckert, who
was able to envision revolutionary uses for the machines
being used by Dr. Wood, the equipment was applied to the
study of astronomy and used to make lunar calculations. Eckert
proceeded to establish the Thomas J. Watson Astronomical Com-
puting Bureau, the second IBM operation at Columbia, using a
modified 601 multiplier. Many scientists were drawn to the
laboratories of Wood and Eckert at Columbia, and among them
was Dr. Howard Aiken, "who was to open other gates to the
computer age."
1939
Howard Aiken and his associates at Harvard, working
in conjunction with IBM engineers, began development of the
Automatic Sequence Controlled Calculator (Mark I). The Mark
I was the first machine to exploit the principles of the
analytical engine conceived by Babbage , and the first attempt
to combine various operations into a single device. It was
the immediate predecessor of the automatic electronic computer,
World War II
59
Dr. Wallace Eckert and IBM machines were used to speed
up the air assault on German submarines in the Atlantic. Action
against submarines had been experiencing delays in signaling
58Rodgers, p. 140-143
59 Sharpe, p. 185; and Arnold, p. 28; and Davis, p. 6, 9.
26

for help while obtaining a navigational fix. The manual cal-
culations required after the sextant readings were entirely
too slow. Dr. Eckert was ordered to the Naval Observatory,
Washington, where he calculated, from the available tables
whose accuracy had been confirmed by IBM equipment at
Columbia, nautical almanacs for air and sea navigation.
These printed calculations, the first scientific computer
output in the world, enabled loss of life and tonnage in the
North Atlantic to be diminished within a matter of weeks. 60
1942
The second model of Bush's analog computer was com-
pleted, but the completion was kept secret until the end of
the war, since it was used extensively in the computation of
61artillery firing tables.
1943
Dr. J. Presper Eckert (no relation to Wallace Eckert
at Columbia) and Dr. John Mauchly and their co-workers at the
Moore School of Electrical Engineering at the University of
Pennsylvania began building the ENIAC (Electronic Numerical
Integrator and Computer) . The U. S. Army Ballistics Re-
search Laboratory at Aberdeen, Maryland, with the help of the




62Rosen, S. , "Electronic Computers: A Historical Survey,"
Computing Surveys , March 1969, p. 7-8.
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computer, supplemented by a hundred or more girls doing
manual calculations, to produce artillery firing tables.
A young Army lieutenant, Herman H. Goldstein, had been sent
to Philadelphia to recruit more girls, where he happened to
read a report written by Eckert and Mauchly in the previous
year describing a revolutionary computer design. Recognizing
the value of a computer in solving the firing tables problem
and possibly shortening the war, he persuaded his Army bosses
to provide financial support, and the building of the ENIAC
63began.
Dr. John von Neumann served as consultant on the
design and building of the ENIAC - the first attempt to build
an all-electronic computer utilizing very high speed vacuum-
tube switching devices.
1944
The Mark I was completed, and put into operation in
the basement of Harvard's Cruft Laboratory in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. It was dedicated on August seventh, and
formally named the IBM Automatic Sequence Controlled Calcu-
lator. A huge electromechanical machine, 51 feet long and
eight feet high, it used standard IBM business machine parts,
65
and was controlled by punched paper tape. Although the use




65Serrell, p. 1043,- and Arnold, p. 28
28

dream of 1833 had finally been fulfilled. The designer,
Howard Aiken, commented, "If Babbage had lived seventy-five
67years later, I would have been out of a job."
Dr. John von Neumann developed the draft proposal for
the EDVAC (Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer)
,
Von Neumann 1 s work represented the first published concept
of a stored-program, general-purpose computer, and called for
the use of acoustic delay lines with mercury as the. trans-
mission medium. Since von Neumann's writings contained-
descriptions of much of the logic being developed by Eckert
and Mauchly at the University of Pennsylvania, many persons
believe that all three deserve credit as co-inventors of th2
stored-program, digital computer as we know it today.
1946
The ENIAC was completed. The world's first all-
electronic computer went into operation for the U. S. Army
at Aberdeen, Maryland, on February 15. (It was turned off
for the last time on October 2, 1955.) The ENIAC was un-
questionably the most complicated electronic device in the
world. Its successful functioning depended on the simultaneous
operation of 18,000 vacuum tubes. Stories were told that
during its construction, the lights in West Philadelphia
67 Bernstein, p. 52; and Rodgers , p. 177.




would dim whenever it was turned or. The behemoth weighed
almost thirty tons, and required 1500 square feet of floor
70
space. Its weaknesses were the limited storage and the
lack of a stored program. Thirty minutes to a full day were
required to do its set-up, and it had to be re-wired or read-
into as work progressed.
Almost immediately upon completion of the ENIAC
,
Professors Eckert and Mauchly began work on the EDVAC - von
Neumann's proposal of the previous year. The EDVAC was the
first stored-program computer to be started, a prototype of
serial computers, and the basis for the latter SEAC (1948) and
EDSAC (1949). 72
Von Neumann, in the meantime, with the help of his
associates at the Institute for Advanced Studies (I.A.S.) in
Princeton, New Jersey, began the development of the IAS
73Computer.
IBM began the development of the IBM 604 Electronic
74
Calculator, a general purpose digital computer.
Later in the year, Eckert and Mauchly left the
University of Pennsylvania to form their own computer manu-
facturing partnership. They began work on the BINAC, a small
69Rosen, p. 8.
70 Serrell, p. 1045.
71Arnold, p. 29; and Rodgers, p. 175-176.





binary computer, and the UNIVAC (Universal Automatic Computer)
75
under a contract from the National Bureau of Standards.
1947
Engineering Research Associates (E.R.A) was organized
by Captain Howard T. Engstrom and Lieutenant Commander William
Norris. Ihe nucleus of this young company consisted of a
group of Navy engineers, who had been actively engaged during
the war on communications research which led them into com-
puter technology. From that year until 1953, there were only
three major sources of computer expertise in the U. S. , the
E.R.A. , the Eckert-Mauchly group, and the scientists at the
76M.I.T. laboratory.
Professor Maurice Wilkes, at Cambridge University in
England, began building the EDSAC (Electronic Delay Storage
77Automatic Calculator) . Professor Wilkes had spent the
previous summer with the Eckert-Mauchly group at the Univer-
78
sity of Pennsylvania.
Under sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research and
the U. S. Air Force, the Servomechanisms Laboratory at M.I.T.
79began development of the Whirlwind I. A major contribution
of the Whirlwind project was an extensive set of detailed
75 Sharpe
, p. 186
76Wise, T. A., "Control Data's Magnificent Fumble," Fortune ,
April 1966, p. 166. Hereafter cited as "Fumble".
77 Sharpe, p. 186, gives the name as the "Electronic Discrete
Automatic Computer."
Rosen, p. 9.
79 Serrell, p. 1047.
31

logic diagrams, which though never published were widely
80
circulated and helped to educate early workers.
Eckert and Mauchly incorporated their partnership to
o i
become the Eckert and Mauchly Computer Corporation.
1948
IBM announced the completion of the Selective
Sequence Electronic Calculator. A3. though an improvement
over the Mark I, the machine was only partially electronic,
containing 13,000 vacuum tubes and 23,000 electro-mechanical
8
2
relays. Thomas Watson considered the computer as merely a
showcase for IBM engineering talent and a gift to the field
8 3
of science, but saw no commercial application. The machine
84
was put into operation at IBM's New York headquarters.
Raytheon Corporation's Dr. Richard Bloch
,
previously
the director of the Mark I project, began development of the
RAYDAC for the National Bureau of Standards. Slow production
resulted in contract cancellation. One RAYDAC was ultimately
85installed in 1952 at Point Mugu , California.
As a result of the cancelled contract with Raytheon,









Rosen, p. 15; and Pantages , Angeline, "Computings Early Years,"
Datamation
,
October 1967, p. 62. Hereafter cited as "Early
Years."

Standards began building the SEAC (Standards' Eastern Auto-
matic Computer)
.
The Bell Laboratories completed the development of
the transistor. Its later use (commercially in 1959) marked
87the beginning of the second generation-
IBM commenced delivery of the IBM 604 Electronic Cal-
culating Punch. A descendent of the IBM 603 Punched Card
Multiplier, the 604 contained over 1400 tubes, making
oo
electronic speeds available in punched card handling systems.
The 604 was often referred to as the Electronic Calculator.
89Over 4000 of these machines were ultimately produced. "
IBM began the development cf the CPC (Card Programmed
Calculator). The CPC descended from the connection, made for
Northrup Aviation, of an IBM 601 Multiplier (later a 603
Electronic Multiplier) to an IBM 405 Alphabetic Accounting
90Machine.
1949
The Eckert and Mauchly Computer Corporation completed
development of the BINAC. The BINAC was the first computer
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who gives credit for the original concept to Northrup in that
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Eckert and Mauchly visited the Watson Laboratory
seeking a contract of financial support to put the UNIVAC
on the market. Thomas Watson, believing that the greatest
market potential for computers was in scientific rather than
business applications, gave them the "brush off," indicating
92that "no reasonable interaction was possible."
Professor Wilkes at Cambridge completed construction
of the EDSAC , the first stored program computer to be com-
pleted. The EDVAC was the first stored program computer to
be started, but its progress was slowed considerably by the
departure of Eckert and Mauchly from the University of
93Pennsylvania.
IBM began the development of the IBM 650, an inter-
mediate size, vacuum-tube computer which became the workhorse
94
of the industry during the late 1950' s."'
1950
James Rand Jr. invited Eckert and Mauchly to Florida
to be wined and dined both ashore and aboard his yacht. Rand
acquired the corporation, operated it as the Eckert and Mauchly
Division of Remington Rand Inc., and financed the continued
development of UNIVAC. 9j
92Rodgers, p. 199; and "A Survey and Study of the Computer
Field," Computers and Automation, January 1963, p. 23.
Hereafter cited as "A Survey."
93Rosen, p. 9.
94Serrell, p. 1050.
95 Sharpe, p. 186; and Rodgers, p. 199; and Sperry , p. 8.
However, contrast Arnold, p. 30; and Davis, p. 10; who both
list the acquisition date as 1949.
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The National Bureau of Standards completed their SEAC
and SWAC (Standards' Eastern, and Western, Automatic Computer)
SEAC was the first stored program computer to be operated in
the U. S. Originally, mercury delay lines, and later, other
96
memory systems were utilized.
The EDVAC was completed at the Aberdeen Proving
97Ground, Mtiryland.
IBM began the development of the IBM 7 01 Data Pro-
98cessing System, originally called the Defense Calculator.
The Korean War brought about a great expansion in the
computer industry. During this period, the industry was
essentially non-commercial, and was supported by universities
and the government. It is possible that without the govern-
ment (and particularly the military) backing, there would be
99
no computer industry today.
1951
The Whirlwind I was completed and put into operation
in March. This was the first attempt to use the computer in
a command and control operation. The Whirlwind memory
consisted of electrostatic tubes developed at M.I.T., a
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The first UNIVAC went into operation in April at the
Census Bureau, and became a household word due to its role
in tabulating and forecasting election returns. Five other
machines were soon delivered to other government agencies.
The television publicity of the UNIVAC accomplishments shook
Thomas Watson and caused tremors throughout IBM. One of the
IBM men involved at that time commented that the news "...
frightened the pee out of the old man, who was convinced he
102had lost his grip."
1952
Remington Rand acquired the Engineering Research
Associates, and established it as a separate division
operating in parallel with the Ecke.rt and Mauchly Division.
E.R.A. had already developed the ERA 1101, the first com-
puter to use a magnetic drum memory.
The Computer Research Corporation introduced the
1 04CRC 102.
The IAS Computer, designed by von Neumann, and
financed by the U. S. Army Ordnance Corps, was completed at
105the Institute for Advanced Studies. The machine utilized
cathode-ray-tube storage and performed parallel binary
102Rodgers, p. 199.
103 Sharpe, p. 186-187.
104Ibid
. , p. 187.
1 05 Serrell, p. 1049.
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arithmetic. Several others of the same design have since
been built, including ORDVAC and ILLI7VC at the University
of Illinois, the MANIAC at Los Alamos, the WEIZAC at the
Weizman Institute in Israel, and one version built at the
Rand Corporation affectionately called the JOHNNIAC (over
U • 4- \ 106von Neumann s objections).
The Whirlwind I was converted to magnetic core memory.
It was the first computer to successfully incorporate the
107
coincident-current magnetic core.
IBM's first production computer, the IBM 701 Data
J
QO
Processing System was completed. The 701 utilized the
Williams' tube memory, magnetic drum with tape backup, random
109
access, and parallel binary arithmetic.
1953
The Electro-Data Corporation, originally the computer
division of Consolidated Engineering Corporation of Pasadena,
built the Datatron computer.
The Computer Research Corporation built the CADAC.
National Cash Register later acquired Computer Research, and
marketed its CADAC 102A and CADAC 102D. 111
IBM announced the IBM 702 - a business computer
112designed to compete with UNIVAC.
Rosen, p. 9.
Sharpe, p. 186.
108Rosen, p. 13; and Sharpe, p. 187; give the completion date
as 1953.
Serrell, p. 1050; and IBM , p. 5.
Rosen, p. 18.
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The UNIVAC was delivered to the General Electric
Appliance Park in Louisville, Kentucky, the first commercial
113
application of a stored program computer.
The first IBM 650 was installed. Ultimately, over 1000
] 14
of these systems were sold by IBM.
The IBM 702 was determined to be inadequate in several
respects and generally inferior to the UNIVAC. The company
announced the IBM 705 as its replacement and withdrew the7C2
from the market, although a few were delivered in the following
115year.
1955
Raytheon and Honeywell set up a firm to manufacture
the Datamatic 1000, a large scale machine. The new firm was
controlled 60% by Honeywell, 40% by Raytheon.
The Eckert and Mauchly Division and the E.R.A. Division
were combined into the UNIVAC Division of Remington Rand In-
corporated. The UNIVAC became the UNIVAC I, and the ERA 1103
became the UNIVAC Scientific Computer. Later, in June,
Remington Rand merged with the Sperry Corporation to become
Sperry Rand Corporation. The UNIVAC II, with magnetic core
, 117
memory was announced.
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IBM began delivery of the IBM 705 , a character-
oriented commercial data-processing computer utilizing a
magnetic-core memory. Many orders were received from UNIVAC
customers as UNIVAC II delivery was delayed. While many
argued that: the 705 was still inferior to the UNIVAC I, IBM
118
moved into the lead in the industry.
1956
IBM announced the building of the STRETCH computer
under contract from Los Alamos Research Laboratory. The
119STRETCH was known later as the IBM 7030.
IBM introduced its IBM 704, which was originally con-
ceived as a modification to the 701 incorporating the magnetic
core (IJ3M 701M) , but ended up sufficiently different to war-
rant redesignation. The 704 was ar. outstanding machine for
this period, and created a near monopoly for IBM in large
scale scientific computers. It featured a high speed magnetic
120
core, floating point arithmetic, and indexing operations.
Its only competitor in this field was the Sperry Rand 1103
series (originally the ERA 1103, then the UNIVAC Scientific),
which incorporated a magnetic core in the 1103A, added floating
point hardware in the 1103AF, and was the first computer with
an interrupt system. Although it was considered by many to be
Ibid









superior to the 704, late delivery and poor support led to
121loss of sales.
Burroughs purchased Electro-Data Corporation with its
Datatron computer which proved to be excellent competition to
122the IBM 650. Burroughs produced Electro-Data's small scale
machines, the E101 and E103. These machines were so small
that a British scientist, Dr. Wormsley, while visiting the
Burroughs Research Center, commented about a mountain that
123had labored to produce a mouse.
By mid-year, IBM, the leading computer manufacturer
despite UNIVAC' s early lead, had delivered 7 6 large machines
with orders for 193 more, while the UNIVAC division's figures
124
were 46 and 65 respectively.
Sperry Rand's UNIVAC Division contracted to build the
LARC (Livermore Automic Research Computer) for the Livermore
125Research Laboratory of the A.E.C.
RCA delivered the BISMAC, which though already out-
moded, proved to be an "interesting failure." It utilized a
small magnetic core backed by a magnetic drum, and as the
cost of magnetic cores was reduced , drum computers became
obsolete. The interesting feature of the BISMAC was the tape
system designed to completely eliminate mounting and dis-
mounting of tapes. Several hundred tapes permanently occupied
Rosen, p. 14.
122






their own low cost tape transports which were interconnected
126through a relay switching center.
1957
The Control Data Corporation was established by
"dropouts'' from the UNIVAC organization. The departing group
was headed by William Norris, now president and chairman, and
Seymour R. Cray, considered the leading computer developer in
the world. In almost no time at all, they had a computer
designed, ready for marketing, and their first order received
127(from the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey)
.
Equipment difficulty and financial problems forced
128the Underv.'ood Corporation to withdraw from the field.
Honeywell bought out Raytheon's interest (40%) in tie
Datamatic 1000, and operated the organization as a separate
division. Deliveries were too late and the cost too great,
however, to overtake the IBM 705. The computer was withdrawn
129from the market.
130Philco began production of the Philco 2000.
1958
The first IBM 709 was delivered. It featured an
advanced, internally buffered input/output system, but its
131
use of vacuum tubes made it already obsolete.
Ibid





p. 23; and Wareham, H. B. , IBM: Management as a
Molder of Corporate Success , Masters Thesis, George Washington









. , p. 15.
41

The first installation of the Burroughs 220 was made
132in December.
1959
The second generation of computers began. The trans-
istor effort got underway with the NCR 304, a joint NCR/GE
effort which proved to be too slow- the RCA 501, also slow
but with a COBOL compiler; the IBM 7070; the IBM 7080, built
to run the IBM 705 programs; the CDC 1604; the Honeywell 800;
and Burroughs' B5000 and B5500. Transistors also made possible
the rush to relatively small computers such as the IBM 1400
and IBM 1600, which were marketed by the thousands; the RCA
301 and CDC 160 which sold hundreds; the Burroughs 200 series;
the Honeywell 400 series; the GE 200 series; the NCR 300
133
series; and several others.
The IBM 705 was recognized as the standard in the
large scale data processing field, but its use of vacuum
l 34tubes made it extremely vunerable to competition.
Control Data announced the CDC 1604, its second
135generation entry, in October.
National Cash Register delivered its new generation
136
computer, the NCR 304, in November.
Dr. John Mauchly left Sperry Rand to set up Mauchly
137
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A UNIVAC Scientific Computer, the 1105, replaced the
UNIVAC I at the Census Bureau.. This machine featured buffered
input/output, but just as with the IBM 709, its vacuum tubes
made it obsolete. It was used, however, in the census of
I960. 138
The first two IBM 7090's, solid state systems, were
delivered in November to the Ballistic Missile Early Warning
System. The 7090's were an extremely successful computer.
Hundreds cf systems were sold at $3 million per copy. The
139
machine was later converted to the slightly faster IBM 7094.
RCA made the first installation of its second gener-
140
ation computer, the RCA 501, in December.
1960
The UNIVAC LARC was installed at Livermore. Another
was built and installed at the Navy's David Taylor Model Basin
at Cardercck, Maryland, near Washington, D. C. These computers
were classified as market failures, but did provide signifi-
141
cant stimulus to the industry from 1956 to 1959.
The Philco 2000 was delivered, but even prior to













The first installation of the UNIVAC Solid State
80/90, a medium- si zed data processing system, was made in
January. As evidence of the IBM influence in the market,
this UNIVAC's card equipment could be adapted to handle 80
.143
or 90 column cards.
Control Data delivered and installed its first CDC
1441604 in January.
After a three year development period, IBM installed
its relatively small sized computer, the IBM 1401, in
145September. The 1401 proved to be IMB's most popular-
146
computer. More than 10,000 were ultimately installed.
The first delivery of the Honeywell 800 was made in
December. The 800 was a general purpose system capable of
running eight distinct programs simultaneously without special
4- 4- • 147instructions.
Control Data began building the CDC 6600, a super com-
puter for the Livermore Laboratory of the A.E.C. The specifi-
cations called for a computer three times as powerful as the
STRETCH computer which IBM was building for the Los Alamos
148laboratory. Although CDC had received the contract and
commenced construction, the 6600 was not publically announced
until 1963.
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Dr. Daniel Slotnick, who was receiving almost no
financial support at Westinghouse for his work on a computer
called the SOLOMON, transferred his efforts to the University
of Illinois. With financial support from ARPA (Advanced
Research Projects Agency) of the Department of Defense, he
began the development of a computer, similar in concept to
the SOLOMON, called the ILLIAC IV. The ILLIAC employed a
149highly controversial parallel processor approach.
Sperry Rand introduced the UNIVAC III, but it was too
150
expensive for the medium priced field. .
1961
The Bendix G-20 was delivered and installed at the
Humble Research Center, Houston, Texas. The G-20 contained
tubes as well as diodes and transistors, and was used for oil
reserve studies involving solutions of problems requiring
151
eight to ten billion arithmetic operations.
IEM began the design of its System 360 with the ulti-
mate goal of complete standardization and compatibility within
IBM of all codes, modes, and units. Preliminary design and
engineering of the 360 were conducted under tight security.
152
Public announcement of the new system was withheld until 1964.
149
Ibid






IBM's STRETCH computer was delivered to Los Alamos,
but failed to perform at advertised speeds. It was so dis-
appointingly slow, that it was classified a failure, and in
the face of orders for 15 STRETCH systems, IBM withdrew it
153from the market.
Control Data's president, William Norris, expressed
concern that STRETCH was not so much a failure as it was a
staged maneuver to curtail CDC ' s entry into the scientific
154
computer market by robbing it of potential customers.
This accusation by Norris was somewhat surprising in view of
the announcement dates of the respective systems. IBM had
announced its STRETCH computer in L956, far in advance of
CDC's building of a scientific computer for the A.E.C., which
began in 1960.
1962
The UNIVAC 1107 was introduced as the successor to the
1103 series. Although it featured the thin film memory, it
was marketed too much later than competitive scientific
] 55
computers.
156Control Data introduced its CDC 3600 in May.
IBM introduced the IBM 7040 and IBM 7044 computers,
which were similar to the IBM 7090 but offered somewhat less
153 Ibid
. , p. 26-27.
154Rodger s, p. 258.
Rosen, p. 25.
156Wise, ''Fumble," p. 165.
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performance at a greatly reduced price. It also marketed a
direct-coupled system in which the 7 094 executed jobs which
157
were staged and buffered in the 7040,
1963
Philco delivered its Philco 2000, Model 212, perhaps
the most powerful computer then being delivered. Philco was
later absorbed by merger into the Ford Motor Company, after
which Fore) decided against any major investment in the com-
puter industry.
Control Data Corporation acquired the computer .
division of Bendix Corporation, with the rights and mainten-
ance responsibility for its G-15 and G-20 computers. Later
it delivered the first CDC 3600, and was then considered a
159
major factor in the large scale computer market. In
August, Control Data announced its next super-computer, the
CDC 6600. 160
The Census Bureau's UNIVAC I was retired to the
Smithsonian Institute after 7 3,000 hours of operational use.
It has since been replaced at the Bureau by two UNIVAC 1107 '
s
and a UNIVAC 1108. 161
In December, Honeywell announced the Honeywell 200,
ultimately a very successful computer expanded into a whole
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was designed along the same lines as the IBM 1401, yet was
30% cheaper. Its announcement prompted a speed-up in the
163IBM 360 development. Honeywell was then IBM's closest
164
competitor in the business data processing field.
1964
Manufacturers began to speak in terms of the third
generation of computers with their new product lines making
use of monolithic integrated circuitry; such as the GE 600
series, as a successor to the IBM 7090; Burroughs' full line
up to the very large 6500,' 7500, and 8500; the UNIVAC 9000
series; CDO's medium priced 3000 series; NCR's Century Systems;
and smaller companies such as Digital Equipment Corporation
with its PDP series, and Scientific Data Systems with its
.165Sigma series.
In April, IBM announced its System 360, a third gen-
eration system responding to the challenge of being out-
maneuvered in scientific advances. IBM spent over $5 billion
to develop, redesign, program, and systematize the full line
of 360 computers, a compatible, multi-model system. Initially,
six models of the 360 were announced, the Models 30, 40, 50,
60, 62, and 70. Later, to ensure coverage of all classes of
users, Models 65 and 75 were introduced, replacing the 60, 62,
163
Wise, T. A., "The Rocky Road to the Marketplace , " Fortune ,





and 70. Although it failed to meet April 1965 delivery dates,
the Corporation shipped more than 15,000 installations in the
next three years at an average cost of $300 thousand.
Raytheon purchased the computer division of Packard-
Bell with the Models 250 and 440 computers. 167
General Electric acquired controlling rights to
168Compagnie des Machines Bull of France. That summer, it
announced that the 600 series of computers would feature time
. . , . . . 169
sharing capabilities.
Control Data delivered the CDC 660 to the Livermore
Lab of the A.E.C. The 6600 was even faster than had been
prescribed in the specifications, and utilized multiple
arithmetic and logic units with ten peripheral processors.
By the following year, every A.E.C. installation had a 660C
either installed or on order."
Project MAC at M.I.T. ordered a dual processor GE 645
computer. MAC had been working on time sharing concepts for
several years using IBM equipment. Following the lead of MAC,
Bell Telephone Laboratory announced an order f.or four GE
645' s. The time-sharing bandwagon was forming with a rush
171
to G.E. , and IBM's reaction was violent. It immediately
Ibid
. ,
p. 30; and Rodgers , p. 275.
167 Sharpe, p. 189-190.
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169Wise, "Rocky," p. 206.
Rosen, p. 27.
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announced a large time sharing machine, the Model 67 to the
„ t ,._ 172System 360.
RCA announced its Spectra 7 computer, a series
compatible with the IBM 360. Its models were numbered 35, 45,
and 55 to indicate performance bracketing 360 Models 30, 40,
50, and 6C, at lower prices. The Spectra 70 represented a move
173toward standardization in the industry.
Control Data announced the CDC 6800, a computer
logically identical to the CDC 6600, but four times as fast
, . 174
and no more expensive.
IBM announced additional models of the System 360 to
meet the challenge of the competition. The Model 90 was a
super-computer designed to counter the CDC 6800. The Model 44
was destined for specific scientific uses. The Model 20
175
represented a move into the lower end of the market.
1965
The Model 67 of IBM' s System 360 appeared to be the
most promising answer to large scale time sharing, and the
company launched a major effort to develop the necessary
operating system (TSS) . Prospective users were planning
installations with hundreds of consoles simultaneously
176
on-line.
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The UNIVAC 1108 was introduced, featuring integrated
circuitry.
General Electric acquired the computer division of
177Olivetti in Italy.





By mid-year, it became apparent that IBM's TSS per-
formance would be marginal at best. It would be difficult
to support even a few consoles. Most orders for the Model
67 were withdrawn. The few systems that were delivered pro-
179
vided limited service to about eight consoles.
Honeywell acquired the Computer Control Company with
180its DDP series of computers.
1967
IBM discontinued production of the series 90 of its
System 360. Only the twenty systems already on order were
] 81
ultimately delivered.
Xerox Data Systems (XDS) was formed in May by the
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IBM announced the model 85 of the System 360, a very
large scale computer with better price and performance character-
183istics than its series 90.
Efforts continued to develop improved time-sharing
software for the 360-67 , but by June it appeared that even
with the best possible operating system, the 67 would not
184achieve a satisfactory level of time-sharing performance.
1968
Control Data withdrew the CDC 6800 from the market, and
185announced a new, more powerful computer, the CDC 7600.
1969
IBM announced the System 3, not really a mini-computer
but aimed roughly at the same market. The System 3 utilized
a new smaller sized punched card, IBM's first departure frcm
its standard 80 column card. Also announced was a new model
187
of the System 360, the Model 195, IBM's most powerful computer.
1970
IBM announced its new computer, the Series 370, with
the initial models, 155 and 165. Although arriving somewhat
sooner than had been anticipated, it was considered by many as
the beginning of the fourth generation. The new models demon-
strated faster performance with greater memory and programming
Rosen, p. 28.
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capacity, but were a disappointment to those expecting any
break-through in state-of-the-art technology. The system
188
was called "evolutionary" not revolutionary.
RCA responded to the announcement with an improved
Spectra 70 system, and Burroughs' answer was a modification
1 89
to the B-500 line called the B-700's.
Honeywell, Inc. acquired the bulk of General Electric '
s
computer business in May, and established Honeywell Informa-
tion Systems, Inc. to be operated as a subsidiary. Honeywell
will initially own 81.5% and G.E. will retain 18.5% of the
190
new company.
In September, IBM announced an additional model of the
System 370, the Model 145. The 145 was the first general-
purpose computer with internal monolithic memory, utilizing
integrated circuit chips instead of separately wired ferrite
191
cores.
B. SIZE AND COMPOSITION
Understandably, information on computer installations and
orders is extremely difficult to obtain. Manufacturers almost
unanimously refuse to release these statistics. International
Business Machines (IBM), quite naturally, is not willing to
confirm the Justice's Department's suspicions as to how large
it is, and other manufacturers are not anxious to have their
188Elliott, p. 3
189 x , . ,Ibid .
190 Ibid.
, p. 10.
191 TV ., oIbid




customers know how small a portion of the market they share.
Accordingly, data on computer installations and sales can
only be obtained by survey of users
.
The primary and perhaps the on]y source of such infor-
mation is the International Data Corporation (IDC)
,
Newtonville, Massachusetts. Its data is obtained through
a continuing market survey, the results of which are sub-
mitted to manufacturers for voluntc-.ry confirmation. In the
past, several corporations, including General Electric, IBM
and Scientific Data Systems, have refused to make any comment
other than that the figures were incorrect. The compilation
is published in the IDC newsletter, EDP Industry and Market
Report , and is sold to editors of magazines, such as Computers
192
and Automation , for reprinting in their publications.
Almost any other itemization of computer installations or
dollar value of shipments will reflect as its source of data
the IDC or the EDP Industry and Market Report . At best, these
statistics must be considered approximations.
1. The Industry
In 1947 , the year following the completion of the
ENIAC , only three principal sources of computer know-how
existed in the United States - the laboratories at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Eckert-Mauchly
group, and the Engineering Research Associates. Although
several machines were in the design or construction phase,
192 Sharpe, p. 202-203.
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only two digital computers had been completed - the Mark I by
M.I.T. in conjunction with IBM engineers, and the ENIAC by
Professors Eckert and Mauchly.
Today, the industry is composed of nine major and
several other smaller computer systems manufacturers, more
than twenty manufacturers of peripheral equipment and sub-
systems, over nine companies dealing in software and E.D.P.
services, and at least four major companies in the computer
193leasing business.
During the calendar year of 1969, approximately
20,000 computer systems were shipped (sold and leased) world-
wide by U.S. -based manufacturers. (The output of "U.S. -based
manufacturers" includes the production of U.S. -owned
facilities located in foreign countries. This distinction
is significant since U. S. Department of Commerce data on
shipments and exports only include those originating in the
194United States.)" The cumulative number of systems in use
at the end of that year was almost 90,000. As reflected in
Table I, the number of systems shipped and cumulative number
in use are expected to triple, to 62,000 and 272,000 res-
pectively, by 1974.
193
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World-wide revenues of American-based companies from
rental and sales of computers are illustrated in Table II.
Revenues during 1969 rose to over $7.2 billion, an increase
of approximately 12% over the previous year. Estimates of
revenues through 1974 reveal an increase each year of approxi-
mately 18%.
2. The Firms
The major computer manufacturers in the United States
are listed in Table III, with an indication of relative
market share in 1969 as measured in terms of number of com-'
puter shipments and equipment in use. The dominant power in
the industry is IBM. It has held this leading position since
almost the beginning of the electrcnic computer era. The
significance of this market concentration will be covered in
more detail in Section III of the study.
The number two position in the industry will unquestion-
ably be filled by Honeywell Information Systems (H.I.S.), the
company formed by the merger of Honeywell and General Electric
computer operations, although data is not yet available for
the combined operation. Sperry Rand (UNIVAC) , formerly number
two, will be forced into third place. Rumors persist that
National Cash Register (NCR) is interested in joining another
company in the computer business, and is seriously considering
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Table IV contains data from a recent issue of Barron '
s
on shipments and installations of major U. S„ computer manu-
facturers, and illustrates part of the problem involved in
obtaining reliable, accurate information on industry concen-
tration. Barron'
s
used the same source of information as that
used by Standard and Poor for the data appearing in Table III.
Yet, significant differences exist in the respective figures
with no explanation given as to how or why the data were
modified. The most obvious differences are $270 million of
IBM computers, $230 million of Control Data computers (one
sixth of its total) , and $570 million of the computers of
Digital Equipment, Xerox, and others (more than half of that-
total) .
A rapidly growing segment of the digital computer
market consists of minicomputers and small computer systems.
This portion of the industry generated an estimated $150 million
in sales in 1969, and an increase of at least 40% in this
amount is anticipated in 1970. The largest manufacturer of
minicomputers is Digital Equipment, which accounted for
approximately 55% of the 1969 sales. A number of other
companies have entered this expanding field in 1970, including
196
IBM with its System 3.
Further analysis of corporate strength in the United
States reveals the IBM is not only the leading manufacturer in
the computer field, but ranks high among the industrial giants
196
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of all industries. In 1969, IBM was the biggest U. S. cor-
poration, as measured by stock market value, with a combined
worth of all common shares of $34 billion. The next largest
were American Telephone and Telegraph with $30 billion, and
General Motors with $21.9 billion. For the year ending 31
December 1969, IBM ranked third in the nation in net income
after taxes with $934 million. Only General Motors and
Standard Oil of New Jersey ranked higher. For the same
period, IBM held the fifth position in total revenue with
$7.2 billion. The total assets employed in the business at
the end of 1969, of $7.4 billion, earned IBM sixth place among
197
U. S. corporations.
3 . The Foreign Market
Nearly $2 billion worth of new general purpose computers
were installed in western Europe last year. This year, that
total is expected to increase to $2.6 billion, a rate of
growth of 30%. By 1980, a conservative estimate indicates
that European companies will be spending $1.5 billion per
4-u v. i ^198month buying or leasing computers.
This projection forsees a great deal of money to be
made by computer manufacturers, but not necessarily by
Europeans. Of the 20,000 computers currently installed in
197,, The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Cor-
porations," Fortune , May 1970, p. 184. Hereafter cited as
"Fortune 500, 1970.
"
198 Siekman, Philip, "Now It's Europeans vrs. IBM," Fortune ,
15 August 1969, p. 87.
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western Europe, four out of five were either built in
factories owned by U. S. companies, manufactured under a
U. S. license, or built in the U. S. and sold in Europe with
199European nameplate.
U. S. exports of computer systems and parts in 1969
totalled approximately $637 million, and the estimate for
1970 is near $830 million. Table V provides a breakdown as
to destination of the exports for 1969.
Exports, however, account for only a small portion of
U.S. -based manufacturers' computer trade on foreign soil.
Because exchange problems, local regulations, and other
factors tend to limit shipments of equipment overseas, all
major American computer firms have plants in Europe, and
particularly in Britain. IBM, for example, has two major
production facilities, one in Scotland and one in England,
plus a research and development laboratory in England at
Hursley. Honeywell and Burroughs also have plants in England,
201
while National Cash Register has one in Scotland.
Just as in the U. S. , the European computer market
finds IBM in an overwhelming position of dominance. IBM
plants have produced at least half of the computers now in-
202
stalled in western Europe. In fact, some estimates claim
Ibid .
200Outlook, p. 348.
ONRL Technical Report 27-67, The British Computer Scene,
Part II: American Computer Companies in Britain , by J.
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203that IBM possesses 80% of the non-communist computer market.
Britain is the only country in which another company leads
IBM. As of January 1969, the International Computers Limited
(ICL) had 45% of the United Kingdom market, while IBM had only
30%. The phenomenon was due partly to the early work on com-
puters in Britain after the war , and also to the success of
204ICL's 1900 series computer.
Other U. S. companies, with the possible exception of
RCA and SD3 (now Xerox-owned XDS) , are employing various types
of strategies to win from IBM a slice of the European computer
market. Honeywell chooses to meet IBM head-on as though to
say, "Anything you can do I can do better, and cheaper."
Other manufacturers, on the other hand, prefer to infiltrate
IBM's rare weak points, or concentrate on their own strengths.
General Electric is emphasizing timesharing, a portion of its
computer operation not given up in the sale to Honeywell.
Burroughs deals almost exclusively in accounting machine
contracts with banks. Control Data is promoting its super-
205
computers.
However, U. S. operations in Europe are not without
competition. IBM and other American companies are meeting
stiff opposition from European manufacturers, and the battle
involves more than just a rivalry for commercial markets.
20
"Yapping Around IBM at Bay," The Economist , 25 January 1969,
p. 67. Hereafter cited as "Yapping."
204.Ibid
205 Siekman, p. 91.
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Each country feels an urgent necessity to develop this indus-
try in order to provide a technology integral to their total
economy, which, for security reasons, cannot be in control of
foreign countries. This has lead to a push by European
nations as well as Japan to develop their own computer
capability
.
As Alex d'Agapeyeff , managing director of a British
software firm put it, this is "... not just patriotism in
the stupidest sense. It is simply a question of having this
central industry wholly in the hands of outsiders who can ba
influenced by many things including their own State Department."
He was referring, of course, to an incident which occurred in
1966, when Control Data was requesting permission to export
five machines to France. Two of them were directed to France's
nuclear-weapons laboratory. The U. S. government refused to
grant the export license until France guaranteed that none of
the machine would be used in their nuclear weapons program.
Naturally the incident was carefully observed throughout
207Europe.
Currently, there are five major companies of signifi-
cance in Europe - Siemens and Telefunken of Germany, Compagnie
Internationale pour 1 ' Informatique (C.I.I. ), Philips of the
Netherlands, Olivetti of Italy, and the British International
Computers Limited. Realizing that no one of them alone could
206putlook, p. 349
207_. , onSiekman, p. 87.
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hope to be effective, these companies are planning a joint




Another factor that will have an effect on the inter-
national market structure is Israel ' s new Golem computers
being developed by the Weizmann Institute of Science. Its
projections call for the introduction of an advanced, giant
209
computer sometime after 1970.
In October of 197 0, IBM engaged in two days of talks
with the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology to
study the possibility of doing business with the Russians.
While realizing the enormous amount; of red tape and possibls
U. S. criticism involved, IBM envisioned a potential market
there of several hundred million dollars. However, Russian
suggestions that IBM also build a components factory within











III. COMPUTER INDUSTRY MARKET MECHANISM
The purpose of an industry study is to examine the
majority of economic and industrial literature, reports, and
studies concerning the history, structure, conduct, and per-
formance in a designated sector of the economy; it should
then be possible to identify the relevant determinants of
prices and output quantities in that industry's market placs.
Walter Adams has noted that such careful introspection of '.
industry thought processes has been essentially an American
undertaking, perhaps because of the availability of data an3
the persistency of the public interest. He has prologued his
examination of several industry studies with the caution that
merely amassing a quantity of facts relating in one way or
another to an industry is not sufficient. "The difficult
problem is to relate these facts to a satisfactory explana-
tion of what has always been the primary objective of economic
211
study in this area, prices and quantities."
The unUsual challenge in the preparation of this thesis is
the uncharted condition of the masses of data relating to the
electronic digital computer industry. That no prior industry
study of computer manufacturing could be found that followed
the above classic outline is not surprising. The leading
cause might be the non-availability of reliable information
211Adams, Walter, ed
.
, The Structure of American Industry ,
Third Edition, Macmillan, 1961, p. xiii.
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concerning prices and quantities, and from a review of the
more serious attempts to analyze effective computer output in
terms of bits or lines per dollar, nanosecond performance of
instruction execution, and memory access speeds, no useful
computer industry output can be synthesized. Several such
studies will be examined in this section together with
additional information gathered from government sources and
other reports. The organization of this section will follow
the outline recently published in Dr. Frederic M. Scherer '
s
four year study of industrial organization; it is presented
in Figure 1. The elements of this outline have been found to
conform with the minimum considerations of other distinguished
212
and respected authors. Dr. Scherer' s outline provides an
excellent framework for evaluating the casual relationships
which flow from the basic conditions of supply and demand
throughout the market structure, to influence the conduct and
performance of an industry's membership. The feedback noted
by dotted lines in Figure 1, for example, is particularly im-
portant in the computer industry because of the persistency
of technological growth and the resultant effect upon computer
model changes. Several important aspects of this cyclic
growth will be separately examined in the nature of the product,
product differentiation, the importance of patents, barriers
212Sharpe , W. F. , Section II; see also U. S. Department of
Justice letter to authors by Allen E. McAIlester dated 9
October 1970; and Scherer, Frederic M. , Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance , Rand McNally, and
Company, 197 0, p. 8.
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to entry of new firms, and indeed, in every important deter-
minant of Market Conduct.
A. BASIC CONDITIONS IN THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
The basic conditions presented by Professor Scherer pro-
vide an excellent format for an analysis of the determinants
of prices and output in computer manufacturing. Further, it
provides a durable approach to synthesis of the industry ele-
ments into a meaningful structure, which then may be compared
with such classical studies as have been prepared by Walter
Adams, J. S. Bain, Richard Caves, A. D. H. Kaplan, J. B.
Dirlam, R. F. Lanzillotti , R. B. Tennant , J. M. Clark, L. W.
213Weiss, and E. S. Mason. The outline in Figure 1 is parti-
cularly interesting in respect to the computer industry, not
only for the organization it makes possible, but for the
elements which have not been revealed in the literature of a
young industry very much discussed and analyzed. For example,
virtually no reliable information is available concerning
computer supply and demand data, although a large variety of
essays and articles have been written which attempt to analyze
the economic impact of electronic digital computers. Most of
the data which is available is identified as "based on esti-
mates"
, usually because the large manufacturers refuse to
reveal prices and output values. Many of the sources con-
sulted in the preparation of this section on prices and output
213
Scherer, p. 4; and Caves, Richard, American Industry:




appeared to be mesmerized by the price base per unit of out-
put in terms of bits or bytes per microsecond or nanosecond,
and then relate such selected average performance to an
arbitrary average rental range. Such is actually the limit
of some of the better studies available on supply and demand
of computers; and several will be examined in the following
214
subsections. This difficulty in being able to more
accurately measure a cost-benefit relationship according to
some meaningful standards, has no doubt contributed to some
of the mistrust and misunderstanding by managers who employ
computers; much of this problem can be traced to very poor
total cost information at the time of the decision to commit
215
an operation to the computer.
214
Knight, Kenneth E. , "A Fast Sort of Country: The Study of
Technological Innovation - The Evolution of the Digital
Computer," Ph.D. Dissertation, Carnegie Institute of Tech-
nology, 1964, and two published essays therefrom: "Changes
in Computer Performance," Datamation
,
September 1966, p. 40,
and "Evolving Computer Performance, 1962-1967," Datamati on,
January 1968, p. 33-35, these works hereafter cited, in
order: "Fast," "Changes," and "Evolving;" also compare
Solomon, Martin B. , "Economies of Scale and. the IBM System/
360," Communications of the ACM
, June 1966, p. 435-440, and
"Economies of Scale and Computer Personnel," Datamation
,
March 1970, p. 107-109, both cited hereafter as "IBM," or
"Personnel;" and Yourdon, Edward, "Call/360 Costs," Data-
mation , 1 November 1970, p. 22.
215Alexander, Tom, "Computers Can't Solve Everything," Fortune
,
October 1969, p. 126-129; and Withington, Frederic, The
Real Computer: Its Influence, Uses and Effects , Add i son-
Wesley Publishing Co., 1969.
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1 . Computer Industry Supply
The many elements of supply in computer manufacturing
have not been found in analyses of the professional journals,
nor is that especially significant in an industry from which
the product is costly and is usually manufactured as a result
of a customer's order, which customer is normally another
business, research firm, or a government agency. In short,
finished goods inventories of computing equipment is under-
standably quite small, or of short duration. Many of the
elements to be examined herein are not normally considered cis
bearing on the supply of computers. It does indeed appear
that supply is not a critical subject for analysis, since the
supply of computers appears to be almost unlimited. Such may
explain the focus of the literature on the demand side. None-
theless, the supply side contains several important factors
which are constraints, or which are externally constrained and
are determinants of output. The market mechanism on the sup-
ply side includes the costly research and development cycle,
the inherently long delivery time, as a factor of production,
and the backlog of customers' orders. The nature of the pro-
duct includes many other limitations such as technology, and
is devoid of some input constraints affecting similar indus-
tries, such as unionization. A short review of the elements
of supply will thus serve a later more extensive examination








An examination of the basic conditions in an indus-
try certainly requires a consideration of the raw material input
to a manufacturing process. The literature was found to high-
light the innovative aspects, such as micro-miniature circuitry,
but the only treatment of the spectrum of input was the aggre-
gate form (and thus not identifiable to manufacturers or
specific models or generations) found in the Department of
Commerce reports, such as the "Preliminary Report of the 1967
Census of Manufactures". ' The Preliminary Report was published
in April 1969, at which time the computer industry was included
in the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, 3571.
Of considerable value to the many comparisons possible from
the Department of Commerce's reports, and to future authors
in computer industry studies, the computer industry was sepa-
rately identified in the publication of the final report of
the 1967 Census of Manufactures
,
published in October 1970,
and available under SIC code 3573. It is now possible to
examine computer manufacturing in general apart from type-
writers (SIC 3572) , calculators and accounting machines (SIC
3574), scales and balances (SIC 3576), and office machines,
217
not otherwise categorized (SIC 3579)
.
217
U. S. Bureau of Census, "1967 Census of Manufactures, Sum-
mary Series, General Statistics," Preliminary Report
(MC67 (P)-l) , U. S. Government Printing Office, April 1969,
p. 11, hereafter cited as "Census, 1967: Summary Series;"
and "1967 Census of Manufactures, Industry Series: Office,
Computing, and Accounting Machines," (MC67 (2) -35F) , October
1970, hereafter cited as "Census, 1967: Industry Series."
74

Table VI lists general statistics from the most
218
recent Annual Survey of Manufacture s,
. and it can be seen
in columns G and Q, "Cost of Materials", that in 1968, com-
puter manufacturers applied 1,985.2 million dollars to pro-
duce equipment valued at 4,151.1 million dollars. This cost
includes the cost of raw materials, semifinished goods, parts,
components, containers, and supplies (including electrical
energy), but excludes services' costs such as advertising,
research and development, and consulting services. It also
excludes overhead costs such as depreciation charges, rent,
interest, royalties and any materia], or equipment used in
plant expansion. The data for 1967 is also listed in Table
VI, and presents a similar ratio in comparison with, the out-
put values. It will later be seen that the usefulness of
this aggregated form of industry data can be demonstrated in
applying market share percentages to these data, which when
compared with individual manufacturers' operating statements
provides a more comparable measure of costs and profits among
such firms.
Table VII lists the general industrial categories
of raw material input to computer manufacturing (SIC 3573)
according to a six-digit product classification. It can be
seen from the four largest raw material categories that most
of the input components are especially made parts and attach-
ments for computers, which by the code number (SIC 357330)
U. S. Bureau of Census, "Annual Survey of Manufactures-1968
,
General Statistics," (M68(AS)11), U. S. Government Printing





GENERAL STATISTICS ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANUFACTURES
table 1. General Statistics for Industry Groups
-mm-
(For explanation of column




Machine tools, ' - tal-cut t ing t ,
Machine tools, metal-forming I . .
Special dies, tools, jigs, And
fixtures
Hachini tool accessories
Uetal«orking machinery, n. e.c. ....
Special industry machinery ......
Food product-- machinery
T< \l i le mach inery
Woodworking machinery
Paper industries each inery
Printing trades r.ichinery
Special industry machinery, n.e.c.
General industrial machinery
l\imps and compressors




Industrial furnaces and ovens
General industrial machinery, n.e.c
Office are! computing machines....
Typewriters
Electronic computing equipment




Aut e itic merchandising machines...
Commercial laundry equipment
Re frige rat ion machinery
Measuring and dispensing pumps
Service industry machines, n.e.c...
Miscellaneous machinery, except
electrical
Electrical equipment and supplies
Electric test and distributing
equipment
Electric measuring ins t ruments
Trat.s iormers










Household refrigerators and freezers.
Household laundry equipment








Current carrying wiring devices
Noncurrent carrying wiring devices...
Radio and TV rece iving ceu : ; I . . .























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































See footnotes at end of table. Tabic VI
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ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANUFACTURES GENERAL STATISTICS 19
and Industries: 1968 and 1957-Continued
captions, see appendix)
/// (ft 1












































K L M N P Q R S T A F 1
334.2 2,833.4 254.0 556.1 1,966.5 5,04 1.7 2,510.2 7,442.0 318.2 1,586.6 4 6 354
86.
9
757.3 60.3 131.5 475.1 1,389.4 767.4 2,127.5 7S.9 535.4 2 2 3541
28.9 247.4 20.7 45.7 163.7 429.9 286.2 698.6 24 .
7
202.6 6 8 3542
111 .6 1,013.1 94.0 213.6 785.6 1,608.9 561 .7 2,151.1 113.1 240.2 7 3544
59.
8
475.7 44.8 95.5 321 .8 916.7 413.2 1,300.2 54.7 272.1 8 3515
47.0 339.9 34.2 69.8 220.3 699.8 481.7 1,164.6 4C.8 336.3 6 354S
206.8 1,575.2 140.5 295.2 947.0 2,865.9 2,164.2 4,962.2 178.3 1,250.3 4 355
32.3 248. G 21.8 45.0 146.
C
499.5 336.0 824.8 21 .9 197.7 10 3551
39.6 252.3 29.3 62.2 168.4 404.9 308.9 712.5 22.2 185.3 14 3552
12.6 83.7 8.7 17.6 50.3 190.8 128.0 314.0 8.2 70.7 6 355 3
21.6 175.1 14.6 31 .2 111 .9 285.9 270.7 560.0 19.1 136.8 10 3554
29.1 239.2 20.1 42.1 148.8 458.0 324.1 750.9 32.9 217.5 2 3555
71.6 576.3 46.0 97.1 321 .0 1,026.8 7! 1 , 800 . 74.0 442.3 5 3559
278.9 2,132.8 196.7 410.4 1,354.5 4,107.3 2,909.7 6 , 930 .
8
296.4 1,552.8 3 356
7P..7 591 .7 50.2 105.3 336.8 1,216.8 1,040.7 2,224.4 63.4 592.1 10 3561
59. 1 457.9 47.6 101.2 344.8 839.5 512.0 1,335.7 107.8 318.8 1 3562
21 .6 152.7 15.5 32.6 S6.1 305.0 225.1 530.2 14.4 84.7 12 356 4
10.9 106.5 9.5 19.4 87.0 166.1 37.4 202.9 8.1 12.7 10 32 3565
54.3 407.0 40.3 82.9 272.7 795.6 4S1.3 1,256.8 56.9 286.0 4 3566
15.0 122.0 8.1 16.7 53.6 244.5 230.6 472.7 15.2 63.1 15 3567
39.3 295.0 25.5 52.3 163.5 539.8 382.6 908.1 30.6 195.4 2 3569
189.6 1,455.9 119.1 236.1 754.2 3,324.3 2,465.5 5,717.3 192.3 1,474.6 1 3572
26.0 172.3 19.9 39.3 116.7 455.0 155.3 596.0 20.1 114.0 1 3572
—
— 98.2 798.3 50.3 103.5 312.6 1,920.7 l , . 9.6 3,760.8 116.6 980.8 1 3S73.
38.4 294.4 31 .3 58.6 219.7 S18.2 198.2 707.8 32.6 206.8 7 3574
6.5 45.6 . 4.3 8.5 24.0 90.0 51 .3 140.2 5.1 36.1 5 20 3576
20.5 145.3 13.3 26.2 81 .2 340.4 191 .1 512.5 17.9 136.9 2 5 3579
141.6 959.6 102.4 206.3 614.5 2,1 41 .7 2,331.9 4,390.6 145.0 1,021.0 2 1 358
10.0 59.2 7.8 14.8 39.6 140.8 122.5 248.0 5.5 81.6 1 2 3581
7.5 50.9 5.4 11.2 32.5 96.4 85.9 183.0 4.9 41 .6 1 14 3582
97.
C
660.1 71.8 145.2 438.7 1,506.1 1,760.9 3,207.5 120.2 745.0 1 1 3585
6.4 45.5 4.3 8.9 25.0 96.6 80.6 17 1.3 3.8 43.6 1 1 35 86
20.1 143.9 13.1 26.2 78.7 301 .8 282.0 577.8 10.6 112.2 2 13 3589
202.2 1,439.4 168.5 346.6 1,090.4 2,525.5 1,192.5 3,701 .4 178.6 370.4 2 7 3599
1,897.1 13,129.0 1,338.5 2,643.8 7,683.6 24,814.7 19,580.7 4 3 . 896 .
4
1,562.2 8,599.6 1 2 36
178.5 1,251.4 1 26 .
3
251.9 751.5 2,556.1 1,630.8 4,139.6 146.9 884.9 1 1 361
62.4 431.0 41.
i
80.2 228.3 809.5 399.5 1,196.5 54.1 297.4 2 1 3611
47.6 331 .6 35.6 71 .5 219.1 719.8 561.4 1,257.1 S4.0 248.5 1 2 3612
66.5 488.8 49.5 100.2 304.1 1,026.8 669.9 1,686.0 38.8 339.0 1 1 3613
208.2 1,427.7 153.8 309.6 928.8 2,792.2 1,870.5 4,630.5 207.3 921.4 1 11 36 2
110.3 750.4 83.5 168.9 504.7 1,406.0 962.4 2,363.6 100.8 443.3 1 1 3G21
50.9 351. 7 35.0 70.0 211.7 722.8 390.1 1,105.1 34.9 227.5 2 41 3622
14.0 120.7 9.6 20.2 74.5 258.3 237.4 485.4 18.2 99.9 4 14 36 23
11.9 82.8 9.1 18.5 57.8 180.3 117.8 296.4 41.3 69.4 2 1 3624
21.1 119.1 16.6 32.0 80.1 218.8 162.8 379.0 12.1 81.3 4 4 3629
168.2 1,088.9 134.1 261.0 778.5 2,543.4 2,762.7 5,278.7 118.0 977.7 1 1 363
20.2 127.9 15.9 32.4 88.4 254.0 291 .6 549.7 8.6 107.0 1 4 3631
50.0 357.8 41 .3 79.4 273.5 769.4 959.0 1,695.0 25.9 308.5 1 1 3632
22.2 154.2 17.8 33.7 113.9 408.5 562.3 982.5 31.8 138.6 1 1 3633
45.0 241.8 35.9 69.8 163.0 597.0 519.0 1,118.9 27.2 232.7 1 2 3634
10.0 62.3 7.6 14.2 42.3 192.1 123.5 308.1 7.4 59.9 1 1 3635
6.4 49.3 4.9 9.7 34.7 95.3 30.0 123.6 5.6 51.2 1 3 3636
14.4 95.6 10.7 21 .8 62.7 227.1 277.3 500.9 11 .5 79.8 1 3 3639
160.6 967.0 126.2 248.8 656.4 2,254.9 1,670.7 3,912.4 136.3 638.5 1 4 361
29.5 169.9 25.8 49.9 136.0 537.7 248.4 781.8 48.2 83.7 1 1 3641
64.9 389.6 50.2 99.2 253.8 832.6 773.5 1,602.2 32.9 248.7 1 7 3642
43.0 248.8 33.2 65.5 164. 5 538.2 354.0 891.9 31.4 169.2 1 1 3643
23.2 158.7 17.0 34.2 102.1 346.4 294.8 636.5 20.8 136.9 3 19 3644
129.6 715.8 106.7 204.5 514.0 1,576.7 2,576.? 4,107.3 93.2 761.8 1 2 36 5
116.2 640.0 95.8 182.5 460.5 1,396.6 2 , ; 3,834.1 86.1 723.8 1 2 3651
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table 7A. Materials Consumed, by Kind: 1957 and 1963
(See Appendix, explanation of Terms)












IKK STRY 3572 .--TYPEWRITERS
Materials, parts, containers, and supplies, total.
).: i 1 1 shapes and forms (extcpt castings):
Carbon steel
:
Bars and bar shapes
Sheet and strip
Wire and wire products
Structural shapes





















Copper and copper-base illoy:
Bare wire (For electrical conduction only).





Rod, bar, and mechanical wire, including extruded and/or
drawn shapes















Aluminum and al uiuinuro-br.se alloy:




Sheet, plate, rnd foil
All other r.luniinum mill shapes and forms (wire, rolled rod















Castings (rough end semifinished):
Steel









Electric rotors and generators:
Fractional horsepower electric motors (under 1 hp.):
Tiring motors, synchronous and subsynchroi .
Fractional horsepower electric motors (excluding timing
motors)
/




















Electron tubes, except X-ray
Solid state semiconductors *
Resistors, capacitors, transformers, sockets, and other
electronic components and accessories, except solid state scdiI-
conductors '
All other materials and components, parts, containers, and
supp) i es consumed *.
Materials and components, n.s.k
nil lion






Materials, parts, containers, and supplies,
total
Mill shapes and fores (except castings):
Carbon steel:
Bars and bar shapes
Sheet and strip
St ructural shapes
Wire and wire products
All other carbon steel mill shapes and forms.






























































































































OFFICE,_CO_MPUTI NG, AND ACCOUNTING MACHINES
table 7A. Materials Consumed, by Kind: 1967 end 1963-Continued
; '
•'; pendix, Explanation of Terms*
Material
Materials, parts, containers, and supplies
Continued
Mill shapes and forms (except :ast ings )—Continued
Copper and copper-base alloy.
Dare wire lor electrical conduction
Insulated wire and cable
Rod, bar, and mechanical wire, including
extruded an/or drawn shapes









Aluminum and aluminum-base alloy:
Shed, plate and foil
Extruded shapes (including extruded rod. bai
pipe tube, tic.)
All other aluminum mill shapes and forms
(wire, rolled rod and bar, powder, welded
'tubing, etc. )
Castii.es (rough and semif inlshe-l) : a
Steel
Aluminum and aluminum-base si ov
Electric motors and generators:'
Fractional hors. power electric motors
(undi r ] hp. ) :
Timing motors, synchronous end subsynchronous.
Other fractional horsepower electric mot o





Electron tubes, except X-ray*
Solid state semiconductors 2
Kesistors, capacitors, transformers, socket s, "and
other electronic components and accessories
except solid state semiconductors ,'
Parts and attachments specially designed for
electronic computing; equipment
All other materials and components, part's',
containers, and supplies consumed
Materials and components, n. s. k. 3
.
Alloy steel (except stainless)
Stainless steel
Copper and copper-hase alloy:
Bare wire (for electrical conduction only)
Insulated wire and cable
'tnotcs at end of table.
INDUSTRY 3576..
-SCALES AND BALANCES
Materials, parts, containers, and supplies, total
Ull shapes and forms (except castings):
Carbon steel:
Bars and bar shapes...
Sheet and strip
Structural shapes
Wire and wire products
All other carbon steel mill shapes and forms
Rod, bar, and mechanical wire, Including extruded and /ordrawn shapes
Plate, sheet, and strip (including millta
Pipe and tube..
.




happens to also be made in the computer industry. The value
is 688.7 million dollars of the total 1,768.1 million dollars
for this 1967 census data; the electronics industry as a sup-
plier to the computer manufacturers supplied only 248.1 million
dollars of that total. The electronics industry is identified
by SIC codes which have the first three digits as 367 in
21 Q
Table VII.
It is appropriate at this point to note as a con-
vention in this section, that reference is made to dollar
values as above, in the mil], ions rather -than in bill.ions
because of the variance between the American and British
systems. i\ more complete description of the Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC) system will be provided in a later
section when it becomes necessary to distinguish among the
various industry classifications,
b. Technology
The growth of technology in the computer industry
has been significant in extending the power of the computer,
and, on the demand side, in determining the overall growth
rate of the computer industry. There are several interesting
definitions of computer generations, but one is based on
technological breakthroughs which affect the supply side in
the form of new models or new families of computers. Some of
the technological growth which has precipitated new families
or generations of computers actually were achieved in the
electronics industry, for example, the transition from vacuum
21 9
"Census, 1967: Industry Series," p. 21-22.
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220tubes to transistors between 1951 and 1960. During that
transition, IBM was fortunate to have hired Dr. Emanuel Piore,
former heed of U. S. Navy Research, because important techno-
logical decisions were before the IBM Logic Committee. That
committee had the task of deciding between two leading tech-
nologies for the System 360 hardware design: Monolithic
221Integratec' Circuitry, and Hybrid Integrated Circuitry.
Monolithic: integrated circuitry meant placing all the essen-
tial elements of a given circuit into one chip at the same
time (transistors, resistors, connectors and diodes). The
alternate technology, dubbed "solid logic technology" by IBM
at that time, meant soldering the circuit eleme to a
card.
In 1961, IBM decided to avoid the uncertainties
and developmental risks of the monolithic circuits being ready
in time for the planned 1964 introduction of the System 360
computers. The decision to pursue the hybrid circuit board
technology was apparently not popular in all technical circles
inside or outside IBM, because there was a question as to
whether the "state of the art" would thereby be advanced.
There was also the criticism that development of the hybrid
integrated circuits would eventually leave IBM frozen into a
technology that would be more costly in obsolescence before
its cost could be recovered. Nonetheless, Watson referred to
2?2
the choice as "the most fortunate decision we ever made."









The prospect of developing an advanced scientific design con-
cept, at that time, which if successful, the monolithic chip
would also contain some of the innermost secrets of IBM'
s
circuitry design, did not provide appropriate protection for
patentable achievements. IBM had not been making significant
quantities of the basic components . and would thus continue to
rely upon such leading component suppliers as Texas Instruments
to provide the advanced monolithic chips; such suppliers would
thus also have access to the monolithic production trade secrets
and the IBM circuit design characteristics. The System 360
family of computers would eventually feature the monolithic
circuitry in such advanced designs as the 360/85, however the
initial decision concerning technologies favored the one which
offered the better probability of completion on time, with
fewer patent obstacles in product design as well as process
innovations. It is still a subject of debate as to whether
IBM continued active development of the monolithic technology,
however no external announcements of the monolithic design for
the later System 360 models is observed until after the family
was first introduced in April 1964. Later in 1964, RCA announced
the intended use of the pure monolithic integrated circuitry in
some of the models of its Spectra 7 line. By that time, IBM
was an experienced component manufacturer, with the capability
to shift technologies if an operational advantage could be
demonstrated, with attendent competitive impetus.
Nonetheless, IBM developed the solid logic circuitry
for the System 360 hardware design, and at the time of the 1964
82

announcements, Tom Watson, Jr. remarked;
"Too much proprietary information was involved
in circuitry production ... Unless we did it ourselves,
we could be; turning over some of the essentials of our
business to another group. "223
Thus technology as a proprietary factor of pro-
'
duction required more protection than could be assured by the
patenting process, and IBM found it necessary to seriously
enter the manufacture of its own components used in the making
of computers. Actually, former IBM president, Al Williams,
had urged such a move in 1960, and in 1962 IBM authorized the
construction of a new plant to make components. The' general
manager of the component manufacturing division was John
Gibson, a doctoral graduate of Johns Hopkins in electrical
engineering. The new division was to have the authority to
decide what components to make, and it was outfitted with the
latest automatic equipment valued at $100 million dollars.
The expense of installing automatic equipment would be
recovered in labor cost savings.
With the present advent of the fourth generation
in computers, and another generation of
.
technology this time
in integrated circuitry referred to as "large scale", the same
proprietary interest in the preservation of circuit infor-
mation has had a continuing effect on computer manufacturers
to produce their own semiconductors and integrated circuits.
By way of progress report on third generation accomplishments,
and as an indicator of fourth generation plans, Business Week
223 Ibid







reported that IBM has become the second or third largest
manufacturer of semiconductors; and the trend of computer
manufacturers making their own integrated circuits is
225
expected to intensify. Business Week continued
:
"The trend to integrated circuits is forcing
computer makers into semiconductor design
—
perhaps irrever-
sibly. They could wire the simpler transistor into any kind
of circuit design. But integrated circuits are completely
wired up circuit functions, so new computer design depends
more on semiconductor manufacturing than on assembly-type
operations. Semiconductors now account for up to 50% of a
computer's cost, and their share is growing."
The latter percentage may be high inasmuch as the
Census of Manufactures listed the 1963 solid state semicon-
ductor input (SIC 367408) as 101 million dollars as compared
to a total delivered cost under the old SIC 3571 of 847 million
dollars. The 847 million dollar f;.gure was published in the
Department of Commerce's 1963 Census of Manufactures, but when
the same data was recently republished with the 1967 Census of
Manufactures it was increased to 1,388.7 million dollars for
1963. That unexplained difference does nothing to help explain
a fifty per cent figure found by Business Week , even though
some part could be explained by an "all- other" category (SIC
970099) , or by a category for parts and attachments made
especially for computers. This category is listed in Table
VI for 1967 as SIC 357330, and for 1963 data as SIC 35710.
As previously noted, these categories are made within the com-
puter industry. A summary of the semiconductor costs in
relation to the "materials consumed by kind" total input costs
225




as reported in the Department of Commerce reports for the
years of manufactures census, 1958, 1963, and 1967 is
. . 226
appropriate.
The material contained in Table VIII is necessarily
general, however it indicated that the trend is that lesser
amounts of semiconductors have bee?i received by computer manu-
facturers from outside the industry; although it did not re-
flect an increasing trend within a newly numbered "special
parts" category as might be expected since that category of
parts and attachments is produced within the computer indus-
try. The most recent reports from which the information in
Table VTII was obtained document the fact that some information
had to be retained in a collective "all other" category to
prevent the disclosure of individual companies.
The rapid advance of technology in computer manu-
facturing throughout the 1960's witnessed the main frame central
processing units (CPU) far exceeding
.
the capability of processing
speeds in the input/output equipment and secondary memory. This
gap in technology has continued to plague and delay effective
time-sharing, even though major advances in input/output chan-
nel organization have enabled continued market development,
which, in 1967 was being served by about 80% by General
227Electric. In a like manner, peripheral equipment develop-
ment required heavy Research and Development expenditures in
"Census, 1967: Industry Series", p. 21-22; and U. S. Bureau
of Census, "1963 Census of Manufacturers, Industry Series",
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966, p. 31-32. Hereafter
cited as "Census, 1963: Industry Series".
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the 1960 's to meet the demand which resulted from an imbalance
of CPU and peripheral equipment growth; many of the indepen-
dent peripheral firms found it necessary to spend ten per cent
of sales oji research and development during this period in
order to compete with the well-financed main-frame manufacturers,
2?R
and allegedly leading to technical advances and lower prices.
According to the U. S. Industrial Outlook 1970 of the Depart-
ment of Commerce
,
"Memories comprise the largest share of the total
peripheral market with estimated shipments of over $1 billion
in 1969. Other large segments include input devices-, output
devices, magnetic tape transports, terminals, and data trans-
mission equipment. Rapid growth in the latter two areas re-
flects the burgeoning expansion of the data communications
industry, which is closely allied to the computer and periph-
eral equipment industry. " ^
The importance of technological development of
memories with the resulting gains in speeds and relative
reductions in cost was recently summarized in a technical
keynote presentation by Dr. C. J. Salter and A. B. Walter
before the proceedings sponsored by Informatics Inc. Their
findings are presented in Table IX, and are considered to be
state-of-the-art, 1968. Some of the 1970 fourth generation
announcements are beginning to provide additional infor-
mation to Table IX technology data. Articles in the October
2 OQ
McLaughlin, R. A., "IBM's 370/145 Uncovered", Datamation ,
October 1, 1970, pp. 30-31; and "Antitrust: U. S. vs. IBM",
Newsweek
,
January 27, 1969, p. 79; and "The IBM Program
for Shaking Off Suits", Business Week , June 14, 1969, p. 49.
229
"Antitrust: U. S. vs. IBM", p. 79.
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and November, 1970 Datamation indicate that memory technology
is still in the forefront of hardware development, and cache
memory concepts of the System 360/85 and 360/195 and indeed
the "barrel and slot" techniques of Control Data Corporation's
latest third generation hardware, have not simply been refined
and renamed. The IBM System 370/145 contains the first fully
semiconductor main memory, and a disk file subsystem that
operates without a separate controller. It is said to have
internal operating speeds that are five to eleven times
faster them the 360/40 and 360/30; and a data transfer rate
of up to five megabytes, which makes the 370/145 about six
times faster than the popular 360/40 on input/output transfer.
It must therefore be about twice as fast as the 360/50 by
IBM's prior announcements. Datamation'
s
comparisons are pre-
sented in Table X for these technological and price announce-
230
ments. It is emphasized that these data are from the
early stages of new hardware announcements, and later the
vigorous tidvertising and marketing tactics will present
further cautions.
c. Patents
Patent infringements are relatively infrequent
in the computer industry, however the expensive task in
policing a very large number of patents together with the
230
"RCA's New Line: Just Enough to Check Migration to 370?"
Datamation , October 1, 1970, pp. 47-48; hereafter cited as
"RCA's New Line"; see also "Perspective: Leasing Firms",
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large specialized staff necessary to determine the infringe-
ment of and prosecution of violations of patents contributes
to the apparent absence of activity. Some of the leading
cases will be discussed in a later section, however patent
litigation has not been significant. Numerous journalists
have alluded to the wholesale copying of ideas from time to
time among the leading manufacturers.
The subject of patents in software has become an
interesting challenge over the last two years for the U. S.
Patent Office, which has refused to grant patents for soft-
ware programs. The U. S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
has reversed two rejections to date, and the Patent Office
231plans to continue the legal battle. The court's first
decision, on November 20, 1968, found in favo3: of Prater and
Wei; and the most recent decision, on October 8, 1970 found
in favor of A. W. Musgrave. In response to the U. S. Patent
Office's contention that the program. for seismic data cor-
rection method was unpatentable because it involved mental
processes , the court said :
"....all that is necessary, in our view, to make
a sequence of operational steps a single 'statutory process'
within 35-USC-101 is that it be in the technological arts so
as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to
promote the progress of 'useful arts. ' 232
231 . .
Hirsch, Phil, "Washington Review and Forecast", Datamation ,
January 1970, p. 99; and "Look Ahead", Datamation , November
15, 1970, pp. 17-18; and numerous reports over the period
such as: "Rehearing Set in Computer Case", The Wall Street
Journal
, January 16, 1969, page 40, col. 3.
232
"Look Ahead," Datamation, November 15, 1970, p. 17.
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The Patent Office is justifiably concerned with
the potential flood of patents, and an almost insurmountable
task of unscrambling posfjible infringements. An equally
serious threat to the hardware manufacturers exists should
the above decision remain firm, because software firms are
eager to compete with the systems software of the main- frame
manufacturers. The 1969 suit of IEM by Applied Data Research,
a leading software firm, has recently been settled privately,
between the two contenders. In the original suit, however,
Applied Data Research (ADR) claimed damages in the amount oc
$97.5 million in the IBM software package market, $10 million
in custom services and software market, $10 million in the data
processing services market, and 689 thousand dollars it had
to pay IBM for software and services which it could have per-
formed itself except for the nonexistence of separate pricing
of hardware and software at that time. The out-of-court
settlement, with IBM was reported to involve about $1.4 million
in cash to ADR and about $600 thousand in future revenue for
233
services on ADR' s Autoflow program.
It is not possible to document the full signifi-
cance of the granting of patents for software. The hardware
manufacturers will be able to move more of the systems con-
trol techniques within the hardware, and the converse of
that possibility was alleged in two of the now-settled suits
233
Pantages, Angeline, "IBM's Vigorous Defense Speaks Thin,
as ADR Files #4," Datamation
,
June 1969, p. 121-123. See
Section IV for full discussion of public policy issues;




against IBM, namely that manipulative techniques were being
guarded by patents when in fact the technique was accomplished
by software. The movement of other control techniques within
the hardware has appeared in the IBM 370/145, such as the
integrated file adaptor (IFA) built within the CPU and sub-
stitutes for a controller for the new 2319 disk memory
234
system.
It is appropriate in tie consideration of tech-
nology and patents and the effect upon supply and demand fcr
a product, to acknowledge the lively discussion among scholars
over the past several years. Considerable insight into pro-
tective patents and the impetus to innovation has been pro-
vided by Professor Harold Demsetz, Dr. Kenneth J. Arrow,
Aaron Director of the University of Chicago Law School, John
S. McGee of Duke University and B. S. Yamey of the London
School of Economics.
Professor Arrow's simple . analytical model led him
to conclude that the "inventors' incentive under competition..
235
will... always exceed the monopolist's incentive." An
opposite conclusion was reached by Professor Demsetz in a
modified model that in the "linear model of two industries of
234McLaughlin, p. 47-48.
235Arrow , Kenneth J. , "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in the Rate and Direction of In-
ventive Activity," National Bureau of Economic Research,
1962, p. 609, 621; and review and comment by Yamey, B. S.
,
"Monopoly, Competition, and the Incentive to Invent: A





equal output size, the more monopolistic will give the
greater encouragement to invention.. . . the development of a
monopoly invention. . . will receive greater rewards from a
236buying industry that is a monopoly."- Demsetz allows for
the output restricting effect of monopoly and demonstrates
that the incentive to invent is greater in a monopoly. To
accomplish this result, the monopolist's cost for the inven-
tion is viewed as a fixed, lump-sum payment regardless of
output, so that the monopolist's marginal cost curve is not
affected. Thus his analysis described a bilateral monopoly
with a lump-sum payment. Member firms of the computer in-
dustry would seem to regard within that lump-sum payment, an
opportunity-cost foregone to prosecute or otherwise police
the patent rights, and instead, apply additional funds toward
research and development to reap new rewards from continued
innovations. This seems particularly feasible in view of the
time span of a patent, seventeen years, against the average
computer generation of five years. Further, the time required
to obtain a patent from application to issue approaches the
five year life cycle of computer generations. Although
Demsetz' model allows for monopsony, and therefore does not
exactly describe the computer industry's customers (although
Demsetz, Harold, "Information and Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics , October 1969,
p. 19; and Yamey , B. S., op_ cit ; see also Kamien, Morton
I. and Schwartz, Nancy L. , "Market Structure, Elasticity
of Demand, and Incentive to Invent," The Journal of Law
and Economics, October 1969.
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they are relatively few and have a commonality of capital
capacity) , the computer industry has been described as near
237
monopoly by Professor Scherer.
The bilateral monopoly entails uncertainty and
negotiation in the pricing process which further affects the
degree of risk to the inventor. Professor Yamey finds that
an inventor's risk may be greater than in the competitive
situation when the negotiating or bargaining takes place
after the inventor has committed resources to an invention.
Such a situation opens the inventor to exploitation, which
could be minimized only by the impractical method of negoti-
ating pricr to making any substantial resource commitment
toward the invention. In the computer industry, this would
require large capitalization in order to support the exten-
sive research effort to develop (in advance) and test com-
puters and components. Texas Instruments provides an
example of a firm which has placed heavy amounts of research
and development funds toward component development for its
computer manufacturing clients, and as previously noted has
found itself in competition with its clients, in the compon-
ent making business. Its reaction is the opposite of what
Professor Yamey would expect (lessening of competition due
to an increase in risk) , since it is reported that Texas
Instruments, which already makes some small computers, plans
238
to seriously enter the computer manufacturing industry.
237 Scherer, p. GO
238,, TT Tilts at IBM's Market," p. 80; also see Yamey, p. 254,
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Professor Yamey's discussion of Arrow's analysis
is none the less enlightening in respect to the computer in-
dustry, specifically the assumption in Arrow's model that
239
"only the monopoly (manufacturer) itself can invent". It
is widely viewed in the business and economic literature that
in the corrputer industry, the dominant firm (IBM) has pro-
vided leadership in the marketing of computers and related
services more so than
.
in technology. This contention will be
examined separately in sections on non-price rivalry and per-
formance, but it can be noted that competition for innovation
has apparently been sufficient for the industry to accomodate
as many as 134 firms according to the Department of Commerce's
2401967 Census of Manufactures
,
in SI 2 3573. This large number
no doubt includes many small component and peripheral manu-
facturers, and the more frequently observed number is eight
to ten firms which normally engage in the production of a full
range or family of computers. Or, as Professor Hamid has noted
in his dissertation on the computer industry, the largest eight
241firms account for 98% of the computer industry's output.
Table III listed ten firms and an eleventh category for the
approximately one per cent measure of remaining output or
installed equipment values.
239Arrow, K. J., p. 619.
240
"Census, 1967: Industry Series", p. 21-22, and "Special
Report Series : Concentration Patios in Manufacturing
(MC67 (S)-2. 1) August 1970, p. 11-19, hereafter cited as
"1967 Concentration Ratios".
241Hamid, Mohammed K. , "Price and Output Decisions in the
Computer Industry," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Iowa, 1966, p. 32-35, 192.
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The leading eight to ten firms in the computer
industry have been found to actively compete to supply virtu-
ally all cf the industry's output; the marketing of which has
242become the hallmark of IBM's success. Apparent competition
in technology to present the latest, fastest equipment has not
been absent, and it can be maintained that the protection
afforded by the patent has contributed to open entry above
a fairly high capital requirement. Further, it would appear
that the incentive to invent is quite active among differen-
tiated products. However, it will be necessary to later
examine the role of hyperactive promotion and market strategy
in oligopolistic industries.
Space and time prevent an analysis of the very
large number of patents which have been issued to the computer
manufacturers in relation to their market share. Such analyses
have occasionally been the modulus of congruence between res-
prective market shares and market power hypotheses resulting
from industry studies. Professor Scherer studied the concen-
tration of sales, patents, and research and development usage
242Numerous business and marketing articles have acknowledged
IBM's dominance, many of which listed the marketing genius
as greater than the technological, until the evolution and
perfection of the system 360 series in the 1960's. In
addition to the historical development presented herein,
some such references include:
Alt, Franz L. , "Computers—Past and Future: The Costs of
Computing and Failure in Computer Programs", Computers and
Automation
, January 1969, p. 14-16.
Schwartz, Lawrence E. and Heilborn, George H. , "Marketing
the Computer," Datamation
,
October 1967, p. 22; and
Trifari, John C. "High Time for Used Computer Bargain
Hunters", Computer Decisions
,
July 1970, p. 10-13.
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in a sample of 35 2 large corporations from among the Fortune
'top 500' for 1955 data. He found it essential to distinguish
among different types of research activity and the degree o::
participation by private industry. He found that twenty per
cent of all basic research in the United States in conducted
by private industry; 65 per cent of all applied research, and
85 per cent of all development are likewise conducted by
private industry. The first four firms in his sample accounted
for 19.9% of sales, 9.7% of R & D employment, and 10.4% of all
patents issued in a time adjusted period. The first eight
firms followed a similar pattern: 27.5%, 16.4%, and 16.8%.
Scherer concluded
:
"... the largest firms account for a considerably
smaller share of both R&D employment (reflecting inventive
and innove.tive inputs) and patents (reflecting technical out-
put) than their share of sales.
The weight of available quantitative evidence
favors a conclusion that among the largest 5 00 or so U. S.
industrial corporations, increases in size do not as a rule
contribute positively to the intensification of R & D inputs
or inventive outputs, and in more cases than not, giant scale
has a slight to moderate stultifying effect. The most tech-
nically progressive American firms appear, with the possible
exception of chemicals and petroleum producers, to be those ?/.^
with sales of less than $200 million at 1955 price levels."
d. Product Durability
Until recently, there has been little evidence of
the mechanical durability of computers, and the five year com-
puter generation cycle does little to unveil the true longevity,
24 3Scherer, Frederic M. , "Firm Size and Patented Innovations,"
American Economic Review , December, 1965, p. 1104; and
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance , p
.
360-361; see also "Tiny Computers Lead a Price Decline,"
Business Week
,
May 11, 1968, p. 108. Scherer ' s article
hereafter cited as "Firm Size," while his book will con-
tinue to be cited by author's name only.
98

The very recent growth of the used computer market may be the
first market generated evidence of product durability. It is
observed that the literature alludes that computer obsoles-
cence is systematically programmed for a period of time suf-
ficient to enable the leading firm to recover development
244
costs. At that point a new generation or family of hard-
ware will nave been readied for intense marketing. One result
is the forced obsolescence of otherwise durable equipment iito
early retirement, or more recently into the quietly expanding
used computer market. 'The f inar.cial .and economic consid-
erations surrounding the individual firm's decision to procure
used hardware is no less complicated than the original decision
to lease, rent or buy new or current generation equipment.
Indeed, the decision has become somewhat more complicated
because of unbundling of software services, and considerations
of maintenance, investment tax credit, and compatibility with
other installed hardware. Heilborn reported that as the life
cycle of a given system progresses, CPU's decrease in value
more rapidly, with complete systems next, and peripheral
246
equipment holds closest to its original value over time.
There is a strong element of overall demand for peripheral
equipment in these observations, even though durability is
indicated by information in these early reports of a growing
segment of the computer industry.
244Heilborn, George H. , "Used Computers," Datamation , October 1,













Some of the other factors which have engendered
the used computer market also indicated that durability is
not necessarily a continuation of the original design, but
from a cost point of view, some older equipment can be
feasibly dedicated to specific tasks. The used market is
also encouraged by:
1. The expansion of some firms to larger systems
with some remaining tasks within the capability of equipment
available on the used market.
2. New customer firms, previously beyond the
feasible cost-fringe of mechanization. This is also the
first example of off-the-shelf supply capability, as opposed
to the traditional made to order structure.
3. Investment credit considerations has altered
the data processing manager's tax and cost alternatives,
however it is expected to eventually stabilize the used
247
equipment prices.
4. The residual value of prior generation equip-
ment has maintained a higher level than previously anticipated
An example discussed by George Heilborn was a three-year old
IBM 360/40 which had sold recently (October 1970) for a range
of 75% of the original IBM price.
5. Hardware costs and, hence, investment commit-
ments, can be reduced by the purchase of used equipment,
ceteris paribus , in the replacement of similar rented or






particular application has a long 'cerm life with little or no
expansion. Static payroll applications might Joe such an
application, which could release other newer equipment for
production expansion without more expensive upgrading.
Savings in the annual cost of depreciation mitigate in favcr
of such a combination.
6. Personnel training costs may be significantly
reduced when the decision to employ used equipment involves
248similar equipment to that already installed.
Advantages indicated by product durability 'in the
used computer must, of course, be (evaluated in terms of
available maintenance support, software services, and personnel
and equipment compatibility. Recent tight money markets of
1969 and 1970 have caused many businessmen to review the used




In the examination of the constraints and deter-
minants bearing on the supply of computers, the value of the
delivered product was found to have repercussions throughout
the market structure. Product value affects barriers to
entry, cost structures of producing firms, pricing behavior,
and production efficiency. A high value for goods in process
is found in the reports of some manufacturers, which in turn
relfects the high component and labor costs. Finished gooes
248 Ibid
. , p. 23.
24 9
Ibid.
, p. 22; see also Nelson, F. Barry, "Used But Useful?",
Datamation
,
October 1, 1970, p. 26-28.
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inventories are negligible, simply because the high product
value and relatively long production period dictate a type
of product which is made to a customer's order rather than
stocked. The shortage of peripheral equipment and resultant
high demand has not appreciably altered the practice of mads
250to order. The planning and research time has been found
to be a significant part of the eventual product value, in
an industry wherein personnel salai-ies arc predominately high,
25
1
and production cycles extend from one to four years. For
example, the IBM System 360 models were • announced on April 7,
1964, and were delivered between May 1965 and February 1966.
The largest member of that family, the 360/195, while not
part of the initial announcement, has nonetheless not yet
made its first delivery. Keydata Corporation reported that
252first delivery is scheduled for February 1971.
The long delivery time from announcement to the
first actual installation has caused considerable contro-
versey among competing firms, and is to be later examined in
non-price rivalry and as part of some of the antitrust suits.
Although the principal interest of this study is
a focus on the equipment manufacturers, a review of the nature
of the product requires acknowledgement that IBM contends that
its purpose is not to sell a product, but to provide a service
253




252,l Computer Industry to Hit $27 Billion in 1957," Computer
Dec isions, January 1970, p. 38, hereafter cited as "Computer
-^Industry to Hit."
Schwartz and Heilborn, p. 22.
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This becomes significantly clear when a firm (customer) con-
siders the total cost of hardware and related services.
Software services, maintenance, supplies, and a host of pre-
liminary services and studies to plan and implement data
processing activities are just some of the surrounding services
frequently needed to enable the hardward.
A recent example of the extensive value direction
which computer equipment can achieve in a very large system,
is the Defense Department's World Wide Military Command and
Control System (WIMMIX) which has also encountered a delay
in the first increment for Fiscal Year 1971, of about $64
million. Datamation reported that this massive system will
eventually include more than 35 large computer systems, and
that the investment in equipment over the next two years will
exceed $260 million. EDP Weekly reports similar cost esti-
mates, with a total foreseeable cost of $500 million.
An interesting requirement contained within the
Request for Proposal (RFP) of the Defense Department for the
WIMMIX, is that the specification tended to coincide with the
IBM service over product contention. Each bidder was required
to demonstrate a data management system (DMS) capability at
benchmark time, which could be demonstrated to be operational
255
at a later time.
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Hirsch, Phil, "Perspective: DOD Releases WIMMIX RFP as
House Kills Funds for First Two Computers," Datamation ,
November 15, 1970, p. 77; hereafter cited as "Perspective:
DOD"; see also "RFP's Go Out for WWMCCS" , EDP Weekly , Vol.
11, No. 25, October 5, 197 0, p. 3-4.




Business attitudes as a factor of supply will not
be laboriously examined. Much conjecture is possible in
observing that as a young, progressive industry most of the
techniques and skills in production were developed in the
post-World War II era. The young and aggressive leaders and
innovators who have been responsible for its rapid develop-
ment, have been seen in the history of the industry to have
developed a high degree of professionalism and entrepreneur-
ship, and perhaps more individualism than cooperation. IBM
has characterized a great amount of the current intra-industry
attitudes., A business environment seems to include the very
careful development of a master plan, and then the skillful
and deliberate execution of that plan. Two articles in
Fortune have been previously referred to as indicating some
of the inner-bickerings at IBM during the development of the
360 family and the termination of some sizeable projects,
such as the 0000 series. The rivalry in personalities is
tolerated as long as production has been demonstrated.
g. Unionization
Perhaps no input subject of the computer industry
has received as little attention in the literature as that
of the labor unions. Nor is it particularly surprising,
when the high degree of engineering skills required is con-
sidered, most of which are not normally represented by unions.
It was previously noted that, when IBM elected to build a
plant for the making of components, it designed as much
automatic equipment as possible to reduce the labor density
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before the plant ever got started. When set into production,
it then quickly became one of the two or three leaders in the
world production of semiconductors.
As recently as October 1970 the first union was
reported to have organized about 1250 programmers in New
York, which could have eventual effects throughout the in-
dustry. Under the presidency of Paul Notari, this new
organization, the Association of Computer Programmers and
Analysts, will expand toward an estimated programmers' nation-
wide group of 400,000. The experience with labor unions in
the computer industry, to date, has not been one of work
stoppage. The unique labor factor in computer manufacturing
appears to be the small number of highly skilled designers
and engineers, who have been in such limited numbers relative
to the labor demand, that manufacturers are willing to pay
above-average wages. In addition, these manufacturers have
employed expensive automatic techniques to maintain as low
a labor density as possible. Another factor from the unions'
point of view, might simply be that with such a relatively
small number of employees in the entire industry, organization
of that class of worker is not attractive.
A review of the general statistics of the Depart-
ment of Commerce in the Annual Survey of Manufactures , General
Statistics, indicated that the computer industry, based upon
all 178 establishments so categorized in the 1967 statistics,
paid the above average payroll per employee of $8,124; and
that the production worker was represented among total
employees as 51 per cent. A cursory review of other industries
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revealed thatproduction workers are usually 75% to 84% of the
total work force.
It is also noted from the 1967 Census of Manufactures
that only thirteen manufacturers in the computer industry
employ more than 2,500; and of the 50,700 production workers
in the industry, the top thirteen firms employ 23,200. The
total number of employees of these thirteen firms was 53,500
256
of the total 98,800. The 1967 statistics are the most
recent available which indicate a spread among the members
of the industry; however, the 1968 Annual Survey of Manufac tures
of the Department of Commerce indicates surprising growth,
from 98,900 to 106,800 total employees. One surprising factor
of this growth is that over the same period, comparably sized
industries, such as radio and television, and electrical test
equipment manufacturers were actually experiencing a decrease
in total employment. Some perspective will be obtained in a
later section on performance efficiency, however the relative
stability of employment has contributed to security market
analyst's tendency to consider the computer industry rela-
tively immune to business fluctuations. Recent personal
interviews with one brokerage firm indicates that this
tendency is being retarded.
The above figures from the Department of Commerce's
1967 census reports, could cause confusion without the reali-
zation that the numbers in no way reflect the total employment
"Census, 1967: Industry Series" p. 11, see also Chandler,
Alfred D. , "The Structure of American Industry in the
Twentieth Century: A Historical Overview", Business Hi story
Review, Autumn 1969, p. 275-293; and for information concern-
ing the unions, see "Computers: Out of the Slump", Newsweek ,
November 9, 1970, p. 79.
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of the various computer manufacturers. The Fortune annual
survey for 1970 reported that the fifth largest corporation
among the top five hundred in sales, IBM, was also fifth in
total number of employees: 258,662 at the end of 1969. While
no precise explanation could be found, it is suggested that
the latter number includes a number of persons engaged in
one of the five other industries of IBM, as reported by
Chandler using 2-digit classifications, or simply a variance
between the international and domestic employees' census of
IBM. The latter seems likely, since IBM's membership in the
typewriter industry could account for a maximum of only
26,000 employees, according to the same Department of Commerce
census.
2 . Demand for Computers and Computation
Certainly the demand for computers is derived from
the demand for computation, just as the demand for automobiles
is derived from the demand for revolutions per minute, or
miles per hour, or miles per gallon. Reasonable men have not
concluded that the latter performance characteristics are
interchangeable with the demand for (and sales of) automobiles
Only one recorded effort could be found that attempted to
measure and display the demand for computers, that of Gregory
Chow. His analysis was the most complete available, and
yet it too depends upon a selected representation of computer
Chow, Gregory C. , "Technological Change and the Demand for
Computers," The American Economics Review , Vol. LVII , No.
5, December 1967, p. 1117.
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characteristics to derive a demand curve. Invariably, most
of the studies to date have retired to an analytical model,
which purports to structure the demand for computation as a
means of assessing the demand for computers. Yet many scholars
in similar endeavors have noted that one must pursue a study
along lines for which reliable data are available and for
which some standard of accuracy can be maintained. The
essential sole source of information on the number of com-
puters of various configurations which have been shipped or
installed, has been noted to be acknowledged by its publisher,
International Data Corporation, as based on estimates in many
instances. Yet, as a measure of demand, it may be no more
inaccurate than some of the computational studies. Gregory
Chow, for example, acknowledges that his analysis is subject
to unknown errors resulting from the variations of programming
efficiencies, which certainly can affect the speeds of instruct-
ion execution cycles or memory timing.
While this is not insurmountable confusion, it is
clear that the computer industry is not represented in the
literature and texts with respect to analyses of demand.
Indeed, Chow's work is the only one available in the economic
literature. Perhaps the data now available from the Depart-
ment of Commerce will encourage such studies.
In the interim, if the performance approach can be
used, and Chow's is more recent and complete than most, al-





might also be feasible to interpret the results to specific
families of computers. Perhaps then a. discrete view of the
demand curves for various sizes of computers will emerge;
from this, the serious student would hope to be able to
construct empirical representations of demand in the com-
puter industry. Grosch's law may be useful to assist in the
discrete ssgmenting of the existing power/cost studies of
specific hardware, according to what has been actually pro-
duced at various prices and performance levels in the industry
The law of Herbert R. Grosch is suggested because it has be;n
found somewhat indicative that average cost of computer equip-
ment decreases substantially as size increases, in studies by
Knight and Solomon, and as reviewed in Sharpe's, The Economics
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of Computers . Sharpe summarized Grosch's law as,
C = K\/E or E = {—) C 2
K
where C = the cost of a computer system
E ~ the effectiveness (performance, speed, throughput)
of the system, and
K = ' some constant.
In Sharpe's review of Chow's analysis, he concluded
that the amount of computer power installed can be expected
to triple, eventually, if the price remains constant. How-
ever, Sharpe maintains that prices will actually fall, not
rise, negating the usefulness of Chow's approach. What each
of them mean by the word "price" may bring them into closer




agreement than Sharpe would imply, since Sharpe prefers to
consider price as being relative to computational output. By
this analogy, one might find that the price of automobiles has
been decreasing over time, in view of the increasing perfor--
• i u 260mance in mles per hour.
a. Demand in Computer Manufacturing
Demand and supply analyses along traditional paths
of economic endeavor have been found to be not widely discussed
in the professional literature. The numerous, virtually un-
limited, array of tasks and computations, and the combinations
of the many possible performance capabilities which can be
designed in a computer system have without doubt prevented
complete studies. The studies of Solomon, Knight, Chow, and
Sharpe provide a starting point, even though at present they
represent the output of a "typical" computer, not the output
of the computer industry. Yet a count of cabinetry would add
little to the understanding of demand and output. The com-
lexity grows when the peripheral combinations are considered
and, as Chow has acknowledged, when software, and in particu-
lar the variabilities in performance from systems software,
compiler and interpreter designs are added to the vast matrix
of hardware configurations. The temptation to consider any
analysis complete upon solving that one million calculations
now cost an average of twenty-five cents, is puzzling, since
the customer or user cannot relate that performance to an








several years, it has been frequently reported in the litera-
ture that raany firms upon initial entry into a computerized
operation have obtained the wrong computer capability, or that
many users have considerable untapped capacity in their hard-
ware. The large number of users with third generation hardware,
who were yet employing second generation software programs
through emulation, some for years after obtaining the third
generation hardware, has likewise been reported in the litera-
ture frequently. The author has personally visited factories
in New England where this result was witnessed. The, billions
of computations for twenty-five cents seems meaningless to
under-employed hardware at a fixed price.
To the maximum extent possible, this section will
not be devoted to the derivation of a new approach for the
measurement of the number of bits or executions per dollar.
The studies of Knight, Chow, Solomon and Sharpe were among
the best available for the purpose of evaluating one aspect
of performance; however, some use will be made of the techni-
ques and results. That Grosch ' s law is largely valid as
a general expression of cost to power of output has consider-
able utility. It will first be necessary to identify some
of the basic elements of demand from Figure 1.
b. Elasticity of Demand
The relative responsiveness of the quantity of
computers in any given category to changes in prices has not
been published, nor is it easily measured in view of the state
262Chow, G. C. , p. 1117-1130; see also Knight, K. E. , "Fast"
and "Performance", September 1966 and January 1968; and
Solomon, M. B. , "IBM", p. 435-440.
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of industry statistics. The following basic conditions in
the computer industry reflect the possible responsiveness.
(1) The rigidity of the price schedules of the
dominant firm, and its high degree of price leadership obvi-
ate any noteworthy movement in the relationship of demand to
prices. It does not follow, however, that the "set price"
condition is complete, for indeed, the product as conceptu-
alized by that dominant firm includes a considerable package
of service:, within which price movement can more subtly
effect demand.
(2) The complexities of the apparent price and
the effect: on demand from the surrounding services, present,
a dampening effect or slow movement of services' pricing.
The true effects of unbundling of hardware and software are
not yet documented, seventeen months after the dominant firm
announced the separate pricing. Price leadership disinte-
grated as the followers reacted slowly, some (GE) even raised
hardware prices; others (Burroughs) waited for a new genera-
tion. The customers simply kept paying whatever was to be
A 264charged.
(3) The lack of reliable information on the
quantities of computers shipped or installed, as a measure
of response, complicate demand measurement.
"Tiny Computer Lead," Business Week, op_. cit. , p. 108;
and Schwartz and Heilborn, p. 22; and Hamid , p. 143-149.
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(4) The customer of the computer industry is gen-
erally better informed, or thought to be, because that customer
is normally a business organization with resources and talent
to operate the hardware, and executives to manage its operation.
Such comma.tment of scarce resources by an organization, flows
through a decision process, which as Professor Hamid has found
using the Cyert-JMarch behavioral theory of the firm, results
in an internally reactive customer to a full scale of qualitative
and quantitative determinants. For example, response to a
lower price announced by a peripheral manufacturer may be
delayed until technical compatibility can be determined or
because of contractual commitments of existing hardware.
(5) The present tools are insufficient to precisely
measure elasticity; with output presently measured in bits or
memory speed, the industry growth evaluated in total sales
values or shipments' values, only the most general conclusions
of price response can be advanced.
The present difficulty in the precise measurement
of elasticity may not be critical to the understanding of an
industry which deals in a complex capital good, sold to a
sufficiently small number of informed customers that demand
can almost be evaluated by interview as opposed to reactive
curve-price-quantity plotting. Professor Hamid reported that
the manufacturers which he surveyed, replied that they placed
little reliance on demand forecasts, for example, and that
price evaluation by customers placed more importance on pros-
pective future prices than on past prices, or historical
113

265pricing patterns. Future studies, however will benefit
from price comparisons with those on the used computer market,
as previously noted.
The study of technical change and the demand for
computers by Gregory Chow acknowledged the difficulty in
estimating output elasticity. He employed a univariate
measurement of technological change, from the demand side,
by measuring price reduction effects in the computer indus-
try between 1955-1965. His model was adjusted to 1960 dollars,
and he used three hardware characteristics which he tested
for relative representativeness: rrultiplication time, memory
size, and access time. He assumed a high representation for
these characteristics, but acknowledged that the omission of
software as a determinant of improvement could lead to serious
266
error. Such is of course true for any of the studies
previously examined involving the measurement of hardware
output based on a representative sample. Nonetheless, Chow's
study was the only one found which attempted to present a
point estimate of the price elasticity of demand for computers,
267
which he found to be 1.44, in the long run. This result is
presented as D* in Figure 2.
Chow asserts that two elements account for the
increase in the use of computers, and he confirmed that the
265Hamid, p. 140-146.
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price per unit of output decreases over time. The first is
simply the time required for a new product to reach an
equilibrium level even without quality changes. The second
occurs at the same time, and is the increase in quality of
the product, and as the increase occurs, the equilibrium
level is continuously raised. To quantify this from two
popular differential equations which express natural growth,
Chow elected to use the Gompertz curve, of the form:
|£ = Q (In Q* - In Q)
where the value of Q* is the equilibrium value of Q, which
actual value (Q) approaches asymptotically. Sharpe restates
this in the discrete time periods as
:
In Qt - In Qt _ 2 = (In Q* - In Qt _ 1 )
To apply the adjustment process of the Gompertz curve, Chow
hypothesized that the price, in predicted monthly rental (P*)
,
increased with memory size and decreased as memory speed in-
creased, as follows:
In P* = a - b. In t + b In M - b, In t







where p* ~ predicted monthly rental
t ~ multiplication time (in microseconds)
m L
M = memory size (in thousands of bits)
t = access time (in microseconds) , and
a
A - e a
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Then assuming that price adequately predicted computing power,
he applied the quantity of computing power of each system and
its rental measurement based on adjusted 1960 prices, of the
form :
In Q = -0.1045 - 0.0654 In t + 0.5793 In M - 0.1406 In t
m a
He then calculated the price index based on actual IBM rental
information, and adjusted these prices by deflating the
"absolute 1 ' values to reflect changes in the general price
levels. The price-quantity pairs could then be used to
estimate a demand curve (D*) by regression, having the -con-
stant elasticity :
In Q = a + b In P (Q ~ APb )
where A = e c and b = price elasticity of demand, less than
zero.
The long run equilibrium demand curve, D* , ex-
pressed in Figure 2, may not exactly represent the actual
price-quantity paired curve becaus2 the adjustment process
represented by the Gompertz curve was relatively slow. The
coefficient of the Gompertz equation was found to be 0.2526.
When this coefficient is near zero, it represents no adjust-
ment; when it is closer to unity it represents full adjustment
in a single time period. Sharpe makes the point that if price
remained constant over succeeding short time periods, as
quantity demanded increased, a long run equilibrium value,
Q* , would be eventually reached and- would indicate the points
for a demand curve. He stated that D* should not be repre-
sented by short run observations of prices and quantities,
but rather, only by long run equilibrium positions. He
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demonstrated the results, as indicated in Figure 2 by the
inside curve, when future prices are held constant; it is
the Gompertz curve with a coefficient of 0.2526. If, in
fact, future prices fall and technology increases the power
or performance, then Chow's representation based on constant
prices will not reflect long run demand for computation.
Sharpe then concluded that neither approach (Gompertz curve
nor the Logistic, or S curve) is likely to satisfactorily
predict growth in computing power. Chow preferred the
use of the Gompertz curve because of comparable empirical
studies conducted by A. D. Bain concerning a similar early-
growth, technology-oriented television industry in which
the growth rate was found to be higher at an early stage
and then found to decline gradually in later time periods;
such was also the findings of Chow with respect to the com-
* ,
269puter industry.
c. Rate of Growth of Demand .
The complexity in measuring the growth of demand
for the use of computers in the United States follows from
the same difficulties which were found to hinder the measure-
ment of elasticity of demand, product value, costs, product
durability and other input determinants. However, Chow
observed that the 1960 based rental value for computers grew
from $370 thousand per month at the end of 1954 to about $194






million at the end of 1965, for an average annual rate of
growth of 88%. In another study by Professors Schwartz and
270Heilborn it is challenged that technological change should
be isolated to present natural growth in the computer indus-
try, and they observed that technological impetus is more
pronounced in the early years of an innovative industry.
(This confirms Chow's findings of a slightly earlier period.)
Schwartz and Heilborn also provide an extremely interesting
very long range projection of continued growth in the indus-
try, which fully accomodates the somewhat shorter range, pro-
jection of Chow in his selection of the Gompertz curve.
These combined results are presented in Figure 3, and it is
apparent that growth is quite pronounced in the early stages
of development, gradually decreasing over time. These two
studies represent the only available analysis which could be
found concerning the rate of growth of demand for computers.
The study of Schwartz and Heilborn contended that consider-
able misrepresentation had been made in the mid-1960 's that
the demand for computers had begun to mature, in terms of
measurable growth rate. They also observed, contrary to most
of the literature at that point, two directions of future
growth :
(1) The rapid expansion toward the small computers
(2) The sharp reduction of growth in large scaJ.e
equipment owing to delays in perfecting effective time-sharing
271
and management information systems.
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These projections appear to be well supported by
current developments, including the yet unresolved diffi-
culties in the communications interface task, which will hold
the utility concept well into the future. Schwartz and
Heilborn also projected a slowing of the five year interval
between computer generations as part of a long range temper-
ing of technological growth, but the announcements of 1970
may have delayed that prediction.
In explanation of the use of the S-shaped or sig-
moid curve they relate that economic theory holds that the
rate of growth of demand depends on both the present size of
the market and the difference between that value and some
hypothesized saturation level. Further explaining the re-
sults presented in Figure 3:
"... it fits quite well the observed behavior of
many markets over time. In section A of (Figure 3) , demand
grows exponentially in the period .After the introduction of
computers, because potential customers want the product
badly. Section B shows that the rate of growth gradually
declines until absolute year-to-year growth becomes stationary
as initial demand for the computer are satisfied. Demand falls
as more and more capital in the form of computers is added to
fixed amounts of labor and natural resources, so that the
profitability of investing in additional equipment falls. In
section C, the absolute rate of growth declines because the
profitability of investing in new machines is still falling 272
and existing computers, being long-lived, need not be replaced."
Section D of Figure 3 represents the accomplishment
of saturation, at which time demand for computers is projected
to be for replacements and upgrading.
In a recent shorter range projection, the Diebold
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summarizes their findings as reported in Computer Decisions
,
and it can be noted that the accelerated growth for peripheral
equipment is projected to 1975. Diebold expected that the
number of computer systems will reach 46,000 by 1975, and that
37,000 of them will be the small, mini-computer; of that
amount, 22,000 are expected to be employed in dedicated con-
273trol of production equipment. Somewhat contrary to the
Schwartz study, however, Diebold projected that a new infor-
mation services industry (through remote terminals) will
emerge, with a value of $6.4 billion (sic) by 1975. They
further note that this growth is largely attributed to the.





(2) Design applications in archetecture
,
animation, and city planning
(3) Interactive graphic display applications
(4) Procurement tasks such as vendor selection,
bid evaluation, purchase order preparation, and material
flow control.
d. Substitutes
The subject of the availability of substitutes
and cross elasticity of demand at various prices reopens the
complex issue of the determination of a cost-benefit relation-
ship among alternative choices of information processing
273





, and the cost trade-offs which have made
comparisons particularly difficult. Simple cost displacement
methods have been attempted by customer firms with limited
275
success. In most matured applications, the choice between
automated and non-automated techniques has no longer been
open to complete reversal except when sizeable reorganization
and cost benefits can be clearly demonstrated. Personnel
adjustments and training investments likewise bear heavily
on alternatives involving substitutes.
J. M. Clark has argued persuasively, in general,
that long run demand schedules might "in numerous cases
approach the horizontal so closely that the slope would not
be a mattej: of material moment, in light of all the uncer-
*7 (~\
tainties involved." This hypothesis has had important
performance implications which will be examined in a con-
cluding section. The demand for products, or as IBM asserts,
for services, of a firm or an interacting group of firms
which possess market power is much more price elastic over
the long run than in the short run. Two reasons have been
277proposed for this by Scherer. The first is that competi-
tion among products or services is much more intense in the
long run than over any observable short period. It takes




Clark, J. M. , "Toward a Concept of Workable Competition",
The American Economic Review , June, 1940, p. 248.
277 Scherer, F. M.
,
p. 213; and Schwartz and Heilborn, p. 22.
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changes in spite of active marketing pressures. The second is
common to most industries with even a semblance of competition,
in that a price policy which has maintained prices persistently
above average cost levels, may attract new entry into the indus-
try. The very simple mechanism over time from the above con-
dition, is that if such new entry competes to a point of
reducing the price levels, some individual firm's average
cost might be found in a loss condition. Entry and exit
effects of substitute products in the computer industry,
with its carefully differentiated hardware, is particularly
difficult to evaluate since leading manufacturers are willing
to endure great development losses. Proper evaluation of the
cross elasticity of substitution in the computer markets is an
ambitious area for analysis not yet possessing data for such
analysis. The complexities of the hardware and related soft-
ware choices and the uncertainties of technology, together
with the period of contractual commitment have served to slow
the reaction time of the using firms. At the risk of over-
generalization, it would appear in the dominated computer
market that the effects of substitution have been minor,
although not necessarily non-existent. As noted previously,
the emergence of the used computer market, as a new price-
substitute factor in the new computer market, may be the
first opportunity to measure the effects of substitution.
e. Marketing and Hardware Acquisition
The scope of marketing in this context does not
include advertising and customer engineering services. Some
of the effects of these very broad areas and the relation no
125

hardware manufacturing will be necessary. The practice of
buying and selling of computer hardware has been observed to
involve a very detailed manufacturer's "list price schedule"
rather than solicited, sealed-bid price derivation. Nor is
such a practice uncommon in markets involving industrial pro-
ducts. The many decision steps leading to a list price
schedule on the part of the manufacturer, and the steps to
be followed on the part of the purchaser, were studied by
Professor Hamid following the Cyert-March behavioral theory
278
of the firm. He found the computer industry to be highly
adaptive to that approach because it focused on the full range
of steps or considerations, not all of which are, or can be
quantified. He found manufacturers interacting in the price
leader technology oriented industry; and he found many levels
of buyer and seller interaction to arrive at complex hardware
and pricing arrangements.
There is a considerable volume of literature which
has defended or attacked the profit maximization hypothesis
of the traditional firm theory, but at the operating level
of the businessman in the computer market, there is an environ-
ment of dynamic uncertainty ranging from potential techno-
logical obsolescence to application success. The user, even
as a businessman, is faced with the skillfull marketing
engineer on the one hand, and his own internal firm com-
plexities which sometimes seem to be in conflict with ulti-
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around the traditional firm theory as having been designed
to explain "... the way in which the price system functions
as a mechanism for allocating resources among markets;
relatively little is said about resource allocation within
the firm. " ' The behavioral theory has considerable
intuitive appeal in that it attempts to identify price as a
fact in the decision process. Cohen and Cyert dismiss profit
maximization of the conventional theory of the firm, and then
og i




(4) Market share goal
(5) Profit goal
Dr. Hamid appears to finally acknowledge the pro-
fit goal as important in his report of the results of a survey
of eight manufacturers of computers (three did not respond)
and five related firms. Profit, growth, reputation, and
return on investment were ranked highest by the respondents.
The traditional theory of the firm does not
appear to provide any unusual difficulty in explaining the
operation of the oligopolistic market behavior which Dr. Hamid
and others have observed in the computer industry. All of the
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280Hamid, M. K. , Chapter IV; see also Cohen, Kolman, J. and
Cyert, Richard M. , Theory of the Firm: Resource Allocation
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in a Market Economy , Prentice-Hall, 1965, p. 330-331.






many elements of price and output decision-making can be
observed along the lines of the market mechanism, whether a
dominant firm affects the market or is dominated by market
conditions. The difficulty in evaluating some of the econo-
mic effects in the industry is the absence of reliable rele-
vant data, rather than by a choice of models to afix such
information. The many cost decisions which the leading
manufacturers surely engage, are not disclosed for public
scrutiny. The public interest might thereby be indirectly
hampered if unreasonable profit maximization has been per-
mitted; this possibility will be examined in the section on
public policy.
f. Cyclical Character of Demand
The constant need for larger, faster memory
handling seems to be the response of technology (supply) to
demand. Yet computer generations which have ushered the
technology are also within the control of the manufacturers.
The possibility of planned obsolescence has been explored in
283
the literature at length, and the question of whether
technology will continue to punctuate succeeding generations
has been raised by Schwartz and Heilborn. The pattern of a
generation cycle has become a part of the structure of the
market which seems likely to continue, not only as a means of
introducing advanced capability and timing of the research





effort to the market place, but an economic necessity of cost
recovery for the manufacturers. That capital intense pro-
duction and research commitment in the computer industry has
become a pattern with no apparent alternatives, is beginning
to become an economic reality.
B. MARKET STRUCTURE AND MARKET MECHANISM
The electronic digital computer industry requires four
divisions to permit its essential product to function:
hardware, software , services, and supplies. Several other
categorizations might include important divisions such as
training and systems' studies. The focus of this study has
been placed on the equipment, or hardware, manufacturers
which frequently required an understanding of those other
divisions in order to comprehend the existing market structure,
The importance of the market structure in determining the
behavior of the firms in the industry, and likewise the
industry's contribution toward major economic goals, which
is the performance objective will now be examined. The
causal flow of the active elements considered in the basic
objectives of supply and demand (Figure 1) provides the
foundation for this structure.
1. Oligopolistic Structure
Although the Department of Commerce reports examined
in the basic conditions listed as many as 140 to 178 firms
in the computer industry classification (SIC 3573) , it has
also been determined that 98% of the output of the industry
in terms of sales value of shipments can be attributed to as
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few as eight or ten manufacturers. Table III listed the most
recent information available concerning the sales of the ten
leading firms, and supports the oligopoly definition ascribed
by Drs. Hamid , Schwartz, and Heilborn. In a classic study of
oligopoly and antitrust by Kaysen and Turner, the definition
of an oligopoly was found to center around the percentage of
the industry's sales attributed to each of a small number of
284firms. This definition will become more complex in the
consideration of market conduct, for, as Richard Caves had
stated in his text on American Industry,' the interaction of
sellers in an oligopolistic market is not only a distinguish-
ing feature, it affects behavior and ultimately performance.
285Caves refers to this as mutual interdependence.
In an extensive study by Kaysen and Turner, 27 indus-
try groups were divided into three categories, which have
become constants of reference in the economic literature:
Type I oligopolies, in which the eight leading firms (in
sales) account for at least 50% of the industry sales; Type
II oligopolies in which the leading eight firms accounted
for between 33 and 49%, and the top twenty accounted for at
least 75% of the industry's sales; and "unconcentrated" in-
dustries with many firms and lower concentration ratios. The
general conclusion of Kaysen and Turner is summarized in
Table XI: 286
284Kaysen, Carl and Turner, Donald F. , Antitrust Policy ,
Harvard University Press, 1959, p. 21-41.
285Caves, R. , op_. cit . , p. 39.
286Kaysen and Turner, especially Tables of Statistics, appendix,
p. 275-291; and Scherer's summary, p. 60-61.
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THE NUMBER OF OLIGOPOLISTIC INDUSTRIES
Number of Percentage of
Industries Total 1954 Sales
Type I Oligopoly 64 23
Type II Oligopoly 56 36
Unconcentrated 71 41
Table XI
From this very broad study, and numerous other sources,
it is readily concluded that the computer industry satisfies
the Type I oligopoly. Not only the top eight firms, but
indeed the top firm has accounted for not 50% but 69 to 73%
over several years. Table III has indicated that the top ten
firms account for 98.9% of 1969 computer industry shipments.
Professor Scherer listed the computer industry among leading
examples over the past several years which have approached
monopoly, when, in 1968, IBM managed "to retain more than
70 per cent of the turbulent digitalelectronic computer and
287
data processing equipment market."
Although such studies normally concern sales, the
data concerning value of shipments has been necessary to
provide a denominator of sales and rentals of computer equip-
ment. It also contributed to more refinement in that sales
figures of manufacturers frequently included revenues from




in determining accurate industry data has been noted; many
common sources of such data to businessmen were traced to a
single leading source: International Data Corporation, or
its industry newsletter EDP Industry and Market Report
, both
of Newtonville, Massachusetts. Adams Computer Characteristics
,
or its successor, Keydata, Computer Characteristics Review of
nearby Watertown, Massachusetts, are also referred to in the
literature as data sources. The latter quarterly summarizes
hardware characteristics, and lists general price ranges, but
288does not attempt to record installed quantities.
288Numerous common business, economic, and marketing publi-
cations refer to these two sources or newsletters thereof.
For example, Computerworld is a weekly industry statistical
report of International Data Corporation (their use of an
address of both Newton and Newtonville, Mass. with identical
street addresses has not been resolved). Keydata, as
noted does not publish quantities of computers shipped.
Thus, the bimonthly EDP Industry and Market Report was
found to be the only source for such information, and
since the leading firms in the reports refused to divulge
exact data, the information is derived from customer sur-
veys. By telephone conversation with Joan Schaar, of that
industry publication, it was learned that this survey pro-
cedure, called the "Blue Sheet", is regularly mailed to all
known computer users and manufacturers. Common sources such
as Barrons
,
The Wall Street Journal
,
Business Week , Forbes ,
Standard and Poors, Computers and Automation (which has
same Newtonville address)
,
and indeed many of the statis-
tical reports listed and cited herein, all have depended
directly or indirectly on this single source. Since the
Department of Commerce is forbidden by law to disclose in-
dustrial firms' data, the sole source of census information
becomes : International Data Corporation. That such data
may be highly accurate is not questioned. EDP I & MR dis-
continued estimating its own accuracy; however, the survey
to user firms was estimated to include 80% of the industry




The Department of Commerce conducts a census of manu-
facturers approximately every five years. The published
reports therefrom, which typically take one to five years
to compile and publish, provide information concerning the
employment, manhours, payrolls, value added by the manu-
facturing process, capital expenditures, cost of materials,
inventory data, and value of products shipped, all classified
by numerically coded industry groups. Current legislation
provided that such census undertaking shall be conducted in
years ending in "2" and "7" „ hence the next census of manu-
facturers will be conducted in 1973 covering activity which
289
will have occurred in 1972.
The classification index used for these census is the
Standard Industrial Classification Manual (SIC) , which pre-
sents industrial activity in a heirarchial system by major
industries. The 1967 census has been published between June
and November 1970 (preliminary reports were published about
one year earlier) . That current census lists twenty-one
2-digit major manufacturing industry groups, 150 subdivisions
of 3-digit groups, which are further divided into 422 4-digit
industry and product groups, 1200 5-digit product classes,
and finally, about 10,000 7-digit individual product types.
Not all industrial input into the industries surveyed is
delineated in the latter category; rather, as a means of
developing industrial activity apart from that which might
"Census, 1967: Industry Series", p. iv.
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be visibly represented by any given firm, deeper and deeper
classification becomes necessary. This "SIC" system for
U. S. industrial classification is portrayed in Table XII
for the computer industry, and is representative of much
of the other industry's formats. The SIC code followed by
an asterisk indicate a digit-level category in use for the
290
computer industry prior to the final report series for 1967.
The Department of Commerce also prepares a special
report series as part of the census, which includes infor-
mation on the degree of concentration in any given industry
group, usually according to the 4-digit classification. The
computer industry was found to require deviation from the
normal reporting method of value of shipments accounted for
by the 4, 8, 20, and 50 largest companies. Instead, the
computer industry is reported by "value added by manufacture"
,
ostensibly because value of shipments contains a substantial
and unmeasurable amount of duplication. Intra-firm transfers
of course would diminish the usefulness of such data. The
value added method presents a less concentrated picture for
the computer industry than the market share evaluation
implicit in Table III data. The total value added for SIC
3573 was $1,926.4 million and the percentage attributed by
the standard grouping of the 134 firms, in the order 4, 8,





; see also "Census, 1967: Summary Series," and Singer,
E. M. , Antitrust Economics , Prentice-Hall, 1968, p. 160-168;
and "1968 Annual Survey".
291
"1967 Concentration Ratios", p. 31, 38.
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THE STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION SYSBEM FOR
THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY (SIC 5575)
NUMBER
OF
SIC CODS DIGITS DESIGNATION HAKE
55 Major inductry Machinery, except electrical
group

















Computers and related machines
Computers
Parte and attachments made especi-
al] y for computers
Parts and attachments made especi-
ally for computers
Various products of the manufacture
listed in Table 6A of each industry
group surveyed. Could be a teletype*




The structure of the computer industry, in terms of the
number of sellers and buyers is relatively small. Eight to ten
firms produce more than 90% of the output (98% according to
the data from Dr. Hamid's study in 1966), and a total industry
membership of 134, 140, or 178 firms which limit actually is
determined by the number of employees. The Department of
Commerce did not canvas firms with fewer than ten employees,
although it estimated that there were nine firms with one to
four employees accounting for $400,000 in value of shipments;
and an estimated six firms with five to -nine employees,
accounting for $1.2 million dollars. The concentration has
other determinants depending upon the degree of specialization
in the product represented by the firms categorized by any
4-digit group, and these factors will be further examined in
a subsection titled, according to Professor Scherer's outline,
"conglomerateness"
.
The number of buyers cannot be accurately determined
in the computer industry. One indicator of this element of
the market structure is the cumulative net systems installed.
Then if one desires to consider any further refinement, for
such reasons as allocation of marketing resources, additional
reference data might include the annual inventory of computing
equipment in the federal government, supervised by the General
292Services Administration. The current inventory identifies
5277 systems in the federal government, and provides a detailed
292
U. S. Bureau of the Budget, "Inventory of Automatic Data
Processing Equipment in the Federal Government," U. S.
Government Printing Office, July 1970, Charts 1-4.
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account of the number by method of procurement, geographical
location, and indeed management classification of employment.
It also provides a detailed account by manufacturer, and it
must be noted that this count does not conform to the output
statistics of Table III. This provides a caution for deriving
any cabinet-counting technique, unless dollar values are also
applied, which are not so provided in that inventory. The
distribution by manufacturer is reproduced as Table XIII, and
to assist in comparing just how the federal government compares
as a large buyer, Table I may be used which includes cumulative
systems in use, from Standard and Poor's "Basic Analysis" of a
293
comparable time period. The latter is an inventory or count
of the net number of systems shipped and in use by U. S. manu-
facturers covering a ten year period, with data from EDP Indus-
try Repor t o From this data it can be noted that, although
the U. S. Government was a significant user of the computer
industry's output at its inception le.ss than twenty years ago,
it operates only about 5% of the systems in use based on 1970
data. The 109,800 systems estimated to be in use and the
5,277 accounted for by the government inventory do not of
course represent the dollar value of the investment.
2. Product Differentiation
Having examined the very large number of possible
differences in computer hardware, much of which has been
made possible by a well-organized and financed technology,
one can then multiply those differences many times by the
293
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WORLD-WIDE COMPUTER ACTIVITY AND SYSTEMS
Number of Cumulative Million Cumulative
Systems Number Value £ Billion
Shipped in Use Shipped Value in Use
E 197^ 62,200 272,100 15,400 70.8
E 1975 55,100 219,100 11,800 60.8
E 1972 42,800 175,900 10,500 51.7
E 1971 55,800 157,700 c,940 45.8
E 1970....... 25,100 109,800 7,720 5608
1969 19,650 89,400 7,170 50.8
1968 « 14,700 69,400 7,150 24.6
1967 18,700 57,600 5,900 18.
9
1966... 10,200 40, 600 5,660 15.5
1965....... 7,4oo 51,000 2,4oo 10.1
E-Estimated
Source: EOF Industry Report , as published in "industry Surveys:
Basic Analysis", Standard & Poors, July 9, 1970, page 15,
DUPLICATE OF TABLE I ENCLOSED FOR EASE OF THE READER.
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addition of constantly improving software, as previously
acknowledged by Gregory Chow. The methods by which firms
strive to differentiate their products from rivals' have
actively followed the early exponential growth of technology
noticed by Dr. Schwartz and G. Heilborn. In the simplist
forms of competition a participant may alter the price or
the product, or both, presumably to maximize profits. In
the computer industry, technology has so rapidly improved
hardware output performance, as previously noted in the
studies of Knight, Solomon, and also Chow and Sharpe , while
prices remained somewhat constant, that product differenti-
ation provides a natural shelter for price behavior. Not
one of the previously advanced studies asked the question,
why did not the hardware price decline as output so rapidly
improved. The limited sources of price information indi-
cated that the prices remained constant, i.e., the price tag
witnessed by the accounting department of a user. Scherer
has noted that, generally, the price decisions are more readily
alterable than product decisions, although the computer indus-
try follows the inverse of both. For most industries, as
Scherer indicated, the product commitment with both long and
short run considerations, leads to a not too severe over-
simplification that pricing decisions epitomize the tactical
problems of business enterprise, "while product differenti-
294




Strategy emerges in the short run, however, in the
computer industry, with a phenomenal five year new product
cycle. It becomes important to review the basic forms of
product differentiation to give appropriate recognition to
the uses of this differentiation, and later to some of the
consequences
.
The first and most important form of differentiation
is the physical product differences, both actual and implied.
Manufacturers will differentiate products so as to display im
adaptation or improvement over competing products, yet still
within some accepted normal range of capabilities. Some
standards have emerged with U. S. Government encouragement
in ASCAI for character capacity representation, and the
direction of the Department of Defense that COBOL language
capability be included in hardware procured under its auth-
ority. The market mechanism has been seen to provide a
measure of commonality among manufacturers, who desire their
hardware to be as general purpose as possible so as to com-
pete for a maximum of different application requirements
(demand). Product differentiation must also be accomplished
within competing capabilities of peripheral equipment and a
large range of software, including systems software, compilers,
and translators.
A second, form of differentiation is service. Hardware
and software services' pricing methods have provided a major
test of a very complex pricing system in the computer industry.
Hardware and software prices have been intricately combined
by most manufacturers, in such a way as to present to the
141

buyer a wide variety of packaged prices. This method has
been attacked by the independent software firms under various
charges of unfair competition and monopolization. These
matters will be examined in a review of cases in the section
on public policy. Generally, separate pricing has become an
accomplished fact, and is often referred to as "unbundling".
It will be seen that the large manufacturers which have un-
bundled hardware and software prices, have slightly reduced
equipment prices, and introduced services' prices which are
significantly higher than previous combined charges. None-
theless, the full effect on differentiation based on services,
since the unbundling of June 1969 are being overshadowed by
the new hardware announcements, and prices, of 1970.
Differentiation of products by the application of
essential services is especially important in the computer
industry. Professor Hamid found that computer manufacturers
have had considerable freedom in the .market to assign prices
different from those of their competitors; and the degree of
price variations depended upon the product differences in
terms of performance. Performance which is surrounded with
essential services provided considerable latitude for
295differentiation.
A third form of differentiation, location of a plant
or factory convenient to a locus of buyers, is not important
in the computer industry. One of the leading reasons for
295
Hamid, Chapter II, and p. 34.
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this is that the effect is normally accomplished in the above
category of service. Programming, engineering, and systems
services are frequently provided readily available to most
customers, and in the case of large users or complex systems,
such services are often available at the location of the
equipment.
One of the results of the availability of service is
a quality product image, which is carefully maintained in the
computer industry. This fourth important form of product
differentiation will require further discussion in advertising
and promotion under market conduct. In a market structured
under the dominant leadership of a proven promotion expert,
differentiation on the part of the competetive fringe of
followers, becomes a task of either establishing overwhelming
technical advantages as was seen in the historical develop-
ment of Control Data Corporation, or a task of displaying to
prospective buyers that its product accomplishes as much or
more for a lower price. The literature of the computer indus-
try is very much dedicated to endless comparative discussions
296
of these differences. That a useful service is thereby
performed in informing the buyers and users is not questioned,
but will be examined as part of conduct and performance in the
industry.
Q C-\
For example, periodic articles in Datamation's "Perspective"
follow major equipment announcements, which compare and
analyze specific configurations. "RCA's New Line", and
IBM's 370/145 Uncovered", of October 1970 and November




3. Barriers to Entry
The appearance and disappearance of firms in the
computer market was described by Dr. Hamid as characterized
297by limited freedom. It can be observed as considerably
more limited with respect to the manufacturing of digital
computer equipment. Some of the leading inhibitors of
entry are
:
a. A very high capital requirement to support the
costly, long term production cycle.
b. Technical complexity of hardware and logic
designs requires personnel capabilities, at the limited
scientist and engineering levels.
c. The innovative capabilities as a limited resource
are further constrained by the patenting consideration, as
noted earlier.
d. The noticeable absence of profits for several
years permits only large well-financed manufacturers to
attempt entry. Major firms such as NCR, RCA, Burroughs,
Sperry Rand, and General Electric have experienced long
periods of unprofitable computer production. The partial
withdrawal of GE from computer manufacturing, and the re-
defining of its objectives toward the time sharing segment
of the computer market, is the observed reaction of the
fourth largest U. S. corporation according to the Fortune





Ibid. See also "Fortune 500, 1970," p. 184-185.
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A substantial and intriguing body of economic know-
ledge in the field of price theory and the relationship to
entry, is beyond the scope of this review, however Dr.
Scherer's text provides an excellent entry into the litera-
ture of current analyses, in his chapter on "Pricing to
Deter Entry" . Application of existing theories to the com-
puter industry is particularly difficult in the examination
of entry and exit of member firms, because of the long
reaction time as noted of major firms above, the absence
of price and cost statistics to determine possible entry
conditions on the competetive fringe, and the unmeasurable
effect of technology with its related innovation announce-
ment cycles. It can be generally observed that to date in
the young computer industry, prices have apparently not
risen sufficiently high to encourage a large new entry of
competitors. The new developments in the small, or mini,
computer market, and IBM's belated entry into that field
could be the first hint of open entry for a producer with
existing capability and marketing expertise. .The growth
of the small computer market perhaps could be the target of
such new entrants as Xerox and Texas Instruments. The
sizable technology and expertise barriers are attainable
through different avenues by these two firms. Survival
through vertical integration is another possible explana-
tion which will require more time to evaluate.
Dr. Hamid has noted that exit from the computer
industry is also quite limited judging from the present
behavior of the firms. He outlined some of the closely
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related industries in which the major computer manufacturers
participate, and theorized that such firms use these "other"
product lines to earn a sufficient profit to permit the
computer division to operate partially as a research
?99facility. He also considered the prestige or reputation
of each of the eight leading firms to be a significant
deterrent to exit by the large mulbiproduct firms. Finally,
he reported that the existing firms which were experiencing
heavy losses had recognized that potential upon initial
entry and nonetheless persisted in pursuit of long run '
project expectations.
Limited entry into computer manufacturing is not
concluded to be the single source for price level mainten-
ance by the industry's limited number of members. The fact
that entry is inherently limited is sufficient knowledge for
a dominant firm to exercise its full market power, as will
be seen in pricing behavior.
4. Cost Structures
Although prices and costs have been noted to be of
questionable value in the computer industry, the inability
to predict costs is not an unusual phenomenon, and certainly
no reason to adopt the Cyert-March theory to explain cost
projections.
Uncertainty in predicting costs is a most contro-
versial issue among financial experts in business, and is





departure from the traditional theory of the firm suggests
that uncertainty is avoided by the use of decision criteria
which feature short-run reaction to short-run feedbacks,
thus circumventing the need for quantitative anticipation
* * 4. ^ 300of future events.
The decision making within the firm based on short-
run reaction to events and short-run feedback of new infor-
mation is not precisely descriptive of the computer manufacturer
with respect to decisions which involve new technologies or
commitments of large amounts of capital -to new families of
computers. Manufacturers have been noted to endure long
periods of outflows of funds without any feedback on pro-
spective returns, or a point in time when a break-even point
between receipts and expenditures can be identified. The
application of the Cyert-March theory of the firm to these
long periods of technological development and marketing
might be explained as a series of intermediate steps which
could perhaps be described as short-run reaction to short-
run feedbacks. However, this cannot adequately present a
complete description of the long range objectives or
parameters within which such short-run decisions are made.
The decision of General Electric in the early part of 1970
to redefine its hardware manufacturing objectives and to
retain only its time-sharing capacity, was made after several
years in the computer manufacturing field. Such decisions do
not appear to be the result of short-run reactions to short-run
Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G. , Behavioral Theory of th e
Firm
,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, p. 119.
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feedback, but the failure to meet long-run objectives, and
the setting of new long-run objectives in the developing
time-sharing market.
It became virtually impossible to make any useful
comparison between the Department of Commerce statistics
and the income and operating statements of various firms.
IBM, for example, in addition to msiking typewriters and
dictating equipment, reflects gross revenues of over $2,000
million from the IBM World Trade Corporation which is a
wholly owned but independently operated subsidiary. Thus
sales or gross revenues have an indeterminate amount of
input resulting from other industries or sources. Nonethe-
less Table XIV reflects this reported information, and it is
interesting to note the differences in capital expenditures
and inventory information for this 1967 data.
The cost structure of the market mechanism has
become of interest to conduct and performance because of
301
what Richard Caves refers to as absolute cost barriers.
The effect is to place the curve for average unit cost of
production for a new firm above that of an established firm,
so that there is a cost disadvantage at any level of output.
For both firms these costs are high at the low-output volume
level and gradually decline as output increases. However,
owing to patents and cost of capital to prospective new
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U. S. Department of Commerce, 1967 Census of Manufacturers ,
Industry Series , October 1970, page 35F-11; and Standard




as to be an absolute barrier to entry. Further, the research
and development costs to develop a different (differentiated),
patentable product, and the cost to maintain such unique
technology, plus the cost of services necessary to compet-
itively present a somewhat homogencus product, operate as
major cost deterrents in the market mechanism. However, if
the dominant firm errs by setting prices too high, entry
could become possible at an earlier point along such curves.
That market share has maintained a level of consistency over
the past several years would indicate that such price policy
is well under control by the dominant firm in the computer
industry.
Another unique factor of computer industry marketing
practice has had a significant effect on the maintenance of
dominance, and that is the need for capital. Not just the
capital-intesive production previously described, but the
additional capital needed to finance the method of marketing
the computer, sometimes referred to as renting by the manu-
facturers. Standard and Poor's estimates that sales have
continued to decline as opposed to leases of computers in
1970, and such deferred income to the rest of the industry
which such rentals represent, have required heavy capitali-
zation. In a high interest rate environment, the marketing
of computers at prices which have tended to be stable has,









Vertical integration is the combination in one enter-
prise of those establishments related as customers and sup-
pliers. The 1967 Census data relating to concentration
ratios has indicated that the number of members in the com-
puter industry who tend to specialize in the products
regarded as primary to the industry is estimated to be
above 90%.
Such specialization is not directly the result of
vertical integration, but serves to help explain one of the
basic conditions, business attitudes, which has developed
from the history of the industry. The desire to provide a
high quality, complete service was noted to be a stated goal
of IBM. The incidental products to this goal found IBM
operating in the supplies, hardware services, and software
markets. In each of these markets IBM and its followers
strive to maximize their market shares. Supplies include
a nebulous array of tapes, disk packs, ribbons, cards,
specialized tagging, labeling and filing devices, and a
303
recent entrant, microfilm.
IBM has long dominated the punched card market of
the supply category. In 1969, Standard and Poors' "Basic
Analysis" estimated that peripheral equipment represented
more than fifty per cent of the installed equipment value,
and that the leading hardware manufacturers accounted for
303
"Basic Analysis", p. 013.
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30494% of that production. The reaction of the independent
firms has been to apply about ten per cent of sales to re-
search and development, in order to continue to produce
proprietary products which now include software. The
financial drain has been so heavy on these firms that third
party leasing arrangements have become the only avenue of
survival in peripheral hardware manufacturing, which has
become a significant and similar subset of the computer
industry.
Software is said to have closely approximated the
305
value of hardware in sales value in 1968, but a quali-
fication cited by Standard and Poor's was that 90% of that
value was actually "developed by computer users, as opposed
to computer manufacturers and independent software companies.
The table which supported that 1969 data differed consider-
307
ably from the one used in the July 1970 "Basic Analysis".
Both tables referred to EDP Industry Reports . The most recent
is presented in Table XV to represent the importance in sales
value of the hardware (main-frame central processor units and
peripheral equipment), software, supplies and services.
Another form of vertical integration flows from raw
materials to finished goods. It was earlier noted in 1964,




"Basic Analysis, 1969, p. 08, 09
Ibid .
306 T , . ,Ibid .
"307
"Basic Analysis," p. 013.
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WORLD-WIDE REVENUES OF AMERICAN-BASED
COMPANIES FROM KEY FACTORS OF THE ELECTRONICS
DATA PROCESSING INDUSTRY
Independent Data Computing Control &














E1975 15,980 1,100 1,500 2,150 1,970 20,680
El 972 11,950 890 1,590 1,810 1,470 17,490
E1971 10,120 710 1,290 1,500 1,050 14,670
E1970 6,580 560 1,165 1,200 700 12,225
1969 7,;-:io 455 1,075 940 450 10,110
1968 6,425 560 960 715 270 8,750
1967 4 , 840 270 850 550 175 6,665
1966 5,585 180 74o 435 100 5,050
1965 2,790 150 660 yy? 50 4,005
*From rentals and sales
E Estimated
Source: EDP. Industry Report , as published in Standard & Poors






Conglomerateness is a general form of integration
which proceeds across organizational lines to achieve certain
economies of market or product extension. A trend toward
conglomerate merger despite antitrust activity, was reported
after extensive studies by the Federal Trade Commission and
Antitrust Committees which covered a seventeen year period.
The most recent trend towards conglomerate mergers does not
reflect product or market consummation; rather the past five
years have witnessed mergers which resulted in dissimilar
products or services, of the category described as diversi-
308fication. Nevertheless, there were 216 product extension
conglomerate mergers and one market extension type in the
1967-1968 period; and a total number of mergers (vertical,
horizontal, and conglomerate) of 361.
Many computer manufacturing firms operate subsidiaries
to extend their image to services, software, maintenance or
supplies. Some of the leading firms moved into computer
equipment from primary industries such as electrical equip-
ment, television, and accounting machines, but recent 1970
developments indicate some movement is proceeding beyond the
manufacturing level. Control Data Corporation recently
acquired Commercial Credit Corporation which in turn is a
holding company with subsidiaries engaged in three other





The acquisition was reported to be prompted by the need to
build liquidity reserves.
RCA is another example of a large well established
hardware manufacturer, and operates in such diversified
fields as those represented by the Hertz Corporation, Random
House, NBC, and a global communications subsidiary.
Burroughs has remained in the four basic divisions
of the industry but operates an active and profitable inter-
national croup.
IBM was previously reported to operate an international
World Trade Corporation; it also operates the Service Bureau
Corporation which provides a broad range of services including
time sharing. IBM also controls Science Research Associates
which develops and publishes educational material.
General Electric and Honeywell likewise operate in a
broad range of related and service-oriented firms and sub-
sidiaries. When they jointly announced plans to transfer
most of their respective computer operations to a new com-
pany, on .May 20, 1970, the first example of a. major move out
of the computer industry was provided; the residue is a con-
glomerate merger.
The public policy section will present some of the
current antitrust actions which have as a secondary role,
the divorce and divestiture of the major subsidiary groups
of the dominant firm.
309Standard and Poor's Corp., "Standard NYSE Reports," Vol.
37, No. 173, September 8, 1970, Section 11.
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The market structure in the computer industry has been
described by Schwartz and Heilborn as the structure determined
by IBM. They readily conclude that the dominant firm structure
includes eight to ten small followers who divide about 25% of
the computer market. IBM has determined that it prefers to
lease its equipment, with prices based on usage, because it
is a service, and IBM has many related services to sell. This
indeed has been seen to be part of the existing structure in
barriers cue to capital requirements, cost structures which
extend over considerable time, and a form of specialized,
technical service which attracts no take-over oriented con-
glomerates, doubtless because of the capitalization ratios.
C . CONDUCT
Having described the history, basic conditions and general
structure of the computer industry, it is now appropriate to
examine the causal flow of these determinants into the
pricing and product. The importance of the structure is in
the way it induces member firms to behave. Such behavior
includes setting and changing prices, output, products,
services, research advertising and legal tactics which pro-
vide for a boundary of conduct. Ordinarily in oligopolies,
the few firms so recognize their interdependence as to react
to one another; this has been noted to take place in techno-
logy announcements, counter-announcements and replies. This
action and reaction brings clever game theory possibilities
to the computer market, except that the strategy variables
are weighted by market share and the dominance in that area




Having reviewed several possible pricing schemes, the
dominant firm model was selected as representing a special
form of price leadership in the computer industry. It is
considered special because it does not result in a common
dollar price mechanism, but a uniform pricing scheme that
has been described in the literature as the "umbrella" effect.
It has feettures other than subtle price leadership, which
still permit oligopolies mutual interdependence and account
for rigidity of prices from list price schedules. The -action
and reaction of a few sellers in the market based on market
share was the first consideration of Kaysen and Turner in
developing a set of criteria concerning the conduct in a
concentrated oligopoly.
The dominant firm model of Cohen, Cyert and
310Ferguson,' uses a basic assumption that the dominant firm
sets the price and allows the minor firms to sell all they
can at that price; the dominant firms sell the rest. This
model adequately describes the computer industry.
In Figure 5, D D' is the market demand curve, SM is
the supply curve (and marginal cost curve) of the minor
firm, and MC is the marginal cost curve of the dominant firm.
At a price of OC the competitive fringe of firms supply CD,
and with total demand CF, the dominant firm supplies DFat
the OC price; E is a point on the dominant firms' demand
310Cohen and Cyert, p. 241-243; Ferguson, C. E. , Micro-
economic Theory. R. D. Irwin, 1961, p. 328-329.
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curve (CE ~ DF) . The marginal revenue curve, AT, for the
dominant firm intersects the marginal cost curve at output
OV and thus the price would be set at OC in Figure 5.
Figure 5 is not proportionately representative of the
computer industry, and indeed, little is known about the
marginal cost and marginal revenues of the dominant firm.
To maximize long-run profits, the dominant firm could
establish a price below OC , at the intersection of AT and
MC , and by way of short-run price wars could drive any number
of smaller firms from the market. The dominant firm needs to
know the industry demand curve, its own marginal costs and
marginal revenues, and given that the smaller firms will
equate marginal cost and price, it can identify the supply
curve (SM) of these dominated firms. To arrive at the demand
for the dominant firm, the procedure is to set a particular
price, compute the amount of computation or computers which
the minor firms would sell at that price, and subtract that
amount from the total demand at such assumed price. The
total demand is seen to be OW where OW = OU +-0V. The amount
supplied by the smaller firms is CD. The model thus explains
how a dominant firm can determine the price which will maxi-
mize its profits while allowing the smaller firms to sell
all they wish at that price, by computing its own demand
curve. It will, not lower prices to eliminate its rivals
because of possible legal difficulties under antitrust laws.
It could however, estimate a market share, and attendant
output quantity, beyond which such legal action would likely
occur, and establish a pricing policy which operates within
159

such constraint. It would be more difficult perhaps to
determine such a threshhold of antitrust reaction by other
firms or on behalf of the Justice Department. This relation-
ship between the dominant firm model, market shares, and the
hiring of former Justice Department attorneys will be examined
in the section on public policy.
Studies have indicated that U. S. Steel with its
dominant 75% of the market in 1903 . operated as the dominant
firm model indicated. But by 1920 it controlled only 50%;
and in 1960 it averaged about 25%, but remained the price
1 a 311leader.
Price leadership is a divisible factor of the model;
the dominant firm presents a list price for a representative
range of hardware configurations. The competitive fringe of
followers is noted to find its price somewhat below the
leader but the pricing prior to unbundling makes it very
questionable as to the resultant value in services and pro-
duct which could be obtained. Yet Schwartz and Heilborn
carefully note that IBM sold hardware only because of the
1956 antitrust consent decree and used its dominance to
establish an industry pricing behavior that is complex, yet
has favored rental over purchase. The ratio of rental to
purchase prices, negligible residual values at the end of
the four or five year depreciation cycle, and a higher cost
of maintenance on purchased equipment, are cited as encour-
aging a preponderance of leases. Since that report in 1967
311Cohen and Cyert, p. 240-243.
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(and Dr. Schwartz' former status as corporate econometrician
with IBM lends stature to his arguments)
, the growth of the
used computer market could alter the residual value concept
sufficiently to favor purchase of more hardware than Dr.
Schwartz envisioned. Yet he provided a behavioral inter-
pretation to the dominant firm model in recognizing that the
apparent price to the customer is regarded as a flexible
price he can terminate. He further states that only when the
competition has taken the technological lead has IBM exer-
cised its dominance, and 'outdated its equipment. This pro-
duct strategy is seen to depend heavily on its ability to
innovate according to a pattern that is dependent on price
dominance indirectly and overall market power directly.
2 • Product Strategy
The ability of computer manufacturers to introduce
new equipment and apply technology to business automation
problems has been widely expressed in the literature. But
pricing policies have been seen to be the silent controllers,
while product strategy is the result of the structure of the
technological industry. And that structure has been seen to
be significantly influenced by the overwhelming market share
of its leader. Yet market share was found to also be ex-
pressed in terms of the number or value of installed equip-
ment, and not just sales alone. Table III demonstrated that
the differences in shares between shipment values and in-
stalled values differ only slightly.
312Schwartz and Heilborn, p. 22-24
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One product strategy noted by Schwartz and Heilborn
was the slowing of the rate of innovation by IBM' s leasing
policy. Yet it was also acknowledged that IBM did not con-
trol the j.nitiation of new products and it had to react to
the occasional introduction of an innovative hardware design.
Its reaction was not in the price dominance, but a coeffici-
ent of lesser magnitude: reactive product strategy. The
introduction of Control Data Corporation's large computer
and IBM' s reaction has become an example of a communication
breakdown in the interdependency of oligopolies. Their suit
313
will be examined shortly.
The overall product strategy requires a considerable
organization in the development and research to produce new
items, but an equally great marketing and services function
to maintain the differentiated strategy. Although Caves has
observed of oligopolies, that product strategy is more likely
than price strategies to satisfy the requirements for inde-
pendent action, that an initial move will not be met by
rivals, the computer industry again has been seen to not
314follow some of these basic characteristics of oligopolies.
The strategic importance of generations and model
changes scale economies in the computer industry depends
upon a special interaction of technology, constant growth
of users' applications, and the industry's institutions.
31 3
"Tackling IBM," Time , December 20, 1968, p. 77,




Scherer and Lanzillotti and others have noted these special
considerations in the auto industry with annual style changes.
This product strategy was previously discussed in the
section on market structure, as having evolved historically
with the capital intensive production, and maintained by a
high capital requirement to finance the rental of a very costly
product. Thus this strategy has been found to weigh very
heavily on the need for large research and development expendi-
tures by the hardware manufacturers. IBM was reported to have
expended between $10 and $15 million in attempt to develop a
computer technology based on cryogenics (low resistance
behavior cf certain metals at absolute zero) ; the effort was
dropped in 1961 as System 360 planning and technology develop-
ment moved into central concern. Thus, not all expenditures
result in a production line technology. A strategy of con-
stant technological development has required the very best in
engineering and scientific talent. For example, in 1965 IBM
hired Eugene Fubini directly as a group vice-president (from
an engineering deputy level in research in the Defense Depart-
ment) . A large talent search is part of all manufacturer's
product strategy and considerable rewards await useful con-
tribution. It is thus seen that the research and development
315factor of product strategy includes a costly personnel input.
The emphasis of product strategy apparently cannot be
directly determined from the literature because of the absence
of specific cost data. It is nonetheless estimated that
independent peripheral manufacturers have expended 10% of
315Wise, "Rocky," p. 139.
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their sales dollar toward product research. In 1961 Control
Data spent $2.6 million (6.3% of sales) on research and
development while IBM spent an estimated $100 million.
Product strategy in market conduct has been seen tc
favor leasing, with complex price schedules that frequently
extend over dozens of pages in itemizing the many contri-
butions of specific hardware , memory sizes, peripheral con-
trollers, and related components. The separate pricing for
some services following unbundling has presented a cost dis-
advantage to some of the leasing firms,' especially noted
with the introduction of the IBM System 370 computers and
316the related new price schedule. Consequently, the nature
of the product with its necessary related services requires
that hardware manufacturers adopt a product strategy, and
services strategy which together, present the most attractive
combination in the market.
The need to maintain product compatibility, that is,
among main central processors and a wide variety of peripheral
equipment, was discussed as an essential consideration to
differentiation. It is particularly important to the smaller
manufacturers which do not produce complete lines of hardware,
particularly central processors, and therefore must address
their products to existing markets in a dependent manner.
L. R. Caveney, who is president of the Computer Peripheral
Manufacturers' Association, representing some of the smaller,





this component compatibility would be facilitated by effective
standards for mechanical and electrical interfaces. EDP
Weekly
,
which reported Caveney's comments, also noted that
it is frequently difficult to obtain specific technical
information concerning IBM systems, unless IBM "has chosen
to release it".
Another example of product strategy reached the busy
Southern District of New York court on April 21, 1970 when
Xerox entered a patent infringement suit against IBM who had
decided to market a competing copier, following Xerox' entry
318into computer manufacturing by way of merger. The com-
plexities of the patents extend back to 1951 and 1955 when
IBM received licences under Xerox (Haloid) patents which
revealed technical knowledge to a special photocopy process.
The product strategy and legal tactics are not only linked
in these details, but some additional uses of that photo-
copying process in output devices is currently under study,
with a strong potential market for copying output devices.
The more obvious strategy is more in the tactics of each of
these giants stepping into one another's market boundaries.
The conduct is clear: IBM was willing to wait for the
patents to run, having paid nothing in royalties which were
stated to be 27% of any resulting net selling price.
317EDP Weekly , Vol. II, No. 25, October 5, 1970, p. 9.




Pi'oduct strategy has been seen to include a careful
application of technology to produce new hardware designs
which demonstrate improved performance and which are sur-
rounded wj.th all the essential services which the market
requires. However, the strategy in relation to the dominant
firm has been seen to follow the leadership in new product
announcements. After the IBM 370 announcements (prior to
370/45), RCA. aimed its new line at the IBM 360s and 370s and
declared them to be equivalent products at a more advantageous
. . . 319pricing arrangement.
Yet this mutual interdependence among firms is not,
judging by the competitive conduct, expecially cooperative
nor is there any indicated collusion. Product strategy
determines price behavior and depends on the full range of
supply elements outlined in the supply section of basic con-
ditions. It is seen to be highly interactive among firms,
with clear and direct leadership of the type engendered by
the umbrella effect. Once IBM has announced a new line, a
technologically oriented scramble occurs to present "equally-
capable, but different (better)" products and related services
3. Research and Innovation
The rapid growth of the computer industry has required
skillful application of the resources; the technology at its
disposal at any time was seen to also be advancing at a rapid
rate. Such continual innovation has not been uncriticized
,
Pantages, "RCA's New Line," p. 30-31.
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and the literature has met each innovation announcement with
analyses that suggest market-share maintenance, or forced
obsolescence to amortize existing development costs.
Research and innovation, however, are part of a
continuous process the accumulation of which cannot be dis-
pensed as rapidly as new drug products nor marketed without
due concern for the existing hardware in the hands of users
and the resultant need for compatibility with the systems
and software necessary for a successful application. Such
conduct is especially important to a manufacturing group
which prefers to rent to its customers and thus has to pre-
pare realistically against termination for cause.
Research and innovation are thus important to the
image of the firm and it is a two-way cause. The results
of that effort at any discrete point along the development
process must be (1) a new quality product needed by the
user, and (2) one that works well, competitively. Not all
firms have used research to innovate; followers are prone to
apply research in product development which essentially
emulated the dominant leader. A recent discussion of the
constant effort of peripheral manufacturers to maintain
"plug-to-plug compatibility" with main frame hardware pro-
ducers while offering an advantageous product, places this
form of technology in the performance race in the factors
, • -. a • 320
of: access time, reliability, maintainability, and price.
320Frost, Cecil R. , "IBM Plug-to-Plug Peripheral Devices,"
Datamation, October 15, 1970, p. 24-34.
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IBM was seen to expend $10 to $15 million on a tech-
nology which did not result in a product. Dr. Hamid found
by survey that manufacturers allocate about nine per cent of
their total cost to research and development. He also
reported the results of a Stanford Research Institute study of
80 firms which were considered high investors in research and
development and it determined that 7.2% of sales was so
allocated
.
Many do not have the resources to attempt to advance
the state of the art in peripheral design. So there is an
umbrella e>.ffect in research that invariably relates to capital
intensiveness , that the large firms lead in basic research and
in developmental research, while smaller manufacturers can
compete only on the development and research level that pro-
duces like products.
It is readily acknowledged that the above observation
of research umbrella effect in the computer industry does not
follow some of the results of previous studies examined in
the section of basic conditions. Scherer's separate study
of "Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output
of Patented Inventions" , concluded that the evidence is to
the contrary. Corporate bigness was found to not favor in-
ventive output when testing the concentration of sales, R and




322Scherer, "Firm Size," p. 1103-1114
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The umbrella effect of the dominant firm in the com-
puter industry over sales and innovation is perhaps a result
of more factors than Scherer had tested, although his study
used 1955 data and 1959 patent information which would
describe a very early period of computer industry growth.
It is not. known whether sufficient data were available to
have inc3.uded the computer industry in his study. Nonethe-
less, one additional factor in the computer industry is the
high degree of specialization reported earlier from the Con-
centration Ratio report of the Department of Commerce.- This
specialization also requires the firms in the industry to
apply heavy amounts of capital to compete in the development
and production of their primary products. Reports for the
Fourth Generation's innovations do not support a conclusion
that the leading firms were not proportionately represented
in products which required significant applications of re-
search and development capital. Fourth generation hardware
reports would also indicate that the industry leaders are
well represented in key innovations. Finally, one patent
for a transistor or similar key component, would have to be
weighted more heavily than several hundred for vacuum tubes
or grid designs. The early stages of growth of the industry
and its technology could be responsible for this apparent
continuance of the umbrella of research and innovation.
Smaller firms will be prone to build compatible hardware




The slowing trend for this research and innovation,
anticipated at some point along a very long industry growth
curve by Schwartz and Heilborn, may actually be taking place
according to one definition. The trend toward the fourth
generation merging of logics, systems and devices into over-
lapping technologies, was observed in a technical report by
Dr. C. J. Walter and A. B. Walter, published recently. 323
This merging effect does not necessarily reduce or simplify
innovation in hardware design, but its effect has helped to
define computer generations, as presented in Figure 6.
Market conduct of the fourth generation innovation
announcements appears to have continued the tactics and
strategies presented in product ar.d pricing observation.
IBM announced two models of the new 370 line on June 30,
1970 and on September 15, RCA anncunced its response to the
new line with various cost comparisons provided by the pro-
fessional journalists. One week later NCR also announced
that a new family of hardware was to be offered. On
October 7, 1970 Burroughs unveiled its new family, and
offered to replace about 200 B5500 and 6500 systems which
were thereby outdated, without installation fees. IBM then
began releasing information on its 370/145 which demonstrated
the first semiconductor memory breakthrough, and the fourth
generation announcements of innovation have now moved into
323Gruenberger, Fred, ed . , Fourth Generation Computers :
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324the professional, hard-sell marketing of the industry.
That tradition is more marked by the effective marketing
organization than by any particular tactics.
4. Advertising
Considerable insight into the nature of computer
industry advertising techniques and objectives have now
been found in the policies and strategies of research,
technology, announcements of ne,w lines, product differ-
entiation and pricing complexities. The advertising of
computers is perhaps no different than many industrial-
products, however it also parallels the professional
customer, professional sales-engineer relationship of drug
manufacture and physicians. The approach, or strategy,
requires direct, detailed account of the effectiveness of
products offered to the responsible user. Although the
computer manufacturer cannot deliver the free samples as
has been customary of the pharmaceutical industry, it none-
theless caters to its existing customers (and probably knows
more about the needs and growth of such customer than any
other professional advertising and marketing organization)
;
announcement of hardware is occasionally accomplished at
demonstration meetings.
IBM' s announcement of the System 360 family pushed
the concept of. tailoring a system to fit a broad range of
3 OA
Schmedel, Scott R. , "Burroughs Third Maker in '70 to
Unveil New Computer 'Family'; Sees Sales Surge", The
Wall Street Journal , October 7, 1970, p. 30 hereafter
cited as "Burroughs New Family"; and "News Scene: Bur-
roughs' New Series: December (70) Delivery", Datamation ,
November 15, 1970, p. 123-124; Pantages, "RCA's New Line",
p. 30; EDP Weekly , October 5, 1970, p. 2, 7.
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needs. It was simultaneously announced at IBM's offices in
165 U. S. cities and 80 foreign countries.
Other forms of professional journal advertising are
essentially designed to establish a communications link
through sn elaborate "reader interest card" system with
which several periodicals participate. The levels of
response and reply are designed to identify the current
interest so that a local representative can be designated.
The order-delivery system found to be inherent in
the market structure, also affects the- conduct of adver-
tising to emphasize the output of hardware and related
characteristics as they apply to a potential customer's
requirements. Delivery time and price remain vague or in
the background. Once the user becomes a customer it is
observed that a very close relationship is maintained and
the goals of advertising shift to the customer services
responsibility to maintain the customer's satisfaction
until added components or upgrading becomes a possibility.
At such future time a new form of advertising can be
applied in the form of a tailored approach based upon past
experience and projected requirements. The incumbent con-
tractor or manufacturer is at that point in a strong position
to dominante, depending upon the degree of service involvement
of the past. New advertising at this stage is carried on by
specialists of the marketing organization variably categor-
ized among the systems analysts and customer engineers.
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5 . Legal Tactics
Legal actions which have involved the large computer
manufacturers have been somewhat limited in scope and in
number. The dominant firm has generally been on the de-
fensive against various charges of monopoly, monopolizing
and in unfair pricing policies. These matters will be
discussed more fully in a concluding section on public
policy.
One recent suit involving IBM and the Greyhound
Computer Corporation indicated the market conduct impli-
cations. Concerning IBM's unbundling policy, Greyhound
contends it was:
"... designed to permit IBM to extract higher
profits; preclude entry into the computer software industry
by use of low-cost pricing for such unbundled services; and
destroy the leasing industry, which will not be able to
recover the original price (of leased equipment) at the
3 25lower (IBM) lease rates."'
The suit further contended that it was not possible
to compete with IBM because of these adjustments of prices,
services and depreciation policies.
Market conduct in the computer industry has been seen
to reflect the oligopolistic structure featuring the dominant
firm model. The degree of dominance is such that pricing
behavior is constructed as part of a full range of services
325EDP Weekly, Vol. II, No. 25, October 5, 1970, p. 5.
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surrounding a complex array or family of computers and
systems. The product strategy permits the technology to be
employed to maintain the high capital employed in its pro-
duction and marketing through timed generation cycles
representing depreciation estimates of capital value. The
full life value has been challenged by recent developments
in the used computer market, which was, no doubt, of no
great surprise to the dominant firm which met this challenge
with unbundled prices for software and services which will
permit it to share in this new market extension. The timing
of these events suggest alertness and ability to react
quickly in product and market strategy on the part of the
dominant firm. The result is seen to support a progressive
image in advertising and marketing techniques. The absence
of coercive conduct is in part, displayed by a defensive
legal tactics policy, descriptive of the dominant firm
structure which does not require such tactics in the short
run. Short run product strategy is calculated to produce
essential revenues to maintain market share dominance. As
Caves and Bain have found , coercive conduct is sometimes
found to be necessary to maintain high barriers to entry,
326
which results from high concentration. Such conduct was
not found to be part of the market structure.
The reason for concern about market conduct is not




nor to observe whether supply begets demand, or the reverse.
The concern is, to the economist, whether scarce resources
are allocated without restrictions by an industry's behavior
or actions. This concern, is more obviously vital perhaps
in consumer goods' industries, the products of which more
directly require a consumer to release cash. The process is
more indirect in analyses of durable goods which are essen-
tially industrial products. Rigid computer prices to a
using manufacturer of a consumer product, are nonetheless,
passed on to the consumer who buys the- highest priced pro-
ducts; and in part, to the multitude of taxpayers who share
the partial tax burdens reflected in investment tax credits
and business expenses of any number of intermediary estab-
lishments. Therefore, a study of even so limited a product
must attempt to equate structure and conduct to performance.
D . PERFORMANCE
Review of market performance in an industry seeks to
evaluate how well, or how efficiently, the scarce factors
of production have been employed to yield the optimum real
income. In that process, full employment is a measure of
minimizing idle capacity and progress is a qualitative
measure of the improvement of factors, output quality
levels, and techniques, and finally, as Richard Caves has
defined this purpose:
"Our economy should be equitable , distributing its
real output among its members to provide for their essential




The task of performance is to evaluate the economic
difference between actual performance and some optimum
possible contribution of an industry's market behavior.
Such an appraisal is the goal of public policy.
1 . Production and ZAllocative Efficiency
Efficiency in the context of economic performance
is normally evaluated according to profit levels in com-
parison with other industries, expenditures such as adver-
tising and sales promotion, and the resultant effect in
extending market power without appropriate production
improvement, or general progress.
An analysis of profits is not only made difficult
from the absence of statistics in the industry which would
hopefully make it possible to determine true profit levels,
but the practice of leasing directly from a manufacturer to
a user and the deferred income effect, over no specific,
identifiable time period with a host of related services
and profits therefrom, combine to make such exact figures
of questionable value to the purpose of performance evalu-
ation. Some indication will be found in the financial data
including net income, of the same leading ten firms which
were used to develop market share positions in Table III.
This financial information is presented in Table XVI for
1969 data. No attempt has been made to evaluate the com-
puter portion of these major corporations, however, it was
noted earlier that several were not yet making profits in
their computer divisions. General Electric apparently
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Burroughs, indicated in the October 1970 announcements that
its data processing division has been profitable since mid-
1968 "and is continuing to grow in profitability." 327
To compare some of these profit indicators with
what little measure of expected profit performance has
developed in the industry, Table XVII has been prepared
from J. S. Bain's classic study of concentration, height
barrier to entry and average profit rates. Caves commented
on this data, that either high concentration or high barrier
to entry in an industry tends to produce a high profit rate.
That high rate is in turn an indication that the industry
328
contains too few factors of production.
The question of concentration has been raised in
basic conditions, and the market share of each of the
leading ten manufacturers in Table III. Further data from
the 1967 Census of Manufacturers on concentration ranked the
leading firms as follows:
Value Added by Manufacture (SIC 3573)
Per cent accounted for by —
Total 4 8 20 50 Total
(million largest largest largest largest firms
dollars) companies companies companies companies
1,926.4 66 83 92 98 134
Another common representation of concentration ratios
is the Lorenz curve and its Gini coefficient. It represents










Prof. i s for j • ' '
Level of Seller Height of Harriers to Entry
Concentration -»- High Medium Low
1. Average profit for the years 1936-19UO
High 19 oO 10.2 10.5
Low — 7.0 5.3
2 Average profit rates for the years 15U7-1951
High "i r .O 13 oh 15 .U
Low — 12 S 10.1
-::- High concentration indicates that the largest 8 sellers during the period in
question controlled 70 per cent or more of sales by the industry ; low
concentration indicates that the top 8 controlled less than 70 per cent.
Source: Bain, Joe S., Parriers to tition, Harvard University
tress, 1S'5^> Chaj • ublished in Caves. Richard,












graphically the dispersion accounted for by any number of firms
possessing a greater market share than any of the remainder;
equality would be represented by the diagonal, sometimes
referred to as the diagonal of equal distribution. It has
acknowledged drawbacks which occur in large numbers of firms
many of which possess very small percentages and yet occupy
an equivalent linear ranking by this method. Figure 7 is
the Lorenz Curve for the computer industry based on 1969 data
of Table III and its ten firms; the use of an eleventh cate-
gory for the remainder was applied to reduce the undesirable
effect of many firms. That such did not essentially alter
the picture unreasonably was tested by using data for all
134 firms assigning 124 firms a 1/124 per cent of the remain-
ing industry output value. That result is presented in
Figure 8.
The measure of dispersion, the Gini coefficients,
329
were calculated as follows
:
1. Sum of the areas below the Lorenz curve:
10 firms = 1554
134 firms = 103.96
2. Area of concentration:
(5000 - 1554) 10 firms = 3446
(5000-103.96) 134 firms = 4896.04
3. Gini coefficient:
3446 -
10 firms - 5QQQ ~ .689
4896
134 firms = —— = .897
329 Singer, E. M. , Chapter 13; see also Scherer, p. 50-52
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In addition, the Gini coefficient was calculated for
installed equipment values for 1969 data, also shown in Table
III. It was found to be .6924, closely approximating the
shipment values.
The Herfindahl index is preferred by Scherer and
correlates highly with concentration ratios from the Depart-
ment of Commerce statistics, and the four-firm concentration
ratio (sales to industry sales) . Scherer finally notes that
they all correlate well to indicate a measure of concentration.
The four-firm concentration ratio for the computer industry
using the 1969 shipment values and firms was found to be
0.836. If Honeywell and GE had boon combined that ratio
would have been 0.867. Bain's study of a different period
of twenty industries resulted in a four-firm 1947 concen-
tration ratio of . 61 for a select group of concentrated
industries, and .41 for all industries.
Although no reliable data could be found concerning
the expenditures for advertising and promotion of computer
products, it would not appear to differ abnormally from
other industries which deal in industrial products.
2. Progress
The computer industry was found to differ in the
apparent innovative trend, even among the largest firms.
The rather open-entry software industry has served to keep
some pressure on developmental systems. Inventiveness or
innovation is not necessarily interchangeable with progress
nor patents. The computer generation cycle seems to pro-
vide a research tempo requirement that even motivated the
184

dominant firm. While this varies with findings of Caves,
Scherer, Schumpeter and Stigler, it could be explained in
part by the early growth of computer technology suggested
by Schwartz and Heilborn. The basic research being pursued
by IBM, Burroughs, RCA, Control Data, Univac and Honeywell
would indicate large firms with the capability are heavily
engaged in technology which is finding its way into products,
even if patents would not so indicate.
Important discoveries which were previously listed
in memory technology have punctuated hardware generations.
IBM held back on monolithic circuit chips at the outset of
the System 360; this may be an excellent example of where the
buck stops under heavy pressure of Watson's design engineer.
The business manager par excellence resisted the pressure of
the scientist, to meet a more probable delivery schedule. In
the analysis of progress it is acknowledged that had IBM
elected the monolithic circuits and failed, no advance would
have reached the market place that April 7, 1964.
3. Equity
The distribution of income because of the computer
industry's high salary levels and impetus and reward system
to scientific personnel cannot be considered out of balance
with the rest of industry. The total industry employment is
very small leading to income concentration as a promised
reward for skilled performance. The umbrella effect for the
remaining firms could be viewed as equitable among various
firms; yet the reports of the past ten years indicate inflated





No true statistics are available, yet the computer
industry is said to have reasonably good resistance to
economic downturn, largely because of the personnel policies
of the dominant firm. RCA's recent announcement of hardware
indicated an expansion of 2000 employees in Marlboro,
Massachusetts, at a time when unemployment in U. S. industries
recently surpassed 5.8% (December 4, 1970). The Department, of
Commerce, Annual Survey of 1968 compared total employee
figures which revealed approximately an 8% increase in -employ-
ment in the computer industry. In short, to date the perfor-
mance of the computer industry has been to maintain more
stable employment than other U. S. firms in general.
A summary of the market structure, conduct, and per-
formance confirm that good ideas are marketable commodities
as envisioned in the minds of the fi^mers of the U. S. Con-
stitution who provided for the protection of inventions in
the U. S. patent system. Computer manufacturers have evolved
in an industry that began as a scientific experiment and
today has provided equipment to more than 50,000 organizations
(per Withington) to assist in the production of America's
goods and services. The standard of living improvement has
continued to rise as a measure of all industry's contributions
The computer is to be found in the improvement of the use of
scarce resources, and to speed the progress of other scienti-
fic and business research.
Business together with the services' industry have
developed applications which are more effective than earlier
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attempts of the 1960's. State and local governments have
also found diverse computer applications to ease growing
urban and environment control problems. The performance of
the industry is not just the performance of the leader: IBM.
Many firms have participated in the technological advances.
No single foreign competition has been able to yet master
the technology capital and marketing capability of the
American firms, although some will surely attempt the dup-
lication of technology.
Thus there is strong indication- that the market
structure inherently provides an opportunity for 'future
misallocation of resources. High entry requirements and
very high concentration are indicated, but capital intensity





The previous section examined supply and demand, the
structure, conduct, and performance of the computer indus-
try, as they are determined by the natural producer/consumer
interaction known as the market mechanism. As long as this
market mechanism functions smoothly and serves the best
interests of the consumer, it acts as the sole determinant
of the characteristics of the industry. However , when the
market processes go astray, some sort of governmental regu-
latory policy is generally applied. Governmental interven-
tion can take many forms, ranging from moral suasion and
the glare of publicity to public ownership. The main weapon
used, in attempting to harmonize the profit-seeking motives
of private- companies with the public interest, has been the
enforcement of antitrust policy.
Antitrust policy in the U. S. has its basis in three
significant statutes - the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton
Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.
In very general terms, the Sherman Act outlawed acts of
monopolizing, the Clayton Act prohibited acts tending to
result in the growth of a monopoly, and the FTC Act banned
unfair competition.
Specifically, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade or commerce. Section 2 prohibits monopolization,
188

attempts to monopolize, and combinations or conspiracies to
, . , 330
monopolize trade or commerce.
The Clayton Act attempted to close the loopholes in the
Sherman Act, and terminate the growth of monopoly in its
earliest stages. The following practices were declared un-
lawful when the effect was to substantially lesson competi-
tion or create tendencies toward monopolies: (1) price
discrimination, (2) tying clauses and exclusive dealing
arrangements
, (3) acquisition of stock in competing companies,
331
and (4) interlocking directorates among competing firms.
The Federal Trade Commission Act established five full
time commissioners with quasi-judicial power, and among
other things, outlawed unfair methods of competition. How-
ever, it left to the Commission the problem of defining what
332
were "unfair methods."
Although these three acts form the nucleus of U. S.
antitrust policy, the implementation of the law through the
years has been greatly affected by the interpretation of the
courts. Decisions have tended to indicate that market dom-
inance itself is grounds for antitrust action. "Restraint
of trade" has been interpreted as "unreasonable" restraint
of trade, with the term "unreasonable" not defined. Monopoly
power has been adjudged to be "power or ability to fix prices
in a market, or exclude competition from ...," but no simple
definition of "market" and no means of measuring monopoly
333






The actions taken against firms found guilty of antitrust
violations take many forms. The intent of the actions is
either to inhibit or prohibit certain undesirable business
conduct, or to channel and shape the market structure along
competitive lines so that desirable conduct and performance
will emerge automatically. Since there are no standard
penalties in antitrust cases, firms can never be sure of
what action will be taken if they pursue certain (illegal)
activities.
A. PREVIOUS ANTITRUST ACTIONS
As has been pointed out repeatedly in the study thus far,
IBM was the dominant firm first in the tabulating machine
industry and then in the computer manufacturing industry.
Not surprisingly, the Justice Department, as well as com-
peting manufacturers, have shown a continuing interest in
IBM's business practices and its share of the market.
1. The 1936 Conviction
In 1932, the United States filed an antitrust suit
against IBM and Remington Rand, Inc. , charging that they
had unreasonably restrained and monopolized interstate trade
and commerce in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
The federal government charged that: (1) IBM and
Remington Rand had entered into an agreement to sell punched
cards only to lessees of their card handling equipment, and
not to solicit business for cards from any user of the other
party's machines, (2) both parties would not sell their
machines, but would only lease them, and (3) the lease contract
190

required that the punched cards used in the machines be
purchased exclusively from the lessor (tying clause) , or
that additional rental be paid for the machines. These
acts constituted restraint of trade, and had resulted in the
formation of a monopoly. IBM and Remington Rand owned sub-
stantially all of the card processing machines used in the
United States. IBM alone had under lease 85.7% of the tab
machines, 86.1% of the sorting machines and 81.6% of all
punches.
The case came to trial in 1934. By then, the IBM/
Remington Rand agreement had been terminated , and that cha::ge
was therefore cancelled by stipulation. Remington Rand
chose not to enter the proceedings, and agreed to consent to
the finding against IBM. At the trial, IBM argued that its
insistence on the use of IBM cards; constituted a reasonable
control, that only IBM could manufacture cards meeting
specifications, and that defects in cards would lead to bad
performance, increased maintenance and loss of customer
335
"goodwill". ~ In previous cases involving "tying clauses"
of the Clayton Act, the court had been willing to consider
336
such extenuating circumstances. The issue in this in-
stance, however, was whether competition had been substan-
tially lessoned. The facts indicated that except for IBM
and Remington Rand, where the situation had been mutually
I'M
Rodgers, p. 129-130; and Neale, A. D. , The Antitrust Laws
of the United States , Cambridge at the University Press,
1960, p. 287.
335Rodgers, p. 129-130; and Neale, p. 287-288.
Scherer
, p. 5 06.
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stabilized, there was none (competition). The court returned
337
a finding of guilty.
In the appeal before the Supreme Court in 1936, the
decision was affirmed. IBM argued that since the condition
contained in the leases did not extend beyond the monopoly
acquired by patents, the leases wece lawful. The court
pointed out that the Clayton Act made tying clauses unlawful
whether the machine involved was patented or unpatented. The
Act did not purport to deny patent protection, but it did
338prohibit the benefit of a tying condition. Regarding the
contention that tying clauses were necessary to protect
"goodwill", the court noted that others, namely the federal
government, were capable of manufacturing suitable cards at
339
substantially less cost than the price charges by IBM.
IBM was required to discontinue the required use of
its own cards, but was allowed to require the cards to meet
minimum standards. It was further permitted to continue its
, , . . 340lease-only policy.
The outcome proved to be a hollow victory for the
Justice Department. IBM prescribed highly stringent stand-
ards for cards used in its machines, and since it held the
patents on the superior automatic rotary card press, no
341
other company could produce cards to meet its specifications.
337Rodgers, p. 129-130.
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2. The 1956 Decree
In 1947 , the Justice Department began a new inves-
tigation, this time in an effort to eliminate the lease-only
policy, and make the card press patents available to other
342
companies. In 1950, after three years of investigation,
the Justice officials made it known they would be willing
to accept, an IBM agreement to license its patents for
reasonable charges. IBM refused and the investigation
34-3
continued.
The civil antitrust suit was filed by the Justice
Department on January 21, 1952, charging that IBM had vio-
lated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by attempting to
monopolize and monopolizing interstate trade and commerce
344in the tabulating industry. The complaint alleged that.
IBM was the largest tabulating machine manufacturer in the-.
world, that it owned more than 90% of all the tabulating
machines in the U. S. , and that it manufactured and sold
345
about 90% of all the tabulating cards sold in the U. S.
The government charged that the heart of IBM'-s domination
was its patent pool of several thousand essential patents




U.S. v. International Business Machine Corporation,
Civil Action No. 69 CIV. 200 filed January 14, 1969, in
the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York, p. 5. Hereafter cited as "U.S. v. IBM, 1969".
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IBM obliged the lessee of its equipment to take a package
346including instruction, repair, and service by IBM.
Even after filing suit, a continuing attempt was
made to settle out of court through the formal process of
a consent, decree. A consent decree leaves unresolved the
question of guilt or innocence, but its terms are binding
once approved by a federal court. Although IBM was re-
portedly spending $3 million per year in preparation of its
347defense, it opposed the out-of-court proceeding.
A strikingly similar case was being fought in the
courts, at this same time, by the United Shoe Company. In
1953, a Massachusetts court found against United Shoe-, and
required it to sell (vice lease only) its equipment, offer
only short term rentals, and license all its patents at
reasonable royalties. The decision was upheld by the
348Supreme Court in 1954.
Early in 1956, Thomas Watson Jr., president of IBM,
signed the consent decree. Terms of the decree required
IBM to sell its tabulating machines at reasonable prices
not substantially more advantageous to IBM than lease
charges; provide maintenance and repairs at reasonable
and non-discriminatory prices; and sell, at reasonable
Ibid .
Rodgers, W. D. , "Is It Trust Busting or Window Dressing?"
The Reporter , 1 November 1956. Rodgers, W. D. is not






° °Sharpe, p. 249.
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prices, up to thirty rotary presses each year from 1956 to
1961. IEM was still permitted to require the use of cards
meeting certain standards, but the forced sale of its card
presses would enable other companies to meet the specifi-
cations. Additionally, the decree required IBM to set up
its Service Bureau Corporation as a separate subsidiary.
The S.B.C. operated some 150 centers that did computing
service on a fee basis. Finally, IBM was required to prove
to the courts that competitive conditions existed in the
tabulating card market, or divest itself of all manufacturing
349
capability in excess of 50% of the U. S. total before 1962.
]n most respects, the outcome was considered success-
ful. The terms of the decree did open the manufacture of
punched cards to the competition, and allowed other com-
panies to get started in the tabulating card field. By
mid-1960, IBM no longer held a monopoly in the manufacture
350
of tabulating cards. Unfortunately, certain weaknesses
were inherent in the mechanism of the consent decree. The
decree was not specific as to what constituted reasonable
prices. It gave IBM the chance to be evasive, and if
Justice officials determined that the coporation was not
living up to the terms of the decree, their only recourse
349
Ibid
. , p. .249-251.
350
Ibid
. , p. 251; and "The Impact of Two Historic Antitrust
Actions," Business Week , 4 February 1956, p. 56.
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would be to institute court proceedings. These same weak-
nesses exist in almost any consent decree, and accordingly,
competitors are often disappointed to see potentially




Although some persons may consider that the federal
government has been somewhat ineffective in controlling
monopoly since the Justice Department has failed to win
many court decisions over IBM, the consent decree of 1956
and the fear of antitrust action since that year have
significantly influenced IBM's moves in several areas.
Over the past several years, IBM has very carefully
filled some corporate executive positions with formidable
legal opponents for the federal government. In 1965, IBM
hired Burke Marshall, former U- S. Attorney General, as its
general counsel. In 1968, Nicholas de B. Katzenbach,
former U. S. Attorney General and Undersecretary of State,
was employed as company lawyer with the title of Vice
President. Marshall is still with the company as a
352Corporation Vice President. ~ Finally in 1969, Cyrus
Vance, direct from the Paris peace talks and formerly








In mid-1968, the threat of Justice's action caused IBM
to transfer the marketing of its time-sharing subscriber
services from its Data Processing Division to its wholly
owned subsidiary, the Service Bureau Corporation. Com-
petitors had cried "unfair competition," since under the
terms of the consent decree, IBM had agreed to conduct its
service operation under a separate company that did not
354
use the IBM name.
Later, in October, IBM backed down from some proposed
increased charges for equipment maintenance. Complaints
had come from the computer leasing firms, who would have
355been most affected by the increased prices.
In a retrospective analysis of the 1956 decree, it is
interesting to note that although some of the terms applied
permanently, the first ten years were apparently considered
the most crucial. The terms give a distinct impression
that the government believed that after a decade the matter
should be re-examined. Whether or not it was their original
intent, the Department of Justice did begin a new probe of
356IBM practices in January 1967.
1. Control Data Suit
Some of IBM' s competitors could not wait any longer
for Justice to act, or perhaps were not at all sure that
354Drattell, Alan, "... and Now a Word from No. 1," Business





Justice would act, and therefore, on December 11, 1968,
Control Data Corporation filed suit against IBM, charging
violation of the Sherman Act. Control Data's action was
merely the first in a series of li.tigations against IBM,
as 1969 became known in the industry as the year of the
lawsuit
.
Four years earlier, when Control Data had intro-
duced its models 6600 and 6800 computers, the largest
machines of their type in the world , IBM retaliated with
the announcement of its own super-computer, the 360/91.
(Many of CDC ' s prospective customers signed up for the
series 90, or at least postponed making a decision on the
6600.) When the 360/91 was slow in production, failed to
meet its announced specifications, and was cancelled after
only a few were delivered, Control Data's president,
William Norris, suspected that IBM had marketed a phantom
357
computer to eliminate the competition.
In December of 1968 , Control Data announced their
newest and largest super-computer, the 7600. Obviously
not wanting a repetition of the battle with the 360/91,
Norris charged IBM with monopolistic practices, and asked
the government for treble damages, injuctive relief, and
358possible dissolution or divestiture.
357
" Tackling, " p. 77.
358Control Data Corporation v. International Business
Machines Corporation, a Civil Action filed December 11,
1968, in the U. S. District court of the United States
for the District of Minnesota, Third Division, p. 11.
Hereafter cited as "CDC v. IBM, 1968".
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The complaint charged IBM with 37 violations of tha
Sherman Act including discriminatory discounts, free
technical services for favored customers, reciprocal
buying power, intimidating customers' procurement person-
nel, direct entry into the time-sharing service business,
false disparagement of competitors, and "misrepresenting
the status and performance" of its own prematurely
announced models - an obvious reference to the 360/91.
IBM promised to "vigorously defend" itself against,
the charges, pointing out that the industry, contrary to the
allegations , was one of the most fiercely competitive in the
nation and included some of the country's most powerful com-
panies. (In 1967, the $5.9 billion market included Sperry
Rand with 5.8%, Honeywell with 5.4%, General Electric with
4.1%, Control Data with 3.4%, RCA with 3.0%, NCR with 2.4%,
3 59
and Burroughs with 1.8%. IBM held the lead with 72.9%.) '
IBM further noted that Control Data was a striking illus-
tration of an IBM competitor that had experienced phenomenal
success, In less than eleven years, Control. Data' s assets
and revenues had grown to $465 million and $387 million
4-' i 360respectively.
Although few people anticipated that the Control
Data suit would result in the dissolution of IBM, they
rightly expected that it might prevent premature announce-
ments of overstated capabilities.
359







2. Su it by Data Processing Financial & General
Corporation
On January 3, 1969, Data Processing Financial &
General, a New York computer leasing company, filed a 39
page complaint against IBM in the federal district court
of the Southern District of New York, alleging violations
of antitrust laws, the consent decree of 1956, and state
unfair competition laws. DPF&G claimed that bundling (i.e.,
combining software, maintenance, education, and engineering
services under a single unseparable price for equipment)
,
along with discriminatory maintenance policies, and intimi-
dation of users planning to acquire competitive peripheral
equipment.: had restrained competition. It also charged that
an increasing gap between purchase and rental prices on new
machines, and higher maintenance prices on purchased systems,
were violations of the consent decree which required sale as




The complaint asked for treble damages of more than
a billion dollars, and more significantly demanded a
divestiture from IBM 1 s manufacturing activity of its soft-
ware , maintenance, and leasing operations. DPF&G hoped to
split IBM into four separate corporations, only one of which
o r o
could use the name IBM.
362
Pantages, Angeline, "Sweet Sue: Another Firm Takes a
Swing at IBM and Justice May Leave Neutral Corner,"







One effect of the suit by DPF&G, as with the previ-
ous charges by Control Data, was the required opening of
IBM files to the plaintiffs. It was considered likely that
all IBM documents and accounting records would go into a
"national depository" to which all parties to the antitrust
proceedings would have access.
In August of 197 0, DPF&G dropped their suit and
settled out of court with IBM. The settlement, apparently
forced by financial strain within DPF&G, provided for the
company t.o be reimbursed by IBM for the legal costs incurred
in the lawsuit. In addition, IBM agreed to refinance DPF&G 1 s
$42 million debt to IBM by extending the payment period at. the
existing interest rate. The debt was incurred in the purchase
of IBM computers. DPF&G appeared relieved over the elimin-
365
ation of the burden of the suit.
3 . The Justice Department Suit
On January 17 , in the waning hours of the Johnson
administration, Attorney General Ramsey Clark and the
Department of Justice filed a major antitrust action against
IBM in the U. S. District Court of the Southern District of
New York. Although only twelve pages, it covered the major
complaints contained in the previous suits by Control Data
and DPF&G, but limited itself to monopoly charges with no
4. • 1 u
366
reference to improper conduct.
364Ibid
. , p. 102.
16S
"Data Processing, IBM End Antitrust Dispute, Settle Out
of Court," Wall Street Journal , -1 September 1970, p. 4.
366U.S. v. IBM, 1969, p. 7-9.
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Specif ically , the claim spelled out four ways in
which IBM allegedly inhibited the competition in violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: (1) its single pricing
policy, '2) announcing new models before they were ready,
(3) marketing models with unusually low profit expectations
,
3 r —\
and (4) granting discriminatory allowances for universities.
The government "prayed" that IBM be required to refrain from
these aces leading toward monopoly and be subject to such
divorcement, divestiture, and reorganization as the court
may consider necessary to restore competitive conditions
4- 4-1 • A *. 368to the industry.
Reactions to the Justice Department suit were some-
what bewildering and not completely anticipated. IBM had
already announced that it was going to make an announcement
in July about pricing, but it was still the responsibility
of the courts or a decree to permanently seal the IBM
unbundled prices. Surprisingly, IBM competitors began to
have second thoughts about the possible effects of the
federal, action.
Since the Sherman Act suit was a structural suit,
it was bound to change the organization of the industry,
determine IBM's share in it, and predestine which com-
petitors would die or grow. Would four separate IBM's
grow to evenlop an even larger per cent of the market?
"Yapping , " p. 67
.
368
U.S. v. IBM, 1969, p. 10-11
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Without the special allowances, many universities would
not have been able to afford the equipment and research
which helped to advance the technology. If IBM were en-
joined from announcing new computers well in advance of
delivery, competitors who followed the lead of IBM in
developing compatible computers and peripherals would be
369the ones to suffer most from the shortened lead time.
Some experts feel that Justice will not try to win
the case but will settle for another consent decree, since:
a court victory would open up IBM to treble damage claims
from everyone, which would be detrimental to consumers and
370
competitors alike. (Consent decrees, unlike court
decisions, cannot be used as evidence in subsequent
proceedings.
)
Finally, IBM's adroit shifting of its engineering
and marketing efforts from tab machines to computers fol-
lowing the consent decree of 1956, resulted in the terms
of the decree being somewhat less than effective with
respect to the new market. Similarly, since the current
Justice action will likely take years to prosecute, the
court faces a major problem of finding a solution which
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4 . Action by Applied Data Research and Programmatics
In April of 1969, Applied Data Research, Inc., a
Princeton, New Jersey software firm, filed the fourth in
what appeared to be a continuing series of suits against
IBM. Filed in the Southern District Court of New York,
the complaint alleged violations of both the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, the consent decree of 1956, and the unfair
competition laws. Among the several allegations, ADR's
parochia?. interest in software patents also emerged. The
charges alleged patent misuse, in that- IBM had threatened
to enforce its patents against the software companies, and
fraud against the U. S. Patent Office, in that IBM had
37 2
applied cor patents on software disguised as hardware.
ADR asked the court to award treble damages amounting
to over $900 million, and to have IBM divest itself of soft-
ware manufacturing, price its software separately in the
meantime, and rebate to customers the price of software
acquired free with the IBM equipment. ADR requested an
amount of $3.57 billion be set aside by IBM for these
i * 373rebates.
The following month, Programmatics, Inc., a Los
Angeles software firm, tried a different tact by seeking
an injunction to prevent IBM from distributing without
37?Pantages , "Thin Defense," p. 121.
373
"IBM Hit with Fourth Civil Antitrust Suit as a Software
Concern Alleges Monopoly," Wall Street Journal ,
23 April 1969, p. 5.
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charge a software package with which Programmatic ' s own
program was incompatible. The company claimed that IBM
374developed the new program to shut it out of the market.
The injunction was denied, Programmatics appealed,
and its case was scheduled to be heard on a consolidated
basis with the cases of the other three commercial firms.
Later, however, Programmatics was acquired by Applied Data
Research, and in mid-1970, both companies with severe
financial difficulties agreed to dismiss their actions
against IBM. In return, IBM paid about $1.4 million to
ADR "for certain costs incurred in connection with the
375
matters at issue."
5 . Unbundling and More Lawsuits
In December of 1968, probably in reaction to the
new investigation begun by the Justice Department and the:
threat of antitrust suit, IBM announced that by July of
the following year, it would make a new policy statement
on pricing. True to its word, on June 23, IBM told the
industry that effective January 1970, it would unbundle
the pricing of hardware, software, maintenance, and
engineering. The details of this move, and the reactions
of other manufacturers, were discussed earlier in section
III of the study. The full impact of the maneuver on the
, v.
376industry remains to be seen.
"Applied Data, Unit and IBM Settle Antitrust Suits,"
The Wall Street Journal , 21 August 1970, p. 2.
375 xi •*Ibid .
Dahl, Aubrey, "1969: An Overview of the News," Data-
mation , January 1970, p. 91.
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The unbundling announcement kicked off two additional
suits against IBM. Motor Replacements, Inc., sued for $5
billion charging that because of unbundling IBM would no
longer provide without charge the contracted "lifetime
programming services." The action was a "class suit"
which would entitle all other IBM customers to collect
similar damages. Later, another suit was filed by Grey-
hound Computer Corporation charging that the three per
cent equipment price increase resulting from unbundling
would prevent it from conducting profitable operations ir
377the computer leasing market.
The battles spilled over into 1970, when the giant
of the copying machine industry, Xerox Corporation, filed
a patent infringement suit in Federal district court against
IBM upon the announcement of its first office copier. IBM
quite naturally responded that its new machine did not
371involve any of Xerox's patents or confidential information.
As recently as October of 1970, the actions con-
tinued to develop, as VIP Systems, a Washington-based firm
engaged in data processing and computer time-sharing filed
suit against IBM for antitrust violations. VIP is seeking
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The Wall Street Journal , 22 April 1970, p. 4.
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"VIP Names IBM in Antitrust Case," The San Francisco
Chronicle, 21 October 1970, p. 59.
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Still pending are the major litigations of Control




The Federal Communications Commission
As though the everpresent threat of antitrust
action ly the Justice Department were not enough, another
federal agency has considered the necessity of regulating
the computer industry. In November of 1966, the Federal
Communications Commission began an investigation to
determire whether computer time-sharing devices utilizing-
telephone lines should come under federal regulation and
be subject to FCC established rates. 380
In April of 197 0, the FCC ruled that the industry
need not be subjected to government regulation for the
time being
. An interesting aspect of the announcement
was the justification for the ruling. The FCC decided
that the computer industry should be exempt because their
activities currently were competitive. The decision
would be reviewed if significant structural changes
occurred in the industry.
C. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTITRUST
Even a detailed analysis of historical antitrust
actions fails to provide a clear answer as to what extent
government regulations has affected the structure and
3R0
"IBM Comes Under Antitrusters ' Gaze," Business Week
,
14 January 1967, p. 34.
3R 1
"FCC Disclaims Need to Regulate Data Processing," The
Wall Street Journal , 3 April 197 0, p. 5.
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conduct of the computer industry. It is difficult to
determine whether the natural market mechanism or public
policy has been the more influencial force. Both have
played significant roles in shaping the industry as it
exists today.
Obviously the success of the Department of Justice in
the courts has been limited, but: the omnipresent threat
of litigation by the federal government has certainly been
effective in motivating the behavior of the dominant firm
in the industry.
IBM watchers have observed even a slight reduction in
the share of the market held by the giant. Although, IBM
competitors may have increased their efficiency at capturing
a larger percentage of the trade, it is just as probable
that IBM is softening its effort in order to slide just
under that precedent-established critical level of 70%.
Further, IBM's top management .has adopted a somewhat
protective attitude toward their competition. Although
the level of IBM profits would easily permit some signifi-
cant price cuts, such a move would undoubtedly push some
of the smaller companies out of the profit-making range
entirely. IBM, sensitive to the close scrutiny given it
by Justice, prefers to keep prices high in order not to
drive its competitors out of the industry.
Although IBM emphasized that unbundling had been in
its plans for months prior to the siege of antitrust
suits which began to bombard it in 1969, the separate
208

pricing policy unquestionably was precipitated by the
threat and anticipation of monopolization litigation.
Millions of dollars and thousands of man hours have
been spent by IBM in preparation of a "vigorous defense."
These were resources that might otherwise have been
applied to the business of manufacturing computers.
Millions of dollars have been paid to competing companies
in out-of-court settlements. Additionally, as a result
of the multitude of litigation initiated in 1969, more
of the private secrets and privileged data about IBM-
will not be known than ever before, as the courts made
available to plaintiffs all IBM accounting records and
files.
Although the threat of federal action has measurably
influenced the industry, the successful litigations have
had a somewhat less significant effect. As was mentioned
earlier, the problem of court proceedings, or even con-
sent decrees, in a dynamic industry is that the decisions
and rulings are often outstripped by technology. The
issues of the 1930 ' s and 1950' s involving tabulating
machines and punched cards became relatively insignifi-
cant in the industry of computer manufacturing. Similarly,
the issues under adjudication today may be totally irrele-
vant in future years as the emphasis shifts to the areas
of time-sharing, service bureaus, and possibly computer
utilities
.
Finally, most competitor suits and all complaints by
the Justice Department routinely "pray" for divorce,
209

divestiture and dissolution of the goliath, IBM. Should
this goE.l ever be accomplished , and IBM be broken up
into separate companies, the prooable results would be
contrary to the wishes of any other member of the industry
Many experts suggest that, just as did "Rockefeller's oil
monopoly, the fragments can be counted on to grow in size
and market dominance separately, perhaps to greater range
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